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This thesis investigates the implications of fiscal federalism on the equitable 
distribution of primary health care resources in South Africa. The study evaluates the 
processes and criteria for intergovernmental and sector budgeting, the influence of 
key stakeholders, community involvement in PHC budgeting, and policy objectives of 
the health sector to assess how they impact on the realisation of an equitable 
distribution of PHC resources.  
 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses was employed in the study. 
Quantitative analysis of health expenditure and health need data was used to assess 
whether the distribution of PHC resources has become more or less equitable. Health 
districts were the units of analysis. Deprivation indices were generated using principal 
components analysis for each district from demographic and socio-economic 
variables. The deprivation index was used as a proxy for relative need at the level of 
districts, and was compared with non-hospital PHC per capita expenditure using 
regression analysis. This analysis was carried out for per capita PHC from 2001 to 
2007. Data on the process for intergovernmental fiscal arrangements and budgeting 
for health was collected through review of government publications and interviews 
with government officials. These were analysed thematically. 
 
Literature on the subject predicts that if lower levels of government have considerable 
autonomy in determining primary health care allocations, there is a greater scope for 
inequities in the distribution of primary health care resources. However, the results of 
the study are contrary to expectations.  Although, the introduction of fiscal federalism 
in South Africa created an additional constraint to achieving a more equitable 
distribution of PHC resources, recent trends in primary health care allocations are 
more equitable than in previous years. A growing public sector budget, consistent 
increases in health sector allocations, and overwhelming political support for equity in 
South Africa have been the key reasons for the shifts towards a more equitable 
distribution of primary health care resources. These findings form the main 
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The transfer of fiscal authority to lower levels of government has become a global 
trend.  In many countries this move has been motivated by the potential for increased 
accountability and efficiency in pubic service delivery. In others, this has resulted 
more as a reflection of political evolution towards a more democratic society (Ter-
Minassian, 1997, de Mello JR, 2000, Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989, Bird and 
Vailliancourt, 1997).  
 
A key concern however, is that the introduction of fiscal federalism
1
 is a reform not 
undertaken primarily with health sector considerations. A major concern for the health 
sector is that the transfer of expenditure responsibilities to lower levels of government 
can have adverse effects on the equitable distribution of financial distributions 
between local jurisdictions (Okorafor and Thomas, 2007, McIntyre et al., 1998). 
Where lower levels of government have considerable autonomy in determining 
resource allocation, there is less influence from the centre to ensure a more equitable 
(or at least uniform) distribution of resources for health sector programmes. This 
study investigates the impact of fiscal federalism on the equitable distribution of 




                                                 
1
 Fiscal federalism refers to a government system characterised by different levels of government, each 
with fiscal authority and functions. Fiscal federalism is a form of decentralisation that involves the 
transfer of fiscal authority from the centre to lower levels of government. Each level of government has 
some autonomy in revenue generation and expenditure of public funds. A full discussion of fiscal 












South Africa has been referred to as one of the world‟s most unequal societies (Bloom 
and McIntyre, 1998). This is largely as a result of apartheid policies that were 
instituted in South Africa from 1948 to 1994. These policies advocated the provision 
of different levels of social services to each racial group (ibid). These policies also 
created unequal opportunities for different racial groups, resulting in large disparities 
in socio-economic status.  
 
The first democratic government elected in 1994 in South Africa set out to reduce 
geographic inequities in the provision and financing of all public services entrenched 
by the apartheid regime. At that time, the public health sector was fragmented, and 
there were huge inequities in provision and access to public health services. This was 
alongside massive disparities in health status. The South African Government, as 
outlined in the White Paper for the Transformation of the Health System, was 
determined to pursue a unified health sector with the fundamental goal of equity 
(African National Congress, 1994; Gilson et al., 1999, Okorafor et al., 2003, Thomas 
et al., 2003).  
 
Considerable progress was made in reallocating health budgets between provinces 
during the first two years after the 1994 elections when provincial budgets were 
determined by the national government through the Health Function Committee. The 
Health Function Committee was a national committee that allocated health care 
resources to different provinces within the country while provinces where 












In 1996, South Africa adopted a new constitution, and with it, a fiscal federal system. 
With the move to fiscal federalism, provinces were allocated global budgets using a 
population based formula and could themselves determine the allocation between 
different sectors/functions. Following this, there was less progress in addressing inter-
provincial inequities in health budgets (McIntyre et al., 1998).   
 
1.1.1 Fiscal Federalism in South Africa 
 
Since 1996, South Africa has operated under a fiscal federal system with three levels 
of government – the national, provincial and local municipality levels. This fiscal 
federal system is characterised by significant decentralisation
2
 of powers and 
functions, including budgeting, to provinces and municipalities. There are nine 
provinces, each with their own legislatures and executive committees, as well as 
administrative structures. These provinces are accountable to provincial legislatures 
and the 283 local governments (also referred to as local municipalities) are 
responsible to councils (National Treasury, 2001).  
 
Local municipality functions involve services such as electricity, water and sanitation, 
but they also provide public goods such as municipal and household infrastructure, 
streets, street lights and refuse collection. Provincial governments are exclusively 
responsible for functions such as local economic development, provincial roads, 
ambulance services and abattoirs. The national government is responsible for 
functions such as defence, justice, correctional services and foreign affairs. The 
constitution stipulates certain functions that are the joint responsibility of the 
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 Decentralisation refers to the transfer of authority from the centre to peripheral units. Full discussion 











provincial government and the national government. These include education, health 
services, agriculture, disaster management, road traffic regulation and tourism
3
 
(National Treasury, 2001). In practice, national government‟s role in these areas of 
joint responsibility with provinces is primarily to determine policy, while provincial 
governments shape some policy and have a considerable role in implementation.  
 
The South African fiscal system is based on a revenue-sharing model
4
. The national 
government collects most of the revenue, while lower levels of government are 
responsible for implementing most of the services. This results in a fiscal gap, 
because the revenue generated by provinces and local municipalities is less than the 
expenditure budget they require to deliver on the functions they are responsible for.  
This fiscal shortfall is addressed through financial transfers from the national 
government to the lower levels of government. These transfers are in the form of 
specific purpose grants and general purpose grants; referred to in South Africa as 
conditional grants
5
 and equitable shares grants respectively (National Treasury, 2001).  
 
1.1.2 Fiscal Arrangements within the Health Sector 
Provinces are largely responsible for the provision and financing of public health care 
services, and are heavily dependent on transfers from the national government. 
However, most of the transfers to provinces are in the form of general purpose grants, 
allowing the provinces significant autonomy in determining how much to spend on 
health sector programmes. Much of the operational decision-making in health care 
delivery, including the allocation of resources, is decentralised to the provincial level, 
                                                 
3
 Full detail of the functions of the different tiers of government is described in Chapter 4 
4
 Full details of revenue sharing and expenditure responsibilities are presented in Chapter 4. 
5
 Conditional grants are grants from the national government to lower levels of government which are 











with the National Department of Health (NDoH) retaining responsibility only for 
national policy making and the development of norms and standards to ensure 
equitable and affordable health care provision across provinces. The NDoH does have 
some power over resource allocation through conditional grants, which fund some 
health programmes (Doherty et al., 2002). Conditional grants are meant to support the 
delivery of services that are considered to be national priorities 
 
Local municipalities have traditionally had the responsible for providing preventive 
PHC services and infectious disease control. However, the 2003 National Health Act 
brought about significant changes in the provision of PHC. First, the National Health 
Act defined municipal health services
6
 to encompass only environmental health 
services. Secondly, the authority for providing PHC services was specified as the 
responsibility of provinces. And thirdly, the Act established a district health system 
(DHS) through which the provinces where to deliver PHC (Republic of South Africa, 
2004).  
 
By design, the district health system (DHS) is a lower level of provincial health 
authority. Essentially, the South African DHS is strictly an extension of the provincial 
governmental administration. This is a distinguishing feature of the South African 
DHS (Barron and Asia, 2001). International literature on the subject defines a DHS to 
include health care activities of non-governmental organisations, including self-care. 
See Box 1.1 for the definition of a district health system by the World Health 
Organisation. 
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Currently, there are 52 health districts in South Africa. Under the DHS system, there 
are three types of districts. The type A districts are metropolitan districts, while the 
rest are type C districts. Each of theses district municipalities (A and C) are sub-
divided into type B municipalities (Barron and Asia, 2001), also referred to as sub-
district municipalities.  
 
Box 1.1 Definition of a District Health System 
World Health Organisation‟s definition: “A district health system based on primary 
health care is a more or less self-contained segment of the national health system. It 
comprises first and foremost a well defined population living within a clearly 
delineated administrative and geographic area. It includes all the relevant health care 
activities in the area, whether government or otherwise. It therefore consists of a large 
variety of interrelated elements that contribute to health in homes, schools, 
workplaces, communities, the health sector, and related social economic sectors. It 
includes self-care and all health care personnel and facilities. Whether governmental 
or nongovernmental, up to and including the hospital at the first referral level, and 
appropriate support services, such as laboratory, diagnostic, and logistic support. It 
will be most effective if coordinated by an appropriately trained health officer 
working to ensure as comprehensive a range as possible of promotive, preventive, 
curative and rehabilitative health activities (Tarimo, 1991). 
 
 
1.2. Inequities in Health Care Financing 
Although the government has been committed to reducing disparities in provision and 
access to health services, previous research in the area has shown that there still exist 
gross inequities in the financing of health care across and within provinces (McIntyre, 
1994, McIntyre et al., 1995, Doherty and van den Heever, 1997, Thomas et al., 2003, 
Brijlal et al., 1997, Daviaud et al., 2000). For example, in the fiscal year 2003/04, 
budgeted per capita provincial health care expenditure was R627 in Limpopo 
Province compared to R1,261 and R1,668 in the Western Cape and Gauteng 












this study looks at a more specific aspect of health care: Primary Health Care. The 
reason for focusing on PHC
7
 is because it is identified by health policy in South 
Africa as critical in the transformation of the public health system (African National 
Congress, 1994). Also, communicable diseases, which contribute significantly to the 
burden of ill-health in South Africa (Bradshaw et al., 2003) are potentially 
preventable and could be effectively treated at a PHC level.  
 
Table 1.1 below provides a snapshot of the level of inequities in PHC funding by 
provinces during the 2002/03 financial year. There is a wide variation of provincial 
PHC expenditure from the national average – ranging from R70 per capita in 
Limpopo province to R238 per capita in Gauteng. The problem with this distribution 
of PHC expenditure is that those provinces with the greatest burden of ill-health and 
the highest level of social and material deprivation have the lowest PHC expenditure 
per-capita (McIntyre and Okorafor, 2003). Research has shown that although the 
variation in per capita PHC expenditure has reduced consistently since the 1997/98 
financial year, the rate of convergence appears to be too slow to achieve equity within 
an „acceptable‟ time frame (Okorafor et al., 2003).  
 
Table 1.1 Out-of-Hospital Primary Health Care Expenditure by Provinces (2002/03)* 
Province PHC expenditure per capita 
Eastern Cape 91 
Free State 183 
Gauteng 238 
KwaZulu Natal 163 
Limpopo 70 
Mpumalanga 122 
Nothern Cape 199 
North West 145 
Western Cape 213 
National Average 148 
*Figures from Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003 and are based on 2003 prices. 
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Within a fiscal federal context, where provinces have considerable autonomy in 
determining budget allocation to health services and within that, to PHC services, the 
question of how to influence provincial level decision-making to achieve equity is a 
key one. The South African Government had in the past proposed a nationwide PHC 
package (National Department of Health, 2002, National Department of Health, 
2003), which outlined how much was required to provide comprehensive PHC 
services to each individual in the country. The PHC package has the potential to 
promote a more uniform level of PHC service provision across provinces. It is seen as 
an important tool for provincial Departments of Health to strengthen their 
negotiations in provincial budgetary forums for equitable allocations to the health 
sector and to PHC in particular. Whether this has been successful, is yet to be 
determined. This study will review the effectiveness of various initiatives employed 
within the South Africa context to promote the equitable distribution of PHC 
allocation. 
 
1.3. Problem Statement and Objectives 
Research has shown that the provinces with greater need for additional PHC resources 
have lower PHC expenditure per capita than provinces that have less need (Thomas et 
al., 2003). Such inequities also exist in PHC financing within the different provinces:  
districts with relatively higher health needs also receive less PHC funding per capita 
than districts with lower health needs (Thomas et al., 2003, McIntyre and Okorafor, 
2003).  This pattern of PHC financing is clearly inequitable and unfair; because the 
losers are the poorer households, who are supposed to be the targeted beneficiaries of 











federalism, it appeared that there had been less progress in reducing the inequities in 
health budgets across provinces. This movement to fiscal federalism serves as a good 
point of reference to investigate the inequitable distribution of PHC resources.  
 
The overall aim of this study is to investigate the implications of fiscal federalism in 
South Africa for the equitable distribution of PHC resources and how equity can be 
promoted in a fiscal federal context. More specifically, the study objectives are to 
undertake: 
 
1. A critical evaluation of the processes of fiscal transfers and the autonomy of sub-
national levels of government, and how they impact on equity in PHC 
expenditure. To achieve this, the study will critically evaluate the following 
transfer processes: 
 The vertical split of nationally collected revenue across the three tiers of 
government. 
 The horizontal split of revenue between provinces and the process of 
budget allocations to departments within provinces. 
 The process of transfers within the Provincial Department of Health to 
different health programmes, with special emphasis on PHC. 
 
The evaluation of these processes will include identifying: 
  Who is involved in the various processes and who has the most influence 
in decision-making, and why.  
 (b) What criteria are used for allocating resources and to what extent 











 (c) What information is utilised by decision-makers to identify areas of 
greatest need.  
 
Such analyses will help investigate the level of autonomy enjoyed by 
provincial authorities in determining the budget for PHC and the effect this 
has on the equitable distribution of PHC resources. To assist this assessment, it 
will also be important to: 
 
a. Identify any guidelines or structures in place to ensure that provincial 
authorities adhere to national guidelines on resource allocation; and assess 
the extent to which such guidelines influence resource allocation at the 
provincial level. 
b. Explore the likely impact of different types of centrally defined incentives 
(to achieve a more uniform PHC expenditure) on equity in PHC and 
autonomy of provincial authorities. 
c. Investigate the mechanisms to ensure that the priorities of the communities 
within provinces and districts feed into decision-making on PHC resource 
allocation. 
 
2. A review of the „equity‟ objectives of the health sector, particularly as they relate 
to PHC and current PHC expenditure patterns. Such equity objectives and the 
current resource allocation criteria and patterns will be evaluated to assess the 












3. An analysis of the factors that constrain or facilitate the realisation of an equitable 
distribution of PHC resources.  
 
4. Documentation of experiences of other countries operating a fiscal federal system 
in the equitable financing of health and PHC activities. 
 
5. The study will then propose recommendations and strategies for addressing the 
identified problems.  
 
1.4. Justification for the Study 
Investigating the problem of inequities in resource allocation of PHC through the lens 
of fiscal federalism is critical as it not only looks at inequities that potentially could 
arise, but reviews the entire decision-making processes that may lead to such 
inequities. The research will prove particularly useful to countries operating fiscal 
federal systems (including those with decentralised health systems), as it will 
highlight the constraints and facilitating factors for equitable financing within any 
sector in a system with decentralised decision-making.  
 
In most African countries, the transfer of power and authority to lower levels of the 
health sector has been motivated by the potential for increased efficiency, better 
quality of care and accountability (Gilson and Mills, 1995). Although it is recognised 
that decentralisation can have a positive influence on equity if it encourages the 
preferential allocation to remote, and usually rural areas, decentralisation can also 
have a negative influence on equity.  Factors such as : (1) inappropriate organisational 











in Cote D‟voire); and (3) inappropriate resource allocation to PHC activities (e.g. in 
Uganda) (Dugbatey, 1999) have rendered health systems unable to effectively 
establish a more effective and equitable distribution of health services. The problem 
of inappropriate resource allocation to PHC is common for most countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. Inappropriate financing of PHC usually arises from: (1) resource 
allocation for PHC being based on existing capacity rather than need; and (2) 
continued centralised control of hospital funding, protecting this portion of the 
national health budget at the expense of PHC (ibid). 
 
This is the first study to fully investigate the implications of intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements on the equitable financing of a health care service such as PHC. The 
study therefore is a pioneer in literature on equitable financing of PHC within a fiscal 
federal context. In this regard, emphasis is placed in the advancement of the literature 
on fiscal federalism. This makes the study even more relevant internationally. The 
study does not aim to cover the implications of all aspects of fiscal federalism on 
equity in financing PHC; rather the study takes on a more precise approach. The core 
focus of the study is around expenditure responsibilities at the sub-national 
government level, and how such decision-making processes influence the distribution 















1.5. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised into 8 chapters. A brief description of what is covered in 
subsequent chapters is presented: 
 
The first chapter (current chapter) has provided a brief overview of the South African 
governance and health system. In this chapter, the objectives of the study have been 
outlined, including the justification of the study. 
 
Chapter two presents a literature review. In this chapter, theoretical and empirical 
literature on key concepts used in the study such as primary health care, equity, need, 
resources allocation, fiscal federalism and decentralisation are reviewed and 
discussed. These are done with a view to come up with the most appropriate 
definitions of these concepts in the study. Also, in this chapter, the experience of 
selected countries (that operate under a fiscal federal system) in financing PHC is also 
reviewed. These provide the study with information on the how different 
intergovernmental arrangements have impacted on the equitable distribution of PHC 
allocations in other contexts. The review of these key concepts and the experiences of 
other countries form the basis for construction of a conceptual framework that will 
guide the methods and analysis used in the study. 
 
In the third chapter a conceptual framework is constructed based on reviewed 
literature. This chapter outlines a framework that depicts the effects of different 
factors (such as different intergovernmental financial transfer options, levels of 











equity in PHC allocations. The conceptual framework is used as a guide for analysing 
collected data. 
 
The fourth chapter provides a detailed description of the South African fiscal federal 
system, the health system and the nature of intergovernmental arrangements for the 
financing of PHC. The chapter also provides a brief history of fiscal federalism in 
South Africa.  
 
Chapter five details the methods used in the study. These include data collection 
techniques and sources, study sites, description of quantitative and qualitative 
analysis, themes for the analysis of qualitative data, and the limitations of the study.  
 
The sixth chapter focuses on the analysis of quantitative data. In this chapter, data on 
PHC expenditure at both province and district levels are compared to measures of 
need to assess the extent of equity in the distribution of finances for PHC. 
 
The seventh chapter focuses on the analysis of qualitative data. The data are analysed 
according to seven broad themes. These are: 
1. Processes and criteria for the vertical split of national collected revenue between 
government levels 
2. Process and criteria for allocations to individual provinces and sectors within 
provinces 
3. Influence of stakeholders 
4. Community participation 











6. Expenditure capacity and sufficiency of funds for PHC 
7. Understanding equity 
Although this chapter focuses mainly on the analysis of qualitative data, where 
necessary, this is complimented by quantitative analysis.  
 
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter. This chapter includes discussions on the results 
of the study, the conceptual framework and the South African context. This section 
basically summarises the outcome of the study. Also, based on the study‟s results, 
recommendations are made to the South African government on how to promote 
equity within its fiscal federal system. This chapter includes discussions and 
recommendations of a broader nature that are relevant for other countries that are 
operating a fiscal federal system and countries with decentralised health systems. In 
addition, the conclusion identifies gaps in the literature on equity and fiscal federalism 

















In this chapter, literature on the definition and conceptual understanding of key 
concepts such as equity, primary health care, and need are reviewed. This is to give 
the reader a clear perspective on the guiding principles of the research undertaken. 
Also reviewed are literature on fiscal federalism, intergovernmental relations and the 
experiences of selected fiscal federal systems in the financing of health and primary 
health care. In addition the literature review also provides the basis for the 
construction of a conceptual framework that guides the analysis of data collected for 
the study.  
 
2.1 Primary Health Care 
The origin of primary health care (PHC) can be traced back to 1920. This is when the 
term „primary care‟ was first used in reference to the organisation of a health services 
system. Primary health care was used in this context to describe the functions of a 
level of health care in the United Kingdom by Lord Dawson (Starfield, 1992, 
Maeseneer et al., 2007). Since then, PHC only received international attention in the 
late 1970s. 
 
PHC takes on different technical and political meanings for different health system 
settings and countries (World Health Organisation, 2000). Nevertheless, the World 
Health Organisation provides a description of what PHC should mean for each health 
system. This is based on the definition proposed at the 1978 International Conference 











service delivery. PHC is defined by level of care, philosophy and the set of services it 
provides. In terms of level, PHC is the first point of contact between the health system 
and the population it serves. This first point of contact could be at the level of health 
clinics, health centres or hospital ambulatory care. However, the level at which PHC 
is delivered is determined by the set of services considered essential (World Health 
Organisation, 2003). The set of services provided by a health system that is based on 
PHC focuses on improvement of the overall health of the population rather than just 
the treatment of disease (ibid). The PHC approach was to provide promotive, 
preventive, curative and rehabilitative health services (World Health Organisation, 
1978). 
 
As a philosophy, PHC subscribes to equity, sustainability, efficiency, acceptability 
and the universal coverage of all citizens with some basic set of health care services – 
a comprehensive approach. The philosophy of PHC promotes the active participation 
of the community that is served; inter-sectoral collaboration (especially the social 
sectors); and the use of appropriate and effective technologies (ibid). PHC, at that 
time was seen as the key strategy for achieving “health for all” by the year 2000.  
 
The PHC approach to health service delivery was promoted at that time as a result of 
a combination of factors experienced in many health systems, albeit to different 
degrees. In the late 1960s many health systems were experiencing high costs in 
providing health services. This was largely because the health systems were hospital 
based, and a large proportion of conditions treated in hospitals could have been 
managed by ambulatory care. Also, the hospital-based model used in most countries 











the majority of the poor and rural dwellers without access to health care. These 
pressures necessitated a radical change in health systems to make them more cost-
effective, equitable and accessible to populations they were to serve (World Health 
Organisation, 2000).  
 
However, many of the PHC programmes adopted by various countries were 
unsuccessful in achieving their intended goals. Identified constraints to the successful 
implementation of the PHC approach include: 
 Inadequate funding 
 Insufficient training of health workers and lack of equipment 
 Insufficient time for PHC workers to spend on prevention and community 
outreach 
 The quality of care at the primary care level was often very poor (World 
Health Organisation, 2000) 
In addition, the original model of PHC has been criticised for giving too little 
attention to peoples‟ actual health care needs and instead concentrating almost 
exclusively on their presumed needs (ibid). The concentration on presumed needs 
means that the PHC model was structured to provide a defined set of health 
interventions (across board) that did not directly stem from the actual demand for 
health care from the populations they served.  
 
Shortly after the adoption of the comprehensive PHC approach, and in response to the 
constraints posed by the original comprehensive PHC approach, the selective PHC 
approach was proposed. The selective PHC approach was to serve as an interim 











contended that the scope of the original (comprehensive) model in the context of 
resource constraints made it unattainable. This approach proposed a selective attack 
on any region‟s most severe public health problem to maximise health improvement, 
thus promoting vertical programmes. Although the use of this cost-effectiveness 
approach has contributed to global improvements in health, it has several 
shortcomings. Some of these are that: (1) it ignores the broader social context of 
development, treating health simply as the absence of disease; (2) the top-down 
approach which is characteristic of vertical programmes limits community 
participation and is contrary to the ideals of the PHC approach; (3) poor coordination 
of vertical programmes leads to redundancy, duplication and wastage of resources 
(Magnussen et al., 2004).   
 
This chapter does not attempt to compare the effectiveness of these two 
(comprehensive and selective) approaches. Nevertheless, a cursory overview of 
implementation of these approaches highlights the need for PHC initiatives to 
recognise the broader political, social, economic and health system infrastructure 
within which it is to function, while appreciating the importance of cost-effectiveness 
for maximisation of population health. In many cases, the PHC strategy has been 
adapted according to contextual health and socio-economic conditions. The 
understanding of PHC as the point of contact with the community and the 
population‟s gateway to the health system has been predominant in countries that 
have achieved adequate levels of basic health services (Kekki, 2003).  
 
While the PHC approach has had mixed results over the past three decades, recent 











a central feature of health systems. PHC is advocated as being important for human 
development. For example, Bengoa et al (2003) state that PHC is critical for the 
promotion of good health in any country, and that a well functioning and organised 
PHC system is important for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Indeed it has been argued that the PHC approach is the appropriate approach 
to achieving the two fundamental goals of health systems. These are: (1) the 
optimisation of health of the population; and (2) the minimisation of health disparities 
across population groups (Starfield, 1992). The basis for these arguments is discussed 
in turn.  
 
Evidence suggests that health systems that are oriented towards the PHC approach are 
more likely to deliver better health outcomes at lower costs (Macinko et al., 2003). In 
comparing PHC-oriented health systems and speciality-oriented health systems, 
Starfield (1992) argues that higher specialisation threatens the goals of equity. 
Specialised medical care is more expensive, and with limited resources and competing 
uses, it is more difficult to provide such services to the entire population. Also, 
specialised medical care is solely concerned with treating diseases and so cannot 
maximise population health as diseases rarely exist in isolation. The environments in 
which individuals live and work have a significant influence on their health status. 
The PHC approach requires less specialisation, and addresses the most common 
health problems through preventive, curative and rehabilitative services, while dealing 
with the context in which the illnesses exist.  
 
Other arguments for the PHC approach are that PHC is characterised by continuous 











other, fostering social cohesion within the communities. The organisation of PHC is 
less hierarchical and primary health care physicians are closer to the patient‟s milieu. 
The system is therefore inherently more adaptable to the changing needs of the 
community and the physicians are in a better position to appreciate social and 
environmental impacts on illness (Starfield, 1992, Maeseneer et al., 2007). These 
arguments suggest that a PHC-oriented health system is more effective in achieving 
the goals of a health system. 
 
The potential of PHC in promoting equity
8
 within the broader socio-economic, 
political and health system context is gaining renewed appreciation. The work of the 
Commission on Social Determinants of Health (2007) draws attention to the influence 
of broader societal conditions on health status, and how PHC can play a central role in 
achieving a more equitable distribution of population health. In their interim 
statement, the commission states that: „the condition in which people grow, live, work 
and age have a powerful influence on health … inequalities in these conditions lead to 
inequalities in health‟. These differences in conditions are usually defined along 
socio-economic axes; and those who are of lower socio-economic status generally 
suffer a greater burden of ill-health. According to this view, PHC can address the 
broader social determinants of health through universal access to health care, 
empowering the vulnerable groups and through social cohesion. This is because, PHC 
requires continuous care for health problems in all patients groups, irrespective of 
race, social class, religion, etc (Maeseneer et al., 2007).  
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As a community oriented approach, it not only deals with individual health problems, 
but also with the identification of community health related problems and the 
implementation of systematic interventions to deal with such problems (such as life-
style and improving living conditions). In order to effectively implement appropriate 
interventions, the PHC team works with other sectors such as education, housing, and 
labour. Inter-sectoral collaboration of this nature then fosters social cohesion in the 
community, which leads to empowerment of the people. This empowerment reduces 
the vulnerability of the population to factors that contribute to inequity in health 
(Commission on Social Determinants of Health, 2007, Maeseneer et al., 2007). 
Studies in the area have shown that  primary health care (in contrast to specialty care) 
is associated with improvements in population health and a more equitable 
distribution of health within populations (Starfield et al., 2005, Engstrom et al., 2001).  
 
However, as noted by Maeseneer et al (2007), certain policy measures should be put 
in place to enhance the impact of PHC on health equity and population health. In 
summary, these are: 
 Guaranteeing universal access through an adequate health system 
 Shifting away from vertical disease-oriented PHC programme to a horizontal 
community-oriented approach 
 Education, recruitment and retention of adequate staff 
 Providing PHC through a district health system 
 Organising the health system in an inter-sectoral network, with links to 












In all, strengthening PHC to impact more effectively on population health and equity 
requires political and financial commitment from the government. PHC is 
traditionally funded and provided for by the state. The governance structure, the 
nature of the health system and the process of public financing within the government 
structure can have a significant effect on the nature of policies for PHC, the size of 
financial resources made available to PHC, and how these resources are used – hence 
the performance of PHC.   
 
Fiscal federalism is a form of public governance structure that is characterised by the 
decentralisation of decision-making on revenue generation and expenditure 
responsibilities to lower levels of government.  Intuitively, and understandably, one 
may presume that under this dispensation, PHC has a better chance of achieving its 
goals of promoting health and achieving equity as fiscal federalism brings public 
decision-making closer to the community. However, the nature of intergovernmental 
relations and the level of government charged with the responsibility of providing 
PHC can have a powerful influence on the performance of PHC (particularly in 
achieving equity). It is the effect of this form of government structure on the financing 
of PHC that this dissertation investigates in the South African context.  
 
2.2 Equity Defined 
In this section, literature on equity in health is reviewed. The objective here is to come 
up with a definition of equity that will be used in this dissertation to assess health 












There are different perspectives on what equity means, and within the health system, 
what definition should guide the pursuit of equity and what should be distributed. This 
review has been limited to the distribution of resources, health, and rights. Literature 
on equity in the financing of health care was not covered. While this is a key aspect of 
equity in the area of health, this study focuses on equity in the distribution of health 
care resources across geographic areas. Equity in health care financing is concerned 
with the relative contribution of different socio-economic groups to the financing of 
health care. The study is not concerned with how finances are collected as this should 
not have any impact on the use of the finances. Equity definitions and perspectives 
reviewed are thus limited to those that are relevant to the allocation of health care 
resources across populations and geographic areas. Also, literature on procedural 
justice has been covered. This highlights the importance of processes of decision-
making and the characteristics of fair processes. 
 
Within the context of health and health care, equity has received much attention by 
policy makers and researchers (Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993). Despite the relatively 
high profile accorded to „equity‟ in health policy, there is no consensus on what 
equity means (Williams and Cookson, 2000, Peter, 2001, Whitehead, 1992). What is 
generally accepted is that equity is about „fairness‟ and „justice‟ (Braveman and 
Gruskin, 2003, Mooney, 2004, Mooney, 1983, Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993, Donaldson 
and Gerard, 1993) in the distribution of something (good, service, right, etc) across 
different individuals and/or groups in society. However, it is because justice and 
fairness are subjective concepts, in that they can be interpreted differently by different 
people in different settings (Braveman and Gruskin, 2003), that makes it difficult to 











forward by different authors reflect the varied views around the concept. A brief 
review of theories of justice provides some insight into different perspectives of 
equity. The discussion of theories of justice will include literature on both distributive 
and procedural justice. Distributive justice refers to fairness in the allocation or 
distribution of resources, while procedural justice is concerned with fairness in the 
decision-making process (Lucas et al., 2007). The different theories of justice 
reviewed include the Rawl‟s theory of justice, the libertarian, egalitarian and 
utilitarian perspectives of justice. 
 
First, and before reviewing the different perspectives on equity (including concepts of 
fairness and justice), it is important to distinguish between equity and equality. 
Equality is concerned with equal shares, which may not necessarily be a fair 
distribution. In health care for example, an equal distribution of access to services  
may not be a fair distribution of access as socio-economically disadvantaged groups 
should perhaps be given greater access in order to achieve a distribution that is 
considered equitable (Mooney, 1983). Equity is an ethical principle, such that the 
term „inequity‟ can carry with it an accusatory or morally charged tone. Hence, the 
term inequity and inequality are not synonymous. Inequalities refer strictly to 
differences in the quantity of some phenomenon across different individuals or 
groups, while inequity refers to differences in the quantity of some phenomenon 
across individuals or groups that are considered unfair (Braveman and Gruskin, 
2003). Subsequently, it is possible for inequality in the distribution of some 
phenomenon to be considered fair and therefore equitable. Equity is a major health 
policy focus in many countries because of consistent evidence that shows that those of 











afford health care. They are therefore caught in a vicious circle: poverty breeding ill-
health and ill-health maintaining or leading to poverty (Braveman, 2003; Wagstaff, 
2002; Davey Smith et al, 1990; Phillimore et al, 1994; Goldblatt, 1990). This is 
considered unfair. 
 
According to Rawls‟ theory of justice, there are two principles of justice (Gaertner, 
1994, Williams and Cookson, 2000). The first is that basic principles such as the right 
to vote and eligibility for public office, the right to property and freedom of speech, 
should be distributed equally and at the maximum level that is compatible with 
everyone enjoying the same level. Secondly, social and economic inequalities are to 
be arranged such that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged member 
of the society. These benefits are judged in terms of an index of primary goods, 
comprising basic liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth – to be 
satisfied sequentially (Gaertner, 1994, Williams and Cookson, 2000). It is the second 
principle that most holds interest for this study. In summary, the Rawlsian notion is 
that equity and justice is achieved if a society‟s arrangement (from any possible 
number of arrangements) maximises the benefits to the most disadvantaged (Olsen, 
1997). Justice is seen as undermined if society‟s main economic, social and political 
institutions require sacrifices from the worst-off groups purely to benefit the better-off 
groups (Peter, 2001). This theory however, does not include health as a primary good, 
or other „natural‟ goods such as intelligence and imagination. Goods included as 
primary goods are those that are distributed by societal structures and not by nature, 












Nevertheless, interpreting the Rawlsian notion of equity within health requires that the 
worst-off in society are prioritised. This could be in the form of providing them  with, 
for example, a decent basic minimum level of health care, and therefore a distribution 
of health care resources that promotes a minimum standard of health care is equitable 
(Gilson, 1998). This view allows for more consideration of the poor than the 
utilitarian perspective (discussed below) although it is also criticised (by egalitarians) 
on the basis that achieving an absolute minimum of health services for the poor is not 
enough. Richer members of the population still have the opportunity to maintain and 
even increase their relatively better access to and utilisation of health services, 
without sacrificing the health status of the worst-off. Another point of view on the 
theory is that the Rawlsian approach to health equity is an indirect approach, that 
identifies as unjust those class, race, gender or socio-geographic inequalities in health 
that originate in the basic structure of society and are the result of a social division of 
labour that benefits the better-off groups at the expense of the worse-off. Therefore, 
the basic objective is not to achieve a specific pattern of health outcomes, but a just 
basic structure of society. If the basic societal structure is just, then any (and all) 
distributions of health outcomes produced by this society are just.  
 
 The libertarian perspective emphasizes a respect for natural rights (the rights to life 
and possession), and consumer sovereignty and market forces in the distribution of 
health care resources and benefits (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993). As long as people 
acquire and transfer their holdings without violating the rights of others, their 
holdings are regarded as just. In the distribution of most economic goods, this view 
would receive support from most schools of thought. However, the distribution of 











most (Gilson, 1998). This is not surprising as health care is fundamentally necessary 
to good life. Essentially, an individual cannot flourish if s/he is dead or diseased. Care 
that postpones death, diminishes disease or eliminates destructive influences on the 
quality of life, improves the capacity for savouring all that life has to offer. If it is felt 
that all residents of a political jurisdiction ought to have equal opportunities for their 
lives to flourish, then it follows that health care is a good/service whose “right” 
distribution must be ensured (Culyer, 2001).  
 
The Utilitarian  perspective seeks to maximise the total sum of happiness or welfare 
(Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1993, Peter, 2001, Williams and Cookson, 2000).  
There are many brands of utilitarianism, but they all have three common features. 
First, consequentialism: things must be evaluated in terms of their consequences. 
Second, welfarism: consequences must be evaluated in terms of the welfare or utility 
of individual human beings; and third, sum-ranking: the overall evaluation must be 
based on the sum total of individual utilities in the relevant population (Williams and 
Cookson, 2000). Within health, this therefore suggests that if any pattern of 
distribution of, say, health care resources maximises overall health status within a 
population, it is equitable. The utilitarian perspective is criticised on the grounds that 
it ignores the distribution of utility across different individuals or groups (Peter, 
2001). With respect to equity in health, the utilitarian view is criticised for not 
allowing for special consideration of the poorest and most vulnerable (Gilson, 1998). 
Overall increases in health status for any given population can be achieved with little 
or no improvement in the health status of the worst-off. Indeed, overall health gains 
can be experienced, even with declines in the health status of poorer members of the 











overall utility but are considered unjust from a commonsense conception are ignored 
by this perspective (Olsen, 1997). Interestingly, utilitarianism yields a clear case for 
redistribution of a good or service if one assumes diminishing marginal utility of that 
good or service (Williams and Cookson, 2000). Maximisation of utility would then 
necessitate the redistribution of a good in favour of those with fewer of the good, as 
their marginal utility will be higher. 
 
The egalitarian perspective advocates for distribution of health care resources 
according to need. In the egalitarian view, access to health care is the right of every 
citizen and the distribution of health care should not be influenced by income and 
wealth. Egalitarians would judge equity by assessing the extent to which health care 
in practice is distributed according to need and financed according to ability to pay 
(Gilson, 1998, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1993). There is consistent evidence 
showing that socio-economically disadvantaged groups carry a heavier burden of ill-
health, have poorer survival chances and have less access to good quality health care 
(Power et al., 1991, Phillimore et al., 1994, Davey and Bartley, 1990, Wilkinson, 
1986, Townsend and Davidson, 1982, Braveman and Tarimo, 2002, Wagstaff, 2001). 
It is because of such evidence that the egalitarian perspective has gained popularity. 
Considering the huge socioeconomic inequalities within South Africa (McIntyre and 
Gilson, 2002, Bloom and McIntyre, 1998), this perspective is deemed most 
appropriate for assessing equity in the South African health system. It is this 
(egalitarian) perspective that therefore guides this research. Central to this perspective 
is that the distribution of health care resources should be done according to need. The 











especially for guiding health care resource distribution. The concept of need thus 
requires further discussion, and this will be addressed in the next section. 
 
Whether any of these perspectives or values forms the guiding principles for 
achieving equity within any health system, the problem of identifying an appropriate 
operational definition of equity based on measurable criteria remains (Braveman and 
Gruskin, 2003). In addressing this issue, a starting point would be to identify “what” 
is to be distributed fairly. Are health systems to be concerned with a fair or equal 
distribution of “health”, “health care”, or “opportunity” for maximising health status? 
Unfortunately, there is no agreement on “what” should be distributed equally (Culyer, 
2001).  
 
Amartya Sen‟s (1993) capabilities approach provides an alternative view on this 
subject. He proposed that in policy evaluation for societal arrangements, the 
appropriate information to assess is not individual utility, well-being or resources that 
people have access to, but something in between. It is what people can „do‟ and „be‟ 
and the quality of their life (their capabilities) that matters (Peter, 2001, Robeyns, 
2005). The various „doings‟ and „beings‟ are the „functionings‟ that a person can 
achieve but may decide not to.  According to this view, it is capabilities that should be 
distributed equally (Roemer, 1996). So, in health, what should be distributed equally 
is the capability to achieve different „functionings‟ such as being able to move around, 
not being tired, etc (Peter, 2001).   
 
This perspective on valuing the benefits of policy brings a new and relevant 











to which functionings should be included when assessing a particular social situation, 
but stresses that each case will require a process of weighing the relative importance 
of relevant functionings. This essentially involves value judgements about the 
weighting given to any particular functioning (ibid), and a largely subjective measure 
of, say health benefits to any individual or group. What is clear is that this perspective 
advocates for greater freedom (available choices) to individuals who, based on their 
socio-economic status for example, have fewer choices or functionings than others in 
the society. Sen‟s contribution to the subject is important and recognises aspects of 
distribution of resources that have previously not been considered. Although these 
insights may be of great importance in informing decision-making around the 
distribution of resources, its obvious limitation lies in the difficulty in measuring 
„capabilities‟ and „functionings‟ for the purpose of practical allocation of resources. 
 
The literature supports the view that a fair distribution of health care is a more 
realistic objective of health systems than a fair distribution of health. This is based on 
the argument that equity in health suggests equality in health outcomes, and there are 
numerous factors that affect health status that are outside the locus of control of health 
systems (Donaldson and Gerard, 1993, Whitehead, 1992). Some of these factors are 
listed below. 
1. Genetically inherited conditions and natural deterioration of health over time 
2. There is no clear definition of what is meant by “good health” 
3. Freely chosen health damaging behaviour such as extreme sports, smoking etc 












There is therefore some consensus in the literature that health differences determined 
by factors such as points 1 and 3 above should not be classified as inequities since 
such differences are unavoidable (Whitehead, 1992, Peter and Evans, 2001). 
Achieving equal health outcomes is potentially highly undesirable because this would 
require too many restrictions on how people choose to live their lives (Oliver and 
Mossialos, 2004). Also, pursuing equality in health seems unreasonable as this may 
necessitate a levelling down of everyone‟s health towards that of the most unhealthy 
(Williams and Cookson, 2000).  On the other hand, Mooney and Jan (1997) argue that 
a fair distribution of health does not have to be an equal distribution of health; just as 
a fair distribution of income does not strictly imply an equal distribution of income. 
The consideration therefore should not be equal distribution of health, but rather to 
reduce disparities in health as much as possible such that differences in health 
outcomes are based on factors that the society considers as unavoidable and 
acceptable (Whitehead, 1992). 
 
With regard to equity in health care, a number of definitions have been put forward 
for practical and operational purposes, particularly to guide the allocation of health 
care resources. Some of the more common definitions, as listed by Mooney (1983), 
are:  
 
a. Equality of expenditure per capita: An equitable allocation of health resources is 
achieved if the available budget is allocated to different regions pro rata with the 
size of the regional population. The major criticism of this definition of equity is 
that it does not consider differential need for health care across populations, and 











Wagstaff, 1993). However, it can still be considered a foundation for resource 
allocation formulae, and a reasonable point from which to start. 
 
b. Equality of inputs (resources) per capita: Equity in resource allocation to different 
regions is achieved if all resources (labour, land, capital, etc.) are distributed pro 
rata with the regional population. The major difference between this definition and 
the previous one is that this second definition takes into consideration the different 
prices of health care resources in different regions. However, it still does not take 
into consideration the possibility of different levels of need for health care that 
could be experienced in different population groups. 
 
c. Equality of input for equal need: This definition suggests going beyond population 
size as the basis for resource allocation. The health needs of the different regions 
(could be defined by health status, demographics, socio-economic levels etc) 
should be considered also. So, given equal population sizes, one region should 
receive more resources if it is deemed to be in greater need of health care. 
 
d. Equality of (opportunity of) access for equal need: Based on this definition, all 
individuals with similar need for health should face the same cost (transport, time, 
financial, etc.) of utilising health services.  
 
e. Equality of utilisation for equal need: This takes the definition of equity further 
than the previous one. If everyone had the same tastes and preferences for health 
and health care, then equality of access would automatically translate into equal 











definition advocates for positive discrimination in favour of those less willing to 
utilise health care.  
 
f. Equality of marginal met need: Assuming that regions rank their needs in order of 
priority to be met, and that the order of ranking is similar across all regions, equity 
is achieved if each region stops treating the same specific need if each of their 
budgets is cut by the same amount. 
 
The first two definitions of equity as listed above are concerned with distributing 
health care resources equally across individuals. While these two definitions may be 
easier (compared to the others) to put into practice, they do not receive much support 
as they do not consider the needs of the population. So, operational definitions of 
equity that recognise the differential needs are preferred for this study.  
 
For the purpose of determining financial allocations to geographic areas, the most 
appropriate operational definition of equity for the South African context, is the one 
that considers differential need and explicitly addresses how financial resources 
should be allocated. Based on these criteria, the operational definitions that do not 
take “need” into consideration are not appropriate. “Equality of input for equal need” 
and “equality of marginally met need” are the only two definitions that meet these 
criteria. The latter can be very difficult to implement, so the “Equality of input for 
equal need” is the most appropriate for the South African context. Given that the 
study focuses more on the financial allocations to different geographic areas, a 
modified operational definition of equity is used as the benchmark for assessing 












Literature on equity in health identifies two major principles of equity: horizontal 
equity and vertical equity (Mooney, 1983, Donaldson and Gerard, 1993). Horizontal 
equity refers to the “equal treatment of equals”, such that individuals with similar 
characteristics in all respects (including health status) are treated equally. On the other 
hand, vertical equity refers to the “unequal, but equitable treatment of unequals” 
(Mooney, 1983). This suggests that those with different health status should be treated 
differently. It may be extremely difficult to put the „horizontal equity‟ definition into 
practice as this presents the problem of deciding what „equal treatment‟ and „equals‟ 
means. Vertical equity on the other hand appears to be easier to put into practice 
because it is easier to identify who has greater health needs than another, and 
therefore (hopefully) provide health care discriminately in favour of the person(s) 
with greater health needs
9
. A key problem in the application of vertical equity is to 
determine „how unequal health conditions (disease conditions for example) are‟? 
Although it is beyond the scope of this review to attempt to answer this question, the 
question raises the issue of processes in decision-making for achieving equity.  
 
The above discussion on theories of justice has focused on distributive justice – 
focusing more on the eventual distribution of resources, outcomes or utility. This 
consequentialist approach (a characteristic of standard economic welfare analysis) has 
for some time dominated the analysis of equity; and has been criticised for not 
acknowledging the importance of the process of decision-making that leads to the 
actual outcomes of interest. Procedures in this regard have often been viewed as 
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valuable only through their instrumental role in promoting better outcomes (Anand, 
2001, Wailoo and Anand, 2004, Dolan et al., 2007).  
 
However, it has become evident that procedures are not only important as an 
instrument in promoting fair outcomes, but that the nature of the processes for 
decision-making are in themselves utility generating. Thus procedures have both 
instrumental and inherent values (ibid). Indeed, there is empirical evidence that 
suggests that the ways in which decisions are made and their underlying rationales 
can affect people‟s reactions to, and the utility they derive from those decisions 
(Dolan et al., 2007). The argument here is that people enjoy some utility when their 
preferences concerning a process for decision-making are considered. So, utility 
enjoyed is not only from “what” a person receives (as a result of some decision), but 
the way in which the person gets it.  
 
There are some other reasons why procedures and their fairness are important.  
 In situations where there are opposing parties that have interests in outcomes 
that are diametrically opposed, a solution defined solely in terms of 
consequences (eventual distribution of the phenomenon) may be impossible. 
In this case, conflict resolution may only be achieved if a mutually acceptable 
procedure is implemented, even where this may lead to unfavourable 
outcomes to one of the two parties.  
 Procedures have an inherent value where the causes of outcomes are uncertain. 
In such cases, an investigation of the process of decision-making can aid the 











outcomes; and then corrective action taken where the desired outcomes are not 
achieved.  
 Procedures used to distribute resources, for example, can provide substantial 
information on how decision-making bodies perceive those that are affected 
by the decisions they take.  
 Outcome uncertainty may be so pervasive that processes are all that can be 
monitored or controlled.  
 It may be necessary to impose limits on the discretion of those in positions of 
power. This promotes accountability of managers involved in decision-making 
(Anand, 2001, Wailoo and Anand, 2004). 
 
Literature on procedural justice identifies six prominent characteristics of fair 
procedures. These are (Wailoo and Anand, 2004, Dolan et al., 2007).:  
1. Voice: individuals affected or potentially affected by a decision have the 
opportunity to contribute to the decision-making process 
2. Consistence: the same decision-making criteria are applied across both a 
significant time period and across a range of comparable decision contexts 
3. Neutrality: decision makers are able to separate themselves from preconceptions 
and vested interests 
4. Transparency: information about the decision-making process is available and 
accessible 
5. Reversibility: there should be mechanisms in place that allow decisions to be 
challenged and reversed if required 












Within the health sector, and in the distribution of health care resources, fair processes 
are justifiably important. Health care is a fundamental input in raising the health status 
of those that are unwell. It is therefore a key resource for individuals to flourish and to 
contribute positively to society. Decisions around the distribution of health care 
resources potentially affect the lives of everyone.  For reasons listed above, it is 
important that the process for making such life-impacting decisions be fair and just 
(embodying all the characteristics of a fair process).  
 
Fiscal federalism is characterised by a tiered government system, such that each level 
of government has a defined set of roles and responsibilities with regards to the health 
sector. The nature of fiscal federalism and indeed the nature of intergovernmental 
relations within a fiscal federal system have implications for the process of decision-
making that results in the distribution of health care resources. While assessing how 
equitable the outcomes of decisions that determine the distribution of health care 
resources is important, it is equally important to assess „fairness‟ in the process for 
decision-making that yields (in)equitable distributions.  
 
The fundamental contribution of PHC to the population‟s ability to flourish is a 
justifiable rationale for citizens to input into decision-making that determines the 
eventual distribution of PHC resources. Not surprisingly, this aspect (community 
participation) of „fairness‟ in decision-making processes is a critical component of the 
PHC approach. So, in assessing equity in PHC allocations, it is necessary also to 
consider whether the processes for decision-making are fair. This study will therefore 











allocations to different geographic regions in South Africa. The characteristics of a 
fair process as identified above will guide this analysis. 
 
2.2.1 Summary and Discussion 
The perspectives on equity that have been reviewed provide a good foundation from 
which to assess the most appropriate operational definition of equity, depending on 
the good and context. The Rawlsian and egalitarian perspectives favour distribution of 
goods such that the more disadvantaged members of the population receive more than 
the better-off. A similar conclusion can be reached for the utilitarian perspective if 
one assumes diminishing marginal utility of the good or service to be distributed.  
 
The libertarian perspective of equity does not support the general view on the way a 
good/service such as health should be distributed. It is generally agreed that everyone 
has the right to enjoy the highest attainable level of health (OHCHR-UNOG, 1966), 
and that different individuals and population groups have different capacities to attain 
their highest level of health. It is therefore important that equity in health should be 
about ensuring that those who are disadvantaged (in their ability to attain their highest 
level of health) should receive more support in attaining their highest level of health, 
thereby equalising (or moving towards equal) opportunities in maximising health 
status. This is also in line with Sen‟s capabilities approach to valuing the impact of 
policies. Consequently, the perspective on equity that this study adopts is akin to the 
egalitarian perspective and is best described by Whitehead‟s (1989) definition of 
equity. According to Whitehead, “equity in health implies that ideally everyone 











pragmatically, that none should be disadvantaged from achieving this potential, if it 
can be avoided”.   
 
This section has also reviewed several operational definitions of equity. Working with 
an operational definition of equity is important as it provides clear and measurable 
criteria upon which policy can be practically evaluated. The study proposes to assess 
the extent of equity in the distribution of financial resources across geographic areas. 
To achieve this, it is important to define equity in such a way that allows for the 
identification and analysis of measurable equity criteria. Only the needs-based 
operational definitions of equity are in line with this study‟s perspective on equity. 
Based on these definitions, those with higher health needs should get a greater 
proportion of health care resources. While this raises the question around what „need‟ 
means, or how it is to be measured, another problem is how to determine “how much 
more” those experiencing greater need should receive, such that it is acceptable.  
Acceptability of how much more those in greater need should receive can be properly 
addressed through a „fair‟ process of prioritisation and valuation of health needs, 
informed by those that are potentially affected by the distribution of health care 
resources.  
 
The amount and distribution of health needs, among individuals or groups is critical to 
the application of any needs-based operational definition. However, as previously 
mentioned there is still the problem of how to define and measure health needs. This 
is discussed in the next section. Since the focus of this study is on the equitable 











centred on the definition and measurement of need for geographic health care 
resource allocation.  
 
2.3 Need 
The meaning and concept of “need” in health has been a subject of debate in many 
academic papers (Oliver and Mossialos, 2004), yet there remains considerable 
confusion and disagreement about the concept in the literature and in practice (James, 
1999). Discussions around the meaning of „need‟ date back to Bradshaw‟s (1972) 
seminal work in which he defined need along four dimensions. First is normative 
need, in which an expert defines need by setting a desired standard and comparing it 
with the existing standard. The second is felt need, which is the same as „want‟, and is 
assessed by asking a person or population if they feel they need a good or service. The 
third is expressed need, in the case where felt need is turned into action (effective 
demand). The fourth is comparative need, which describes the need of one population 
that does not receive a certain service compared to another population with similar 
characteristics that does (James, 1999, Oliver and Mossialos, 2004). These 
dimensions of need are still relevant to more recent discussions around the definition 
of need, especially in the health sector.  
 
In the health sector, a common definition of need amongst clinicians is based on the 
state of an individual‟s pre-treatment health. Under this premise, persons with the 
same health status have similar need, and in the same vein, those with greater ill-
health have greater need (Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993, Oliver and Mossialos, 2004). 
This definition of need has received wide criticism on the basis that there are 











that health care cannot improve the health status of the individual. According to 
Culyer and Wagstaff (1993): 
“The difficulty with this definition is that it is hard to see why someone 
who is sick can sensibly be said to need health care, irrespective of the 
latter‟s ability to improve the person‟s health” 
 
They also argue that this definition is inappropriate, as a person may be in need of 
health care but not be ill, as in the case of preventive measures. Also health as a 
concept is difficult to grasp (Peter, 2001) and difficult to measure with precision 
(Waters, 2000). For example, if individual A and individual B are suffering from a 
sore-throat and back-ache respectively, how can people tell who is more ill and thus 
who is in greater need of health care. In fact, it may even be difficult to tell amongst 
two individuals suffering from the same illness if and who is more ill than the other. 
Their characteristics, such as age, previous health status, gender and socioeconomic 
status can affect the severity of the illness they are suffering from. 
 
Need has also been defined as the „capacity to benefit‟ from health care (Culyer and 
Wagstaff, 1993). This definition embodies the perspective on need as an instrumental 
concept – that the need for health care is not for health care as an end, but for the 
improvement of health as the ultimate objective. So, in instances where health care 
cannot result in the improvement of health (the ultimate objective), there is no need 
for health care (Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993). In the area of equity in health, one can 
argue that the importance of defining and understanding the concept of need for 
health care is not an end to itself but to quantify the levels of health care resources to 











capacity to benefit does not provide a basis for quantifying the amount of health care 
resources an individual or a population needs.  
 
Hence, another definition of need, based on the principle of „capacity to benefit‟ has 
been proposed. Need is defined as the expenditure required to exhaust capacity to 
benefit (ibid). This definition gives monetary value to the amount of need experienced 
by individuals. It allows for the financial quantification of need and therefore the 
assessment of marginal benefits yielded by competing health interventions. As 
resources are scarce and have competing uses, this definition may be more appealing 
to economists and health planners. However, Culyer (2001) cautions that capacity to 
benefit differs from need. He argues that it is possible for two individuals to have 
different capacities to benefit, even when their individual capacities to benefit can be 
exhausted by the same expenditure. Therefore their need for resources is the same 
even though they have different capacities to benefit. 
 
According to McIntyre et al (2008), the concept of „need‟ is value-laden and 
subjective and is therefore viewed from different perspectives depending on whose 
perception, interpretation and values are at play. Given the subjective nature of need, 
the relevant question for this study then is: how is need to be defined such that is 
useful for allocating resources equitably? Culyer (1995) proposes that if need is to be 
a practical idea that is useful for resource allocation, then the concept or definition of 
need should fulfil the following conditions: 
1. The value-content of the definition should be explicit and easily interpretable 











3. It should be capable of empirical application in issues of horizontal and 
vertical distribution 
4. It should be service and person oriented 
5. It should enable a straightforward link to be made to resources 
6. If acted upon as a distributional principle it should not produce manifestly 
inequitable results. 
He also goes on to comment that for most definitions of need, one or more of these 
conditions are absent. In the absence of a definition that satisfies all the conditions 
above, how then should health systems allocate resources according to need? In 
answering this question, a good place to start is to look at how different health 
systems have attempted to allocate health care resources based on need. A critical 
review citing the pros and cons of each approach to needs-based resource allocation 
will help in narrowing down the most appropriate measure or indicator of need for 
allocating PHC resources in South Africa. 
 
2.3.1 Needs-Based Resource Allocation 
In many countries, different measures of need have been constructed to guide the 
allocation of health care resources. The approach to allocating resources based on 
need could be done subjectively or based on more objective indicators of need and in 
some cases a combination of the two (Pearson, 2002). As previously indicated, it is 
the more objective approach to measuring population health needs that is of interest in 











The most widely used indicators in measuring relative need
10
 for health services are 
population size, demographic composition (e.g. the elderly tend have a greater need 
for health services), levels of ill-health (mortality and morbidity), and socioeconomic 
status. In some cases, countries have also taken into consideration the difference in 
the cost of providing health services in different areas  (McIntyre et al., 1990) 
(McIntyre, 2007).   Relative need refers to the need for health care for a person (or 
group of people) in comparison with the need for health care for another person (or 
groups of people). 
 
The most famous application of a needs based formula is the Resource Allocation 
Working (RAWP) formula, which was used in the late 1970s in England to distribute 
the national health budget. Allocations to regions were based on the population size, 
as a base line. The population for each region was then adjusted or weighted by: 
 Demographic distribution (age and gender) – by using the national average of 
utilisation of different services for each age and gender category. 
 Standardised mortality ratios (as a proxy of levels of ill-health) 
 Cross-border flows, special costs of teaching hospitals and market related 
costs in dense urban areas (Doherty and van den Heever, 1996) 
 
Some of the criticisms of the RAWP formula were that it did not consider the 
presence of the private sector in the health system; it applied only to recurrent 
expenditure and did not include capital expenditure; and that it did not accommodate 
the impact on the need for health care of developments in other social sectors such as 
housing and welfare (ibid). Nevertheless, the RAWP formula remains a point of 
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reference for any discussion on needs-based resource allocation within the health 
sector. The RAWP formula used a combination of different indicators in measuring 
relative need, with a focus on population size, demographic composition, and 
mortality.  
 
The original RAWP formula did not include measures of socio-economic status as a 
basis for resource allocation, but a later version of the RAWP formula did include this 
element (McIntyre, 2007, Asante, 2006). With such huge disparities in socio-
economic status in South Africa, a proxy for need that does not reflect the impact of 
socioeconomic factors on the level of health care need has little relevance for guiding 
resource allocation. . 
 
Measures of mortality such as infant mortality rates and under-5 mortality rates are 
considered to be very good indicators of health need. However, it has been 
documented that the use of mortality measures has the potential to pose problems as 
an indicator of need. It is suggested that using them alone as a guide for resource 
allocation can create perverse incentives. This is because effective care that reduces 
mortality is punished with declining budgets (Diderichsen 2004). Nevertheless, they 
remain an important indicator of health needs.  
 
 Morbidity is also considered to be a good indicator of need, although it also has some 
setbacks. Where morbidity data are collected from the health system, the information 
derivable from different regions are affected by variations in record-keeping 
efficiency. Also, even where morbidity data is collected through surveys, contextual 











objectively measured and medically defined morbidity. These problems associated 
with the direct use of epidemiological data as proxies for need have prompted most 
countries to use a list of demographic and socioeconomic indicators related to need. 
Although demographic and socio-economic variables have been shown to be poorer 
indicators of individual health needs, they are considered a much better indicator of 
variations across geographic areas (Diderichsen, 2004). 
 
The use of indices of deprivation or socioeconomic status for allocating health care 
resources according to need has been developed as an alternative or addition to 
mortality based indicators (Newbold et al., 1998). These indicators focus on the 
broader socioeconomic determinants of health status, and this is its major appeal. This 
approach to assessing health needs holds particular interest for this study for two 
reasons. First, the study focuses on allocations to PHC and not higher levels of health 
care. As discussed in section 2.1, the broader societal condition under which people 
has a huge impact on their health status, and the PHC approach is arguably the most 
appropriate approach to address these societal-induced health outcomes. Second, 
those of higher socio-economic status have a greater ability to influence their 
immediate societal environment to improve their health status than those of lower 
socio-economic status (Behrman, 1993). Indeed, and as mentioned in earlier sections 
of this chapter, those of higher socio-economic status are usually healthier. So, an 
indicator of health needs such as a deprivation index, which includes immediate 
societal conditions as well as socio-economic status is an ideal way to determine PHC 
allocations.  A further argument in favour of the use of deprivation index that is based 











mortality. Research in different contexts show a consistent inverse relationship 
between socio-economic status and mortality (Stockwell, et al, 2005) 
 
Different deprivation (or socioeconomic) indices have been developed over the years, 
and they have included different variables. For example, one of the first indicators of 
relative need by geographic areas based on social deprivation was constructed by 
Jarman (1983). He used social and economic variables such as age, employment 
status, housing, ethnicity, characteristics of the family, housing, crime rate, mobility 
and visiting difficulties. Other indices include Townsend‟s (1987) index of material 
deprivation that included four variables: unemployment, overcrowding, non-car 
ownership and non-home ownership.  
 
Another index was developed by Castairs which is based on four census indicators: 
low social class, lack of car ownership, overcrowding and male unemployment 
(Carstairs and Morris, 1991).  More recently, McIntyre et al (2002) developed an 
index of deprivation that included demographic, socio-economic, and environmental 
variables for the analysis of equity in the allocation of health care resources. Similar 
variables were employed by Lozano et al (2001) in assessing health inequalities and 
inequity in health in Mexico. Table 2.1 lists variables that have frequently been used 
in calculating deprivation indices (the ordering of the variables has no significance).  
 
The use of deprivation indices (or some composite index of socio-economic status) 
appears to be an appropriate option for this study. South Africa has been cited to be 











International Development Agency, 2004), and it is worth noting that inequality in the 
country has been increasing in recent years (Ardington et al., 2006). 
 
Table 2.1 Variables frequently used in deprivation indices in different contexts 
Variables frequently included in 
deprivation indices in high-income 
countries 
Variables frequently included in 
deprivation indices in middle-income 
countries 
Unskilled worker/Low social class Illiteracy/low educational attainment  
Unemployment Lack of access to running water 
Over-crowding in housing Lack of access to electricity 
Socio-economic group Lack of access to sanitation/sewerage 
facilities 
Child under the age of 5 Low quality housing 
Pensioner living alone Overcrowding in housing 
Belonging to minority group Low income levels 
Changed house/address in past year 
(Mobility) 
Unemployment 
Don‟t own a car Extent of debt 
Single parent Lack of assets/durable household goods 
Living in rented accommodation/don‟t 
own a house 
Age (children and the elderly may be 
deprived) 
Lack of amenities (shower and inside 
toilet) 
Gender (women may be more deprived) 
Lack of educational qualifications Geographic area (rural dwellers) 
Source: McIntyre and Okorafor (2003) 
 
 
Considering the wide disparities in socio-economic status across the population, there 
are most probably, huge disparities in the opportunity levels of the best-off and the 
worst-off in achieving their full health potential.  
 
2.3.2 Summary 
In assessing the equitable distribution of health care resources in South Africa, this 
study views equity from an egalitarian perspective; the view that proposes a fair 
distribution of opportunity for all to achieve their highest health potential. This means 











which resource allocation patterns improve the lot of those who have less opportunity 
to attain their highest possible health status. These disadvantaged groups are identified 
by their socio-economic status and considered to have relatively higher health care 
needs than others of higher socio-economic status. This assumption is supported by 
the consistent international evidence that those of lower socio-economic status carry a 
heavier burden of ill-health (Lynch et al., 2000, Braveman and Tarimo, 2002, 
Whitehead et al., 2000, Wildman, 2003, Commission on Social Determinants of 
Health, 2005, van Doorslaer et al., 1997, Marmot et al., 1997), and that they are least 
able to afford health care. They are thus, caught in a vicious circle: poverty breeding 
ill-health and ill-health maintaining poverty (Braveman and Tarimo, 2002, Wagstaff, 
2001). The study will therefore use variables that are indicators of socio-economic 
status in constructing an index of deprivation. This deprivation index is used as a 
proxy for relative need across geographic areas in South Africa. Other variables such 
as demographic and ethnic characteristics are included in this index to capture 
contextual indicators of relative need in South Africa11. 
 
2.4 Decentralisation, Fiscal Federalism and Equity in the Health Sector 
Decentralisation refers to the transfer of authority in public planning, management 
and decision-making from higher levels of government to lower levels (Mills, 1990).  
In the literature on decentralisation of health systems, four forms of decentralisation 
can be identified.  
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 Deconcentration: shift in administrative responsibilities from the centre to 
lower levels of the system that does not involve the shifting of any political 
power 
 Devolution: substantial shift in political responsibilities, often including tax-
raising authority 
 Delegation: relocation of a specific function to a quasi-autonomous 
organisation 
 Privatisation: shift of specific functions away from the government. Some 
authors do not consider this a form of decentralisation (Jowett, 2000). 
 
Fiscal federalism can be defined as the devolution of expenditure responsibilities to 
sub-national levels of government (Ter-Minassian, 1997, de Mello JR, 2000). Fiscal 
federalism thus involves decentralisation, specifically around the shift of expenditure 
responsibilities, but to lower levels of government and not just any administrative 
structure or entity. Henceforth, the term „decentralisation‟ will be used in reference to 
shifts in authority from higher levels of government to lower levels of government.  
 
Generations ago, federations were regarded as tiers of government, each with 
identifiable domains of power and responsibility, and little or no interaction between 
them. In modern federal structures, different levels of government have wide and 
varied interactions between them (Cameron, 1999, Opeskin, 1999). Such interactions 
are shaped by the functions allocated to the levels of government. Many countries 
have substantially devolved expenditure responsibilities to lower levels of 
government. However, the form of decentralisation, the nature of intergovernmental 











any country is a reflection of its particular context. Demographic, geographical, 
social, cultural, historical, political, constitutional and institutional factors all 
influence the structure and design of federal systems and the nature of 
intergovernmental relations (Bird and Vailliancourt, 1997, de Mello, 2000, Cameron, 
1999). The amount of autonomy and the nature of responsibilities given to sub-
national governments within federal systems therefore vary considerably across 
countries.  
 
Fiscal federalism has become a global trend in recent years (Ter-Minassian, 1997, de 
Mello JR, 2000, de Mello, 2000). This is partly a reflection of the political evolution 
towards more democratic societies. In addition, the literature has presented the view 
that fiscal decentralisation can entail substantial gains in terms of both efficiency and 
welfare. According to this view, such gains are best achieved by assigning 
responsibility for each type of public expenditure to the level of government that most 
closely represents the beneficiaries of these outlays (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989, 
de Mello, 2000, Bird and Vailliancourt, 1997, Ter-Minassian 1997). Fiscal 
decentralisation brings expenditure and budgeting decision-making closer to the 
communities, and therefore has the potential to increase the responsiveness of the 
public sector to differential needs of local jurisdictions  (de Mello, 2000) and reduce 
information and transaction costs associated with the provision of public goods and 
services (World Bank, 1997).  These are expected to increase the welfare of the 
various populations served. 
 
However, the literature also indicates that efficiency gains from decentralisation can 











 Weak administrative capacity in sub-national governments (SNGs), poor technical 
skills at lower levels, and the existence of corruption; 
 Sub-national governments may not have developed modern and transparent public 
expenditure management systems; and   
 The size of the local jurisdiction (which is often a result of historical 
developments or political factors) is not always consistent with the full realisation 
of potential efficiency gains from decentralisation (Ter-Minassian, 1997). 
 
These constraints outlined above all make reference to the capacity of SNGs to 
efficiently and adequately deliver on the responsibilities they have been entrusted 
with. It is important at this point to define what capacity means. The need for clarity is 
due to the common understanding that capacity refers only to the size and skills mix 
of human resources, however, as Brijlal et al (1997) explain, this definition of 
capacity is too narrow to be applied to a public sector organisation. Also, the term 
„capacity‟ is used often in this thesis and it is important to get clarity on what is 
referred to when the term is used. For this thesis, capacity refers to the ability of a 
public sector organisation (PSO) to perform appropriate tasks effectively, efficiently 
and sustainably.  
 
This definition is further qualified by acknowledging various dimensions of capacity 
that can affect the ability of a PSO to perform its tasks appropriately. These are: 
1. Human Resources: This dimension refers to the mix and quantity of skills 











2. Organisation: This refers to the organisation and administrative structures of 
the PSO, including financial system and skills and professionalisation of 
personnel. 
3. Task Networks: This refers to the range of organisations that are jointly 
involved in accomplishing a particular task.  
4. Public Sector Institutional Environment: This refers to the broader public 
sector environment 
5. External Environment: This refers to the broader context in which the public 
sector operates such as economic conditions of the country and the political 
situation within the country (Brijlal and Gilson, 1997)
12
. 
Essentially, the term capacity as used in this thesis not only refers to human resources 
but to organisational structures and the broader context within which a government 
unit operates. 
 
2.4.1 Sub-National Government Autonomy: Centralisation vs Decentralisation  
A key issue in any federal structure concerns the amount of autonomy assigned to 
SNGs, in other words, the level of centralisation or decentralisation. This is of critical 
importance considering that most of the cited constraints to reaping the stated benefits 
to fiscal federalism concern the capacity of SNGs in adequately delivering on the 
responsibilities assigned to them.  
 
In the literature there appears to be some consensus that there is no „best practice‟ 
with regards to the structure of intergovernmental relations (Feld et al., 2007), but that 
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political and historical contexts are key in defining such relations (Institute On 
Governance, 1998, Bahl and Linn, 1999).  Bahl and Linn (1999) argue that theory 
cannot lead to firm conclusions about the optimal division of fiscal responsibilities 
between national, state and local governments. This view is shared by Oates (1999), 
who argues that intergovernmental fiscal arrangements may not necessarily conform 
to the traditional theoretical framework for the assignment of functions to different 
levels of government. The nature of the public service (or good), the context and the 
time within which the service is provided may result in differences in the pattern of 
goods and services provided by different levels of government.  
 
With regard to developing countries, Bahl and Linn (1999), provide arguments for 
both fiscal centralisation and decentralisation
13
. According to them, fiscal 
centralisation may be the better option for developing countries. The reasons for this 
view are listed below: 
a. Growth policy – investment capital is scarce and must be controlled by central 
government in order to maximise profits. 
b. Income distribution – centralisation allows the national government more 
discretion in dealing with regional differences, for example rural-urban 
disparities in income and wealth. 
c. National governments have superior abilities in administering taxes and the 
management of public service delivery. With characteristic weak 
administration at local government levels, less local autonomy means that 
there is less possibility for mismanagement of finances by local governments. 
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They add that arguments such as those listed below can also be made in favour of 
decentralisation: 
a. Local governments can adjust budgets in response to local preferences, 
resulting in a more efficient distribution of public resources 
b. Local governments may be able to tax some sectors of the urban economy 
more easily that the national government 
c. Cities would levy higher taxes and could thereby charge residents the full 
marginal cost of urbanisation. Based on this, a more efficient size distribution 
of cities could result. 
 
Bahl and Lin (ibid) however raise concerns about the applicability of arguments in 
favour of decentralisation within developing countries. Theories on fiscal 
decentralisation were developed in industrialised countries, where voter preferences 
are translated into budget outcomes, and local councils are elected, not appointed. 
Local preferences in these countries drive local government fiscal operations and this 
is not necessarily the case in many developing countries.  
 
Empirical work by Ugo Panizza (1999) using data from over 60 countries revealed 
that there is greater decentralisation in geographically large countries, rich countries, 
countries with many ethnic groups, and countries with a high level of democracy. 
Oates (1972) argues that decentralisation is appropriate in cases where there is 
heterogeneity in taste for public services between sub-federal jurisdictions and that in 
the absence of economies of scale and inter-jurisdictional externalities, 












The level of decentralisation of overall fiscal responsibilities is a primary concern in 
this study. However, what is even more important for the study is the appreciation of 
the factors that determine the extent of decentralisation or centralisation in the 
financing and provision of a particular good or service and the arguments for either. 
These are crucial in making assertions about the appropriate level of decentralisation 
within the health sector and particularly for PHC. Literature reviewed on the subject 
does provide some valuable insights. What is clear is that while there is no consensus 
on the optimal level of (de)centralisation within a fiscal federal system, economic, 
social, political and historical factors have significant influence over how the system 
is structured. Also, the nature of the good/service to be provided and differences in 
taste between sub-national jurisdictions can sway the argument in favour of either 
centralisation or decentralisation. Therefore, understanding the nature of health, the 
values of primary health care and the South African context (socio-economic, 
historical, and political) are important in the assessment of the appropriate level of 
government that should be entrusted with fiscal responsibilities for PHC.  
 
2.4.2 Decentralisation, the Health Sector and Primary Health Care 
In this section, literature on decentralisation within the health sector is reviewed. 
Within fiscal federal systems and unified systems the issue of the extent of 
decentralisation/centralisation of health services still attracts a fair amount of debate. 
The review in this section is not limited to fiscal federal systems, as the concept of 












Even where health services are decentralised to lower levels, the extent of authority 
granted to these lower administrative units
14
 vary. Bossert‟s (1998) “decision space” 
framework outlines different functions of administrative units that can be used to 
assess the level of autonomy they enjoy. They are finance, service organisation, 
human resources, access rules and governance rules. For example, the level of 
financial autonomy enjoyed by local units will depend on their revenue generating 
ability, the proportion of their health spending that is from intergovernmental transfers 
and the proportion of health spending that is ear-marked by higher authorities. The 
level of autonomy is determined by the extent to which service organisation at local 
units are defined by law or a higher authority. It is also determined by the extent to 
which local units have the authority to hire and fire staff.  
 
In recent years, decentralisation has been promoted by advocates of health sector 
reform as a means of improving efficiency, quality of services, promoting democracy 
and accountability to the local population (Green, 1999, Bossert, 1998). They argue 
that decentralisation facilitates the design of the most effective mechanisms for 
coping with three crucial challenges to the health system. The first challenge is that it 
is common to find diversity in the epidemiological pattern of diseases across regions 
and populations within a country. This is accounted for by: characteristics of the 
health sector, geographical, ecological, environmental, economic, social, behavioural, 
demographic and cultural factors that may differ from population to population in 
regions within a country. The second challenge is the increased complexity of health 
care. The greater awareness of the important influence of non-medical factors on 
health status requires the mobilisation of complementary inter-sectoral action from 
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agriculture, education, waterworks, sanitation, labour and industry. Thirdly, the 
delivery of health care has to constantly respond to changes occurring in the health 
situation in local areas, especially as these changes do not occur uniformly nor at the 
same pace in all regions of the country (Adetokunbo, 1999). Other arguments in 
favour of decentralisation are that it brings decision-making closer to the communities 
served (yielding greater potential for community participation). It brings decision-
making closer to the field-level providers of health care and it is also suggested that 
breaking down the large monolithic decision-making structures that are typical of 
centralised health systems increases the efficiency of service provision (Green, 1999).  
 
There are also arguments against decentralisation of the health system. First, the lack 
of skilled staff in areas such as financial management at local levels, especially in 
developing countries, has the potential to counteract any efficiency gains from 
decentralisation. Secondly, where the process of decentralisation is not properly 
handled, it could result in enhancing the power of elite groups at the local levels, 
negating the prospect of community participation in the process of health care 
delivery (ibid). Thirdly, decentralisation has the potential to increase administrative 
costs if it removes the economies of scale associated with centralisation, and could 
encourage service duplication (Gilson and Mills, 1995). Perhaps the most serious 
argument against decentralisation (and fiscal federalism) is its possible impact on the 
equitable distribution of health care resource between local jurisdictions (Thomas et 
al., 2003, Green, 1999). This potential is even greater where local authorities have 
revenue-generating responsibilities and autonomy in spending their revenue. 
Differential capacity to generate and utilise resources coupled with different local 











care services across local jurisdictions (Okorafor and Thomas, 2007). This suggests 
that if SNGs are responsible for financing health and PHC and the prevailing fiscal 
arrangements are such that they leave SNGs with substantial expenditure autonomy, it 
is likely that the levels of expenditure on and provision of PHC will differ for each 
local jurisdiction. Following this line of argument, it can then hypothesise that there is 
a positive relationship between the level of autonomy enjoyed by SNGs that are 
responsible for providing and financing PHC and the potential for inequity in country-
wide distribution of PHC resources. In later sections of this chapter, the relationship 
between intergovernmental fiscal arrangements and autonomy are discussed.  
 
It is clear that considerable emphasis should be placed on contextual factors in 
deciding on whether to decentralise the health system, and the extent to which 
authority should be given to lower levels of government in the provision of health 
care. Availability of requisite skills at lower levels, the size of the country and level of 
heterogeneity in disease profiles across geographic areas and how democratic the 
society is, are issues that need to be considered in arguments for and against 
decentralisation within any country.  
 
For the provision of PHC, there is an even stronger argument for decentralisation. 
This is based on PHC‟s underlying values. The PHC approach advocates for 
community participation and greater responsiveness to the needs of the community 
(World Health Organisation, 1978), which implies that lower levels of government 
would be the appropriate level to manage expenditure responsibilities for PHC 
(influencing the determination of the budget for PHC and deciding on how to spend 











may require uniform access across local jurisdictions, and therefore some regulation 
of their funding and provision across areas (Okorafor and Thomas, 2007). There is 
broad consensus in the literature that the responsibility for achieving equity and 
redistribution should lie with the central government (Shah, 1998, Buchanan and 
Wagner, 1971, Inman and Rubenfeld, 1997, Smith, 1985).   
 
In general, the outcome of the health sector is of interest to central governments in 
most countries. Health is generally regarded as a merit good, such that all citizens 
within the country should have an “acceptable” level of access and utilisation. In this 
regard, central governments (in most countries operating a fiscal federal system) 
influence fiscal operations to achieve a desired distribution of resources, expenditure 
and provision of health services within the country. There are different ways in which 
central governments have influenced these within health systems. In some cases 
higher levels of government retain expenditure responsibilities for health services 
with the central government maintaining overall control of activities in health sector 
financing and provision, as in Australia and Canada (Craig, 1997, Krelove et al., 
1997). In other cases, all tiers of government share the responsibilities for financing 
and delivery of health care, as in Argentina (Schwartz and Liuksila, 1997) and Nigeria 
(Ayodele, 2003). Also, where financing and provision of health services are 
decentralised to lower levels, the central government transfers funds for health as a 
specific purpose grant with conditions on how the funds are to be used. In other cases, 
specific purpose grants are used to finance only specific programmes within the health 
sector. For all options outlined, the central/national government still retains some 












A major concern around the interference of central government in SNG fiscal 
arrangements is, that the more control the central government has over SNG fiscal 
affairs, the less autonomy SNGs have. Now, the less fiscal autonomy enjoyed by 
SNGs, the less decision-making space SNGs have to respond to the unique needs of 
the communities they serve.  
 
Within fiscal federal systems, where expenditure responsibility for PHC rests with 
SNGs, the nature and size of intergovernmental transfers to SNGs can influence the 
amount of autonomy they enjoy. This in turn has implications for the equitable 
distribution of PHC resources. In the following sections, literature on different types 
of intergovernmental transfers, the reasons for their uses and their implications for 
autonomy of SNGs are reviewed. 
 
2.4.3 Fiscal Imbalances 
In most countries operating a fiscal federal system, large expenditure responsibilities 
are decentralised to sub-national levels of government while most of the major taxes 
are collected by the central government. Therefore, central governments usually have 
higher revenue-generating capacity compared to their expenditure needs, while the 
reverse is the case for sub-national governments. This mismatch (funding gaps) of 
expenditure responsibility and revenue generating capacity are referred to as vertical 
imbalances (Fjeldstad, 2001). In federal systems, horizontal imbalances also occur. 
These are instances where government units within the same tier of government (say, 
provincial governments) have different revenue raising capacity and therefore 












For example, in a given country, province A could be endowed with an abundance of 
minerals, and therefore has the ability to extract mining royalties over and above other 
sources of revenue, whereas provinces B and C do not have these minerals and so do 
not earn such royalties. Subsequently, the revenue generating capacity of province A 
will be higher than that of provinces B and C. Province A will have more resources 
available to fulfil similar expenditure responsibilities assigned to all provinces.  
 
In the case of vertical imbalances, there are generally four solutions used by 
federations to deal with these imbalances:  
 The first is to increase revenue at the sub-national level by transferring more 
revenue raising power to lower levels of government, so as to achieve a better 
match between their revenue raising capacity and their expenditure 
responsibilities. 
 A second is to reduce local expenditure 
 A third option is to transfer expenditure functions up to the government level with 
more revenue. 
 The fourth option is to transfer some centrally collected revenues to lower levels 
of government; and this last option usually prevails (Bird and Vailliancourt, 1997, 
Opeskin, 1999).  
 
These issues of size and type of expenditure responsibility assigned to SNGs, 
including the processes for achieving a match between expenditure responsibility and 
revenue are at the core of this study. In considering the equitable distribution of 











“solutions” are possible options for financing public services such as PHC. In the next 
section, the implications of different types of “solutions” are reviewed.  
 
2.4.4 Correcting Fiscal Imbalances 
In most countries, these imbalances (vertical and horizontal) are addressed through 
inter-governmental transfers, which refer to the transfers of funds from the central 
government to lower levels of government such as provinces, states and local 
governments. However, the type of transfers utilised to correct both vertical and 
horizontal imbalances will have varying impacts. Consequently, the key issues in 
intergovernmental transfers are around deciding on the type of transfers and the 
criteria for the size of transfers made to sub-national governments. The results of such 
transfers, whether good or bad, will depend on the incentives (built into the transfer 
system) they create for central and local governments and, indirectly, for residents of 
the different regions of the country (Bird and Smart, 2002). Inter-government transfer 
mechanisms can be grouped into two broad categories: revenue sharing and grants 
(Fjeldstad, 2001).  Whether transfers are of the nature of revenue sharing or grants, 
there are basically three ways to determine how much is to be distributed:  
1. As a fixed proportion of government revenues; 
2. On an ad hoc basis, in response to specific claims, and 
3. On a formula-driven basis (Bird and Vailliancourt 1997). 
 
Revenue sharing arrangements are usually geared towards correcting vertical 
imbalances. Sharing of tax revenues can be on a tax-by-tax basis, with different 
coefficients of distribution among levels of government for each tax or on the entire 











such as Argentina, Brazil, Hungary and Russia. However, a major disadvantage of 
such sharing is that it provides an incentive for tax administration at central 
government to concentrate its collection and enforcement on the taxes that are not 
shared or are shared to a lesser degree (Ter-Minassian 1997). Furthermore, tax-by-tax 
sharing provides the central government with incentives to concentrate increases in 
rates (for instance for stabilisation purposes) on the shared taxes. Therefore, revenue 
sharing based on the entire pool of government revenues may be preferable 
(Fjeldstad, 2001).   
 
In general, grants can be grouped into two:  
 General purpose grants: unconditional transfers aimed at addressing vertical and 
horizontal imbalances; 
 Specific purpose grants (or conditional grants): grants that carry conditions 
regarding the use of the funds and/or the performance achieved in the 
programme(s) financed through them. Some conditional grants may require 
matching elements by recipient authorities. 
 
Most countries use a combination of revenue sharing and grants. In general, the 
former forms the basic revenue for sub-national governments. Grants are additional 
transfers made to certain (or all) sectors of sub-national governments either to 
increase the overall expenditure capacity of certain jurisdictions to correct horizontal 
imbalances (usually in the form of general purpose grants) or to influence the level 
and distribution of particular services across all jurisdictions (usually in the form of 
specific purpose grants). Bahl and Linn (1999) state that grants are compromise 











responsibility. They argue that grants permit central governments to retain authority to 
tax productive resource bases, but guarantee SNGs a flow of resources. 
 
The choice between conditional and unconditional transfers should be based on a 
number of considerations. On the one hand, the imposition of conditions clearly 
reduces the level of autonomy at lower levels with respect to decisions around “how 
much” to spend and on “what”. This is contrary to the welfare and efficiency 
arguments in support of decentralisation. Imposing conditions on the use of transfers 
to SNGs reduces their autonomy over the use of available resources, and hence their 
responsiveness to local needs. On the other hand, the imposition of conditions may be 
justified by other considerations. For example, it may be necessary to attach 
conditions to funds to realise uniform or minimum expenditure on issues of national 




If any grants are used, some choices must be made:  
 Whether the transfers should be made on a conditional or unconditional basis. It is 
to be noted that an unconditional grant simply increases the SNG‟s income 
without altering their spending priorities (spending priorities which are assumed to 
be dictated by local preferences). The main justification for conditional grants 
over unconditional grants therefore must be that local decision-making fails to 
produce the socially optimal outcome. Conditional/specific purpose grants are 
more appropriate where SNGs lack the capacity to manage resources, as the 
conditions attached to the funds dictate the terms of how the money is to be spent. 
However, where the conditions for use (and performance) are such that they 
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require a high level of managerial capacity to fulfil stated criteria, managing 
conditional grants at lower levels could become very difficult. The use of 
conditionality and performance criteria for a special purpose grant may then 
generate confusion and pro forma fulfilment of the needed criteria
16
 (Ahmad and 
Craig, 1997). Therefore, unless SNGs possess the capacity to monitor and manage 
the conditionality for grants, it may be better if central governments simplify the 
design and conditionality of special purpose grants, and/or supplement these with 
lump-sum transfers, which could then be seen as „own‟ resources by recipient 
governments (ibid).  
 
 Second, within the category of conditional transfers, whether the central 
government should require sub-national governments to undertake some matching 
of funding of programmes. This might be done to ensure that SNGs spend 
resources on this priority activity, and not on other activities („matching‟ means 
that SNGs cannot divert more of their funds to non-national priorities). It may also 
be done to pave the way for the transfer of responsibility for funding the activity 
to SNGs, by gradually decreasing the proportion of funding paid by central 
government. 
 
 Third, whether there is to be some redistribution in the transfer mechanism or 
whether the transfers will be made based on efficiency (or other) criteria to the 
defined population in each region.  
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 Finally, within both conditional and unconditional transfer mechanisms, whether 
the grants should be open-ended or subject to caps i.e. limits placed on the amount 
of spending (Ahmad and Craig, 1997). 
 
2.4.5 Intergovernmental transfers and Autonomy 
Whether large expenditure responsibilities are devolved to SNGs or not, the 
correction of vertical and horizontal imbalances through transfers from the centre also 
have implications for the level of autonomy enjoyed by SNGs. The nature of 
intergovernmental transfers to SNGs may depend on the public good/service that they 
finance.  For certain public services, the outcomes are of national interest and 
therefore the central government may see a need to intervene in fiscal operations at 
lower government levels to realise a more „desired‟ outcome. This is in cases where 
the SNGs are responsible for providing the service. For example, in Australia, in 
pursuit of national policy objectives, sectors such as health, education, social welfare 
and housing are largely funded through specific purpose grants. In Canada, the major 
general purpose grants are transferred to provinces with below average tax capacity, 
while specific purpose grants are employed to fund health and, more broadly, the 
social sector. In Italy, conditional grants have been used to influence the level and 
distribution of sub-national expenditure on health and public transport, which are 
deemed to be of national concern. In Bulgaria, specific purpose grants are given to 
municipalities for capital expenditure purposes only, while general-purpose grants are 
the dominant form of transfers to municipalities (Bogetić, 1997). 
 
The central government influences the expenditure and provision of services that are 











transfers) or by laying down norms, standards or other regulations for the financing 
and provision of services at the sub-national level. Whatever the mechanism 
employed by the central government, any intervention in SNG fiscal affairs 
effectively reduces the autonomy they enjoy. The extent of the erosion of autonomy 
for SNGs through these interventions will depend on the nature of central intervention 
and the proportion of SNG revenue that is funded through these transfers. Effectively, 
then there should be a positive relationship between the proportion of the expenditure 
budget raised by SNGs through own revenue and the level of autonomy they enjoy.  
 
2.5 International Experience 
As previously mentioned, many countries have adopted a fiscal federal system, albeit 
for varying reasons. The experiences of some of these countries in the financing of 
health and primary health care are now reviewed in more detail. The countries 
selected are Australia, Canada, India, Nigeria, and Brazil. Canada and Australia are 
selected because they are among the countries with the oldest fiscal federal systems. 
Nigeria, Brazil and India are selected because they are large (in size and population) 
developing countries, and therefore comparable in at least these respects to South 
Africa. Also, they are from different continents, thus providing information from 
varied contexts.   
 
For each of these countries, I outline the nature of fiscal federalism in operation, the 
level of vertical imbalance, sub-national government autonomy, nature of 
intergovernmental transfers (in general and for health and PHC), the level of 
government responsible for health care provision and expenditure, and mechanisms in 











Intergovernmental relations are defined by history and context, so what “works” in 
one country may not work in another. The objective is therefore not to base analysis 
of the South African system strictly on the performance of instruments of 
intergovernmental relations in other countries, but to achieve a better understanding of 
the likely implications of different structures of intergovernmental relations for the 
equitable distribution of PHC. 
 
2.5.1 Australia 
Australia has one of the oldest fiscal federal systems; lasting for over a century 
(Warren, 2006). Australia has three tiers of government, the Commonwealth, State 
and Local governments (Institute On Governance, 1998). The provision of health 
services is the joint responsibility of the Commonwealth and the States and is shared 
almost evenly (Warren, 2006). Australia has a centralised tax system, with the 
broadest tax bases such as personal income, corporate profits, and goods and services 
held by the Commonwealth (the national government). Subsequently, there is a large 
vertical fiscal imbalance, considering the expenditure responsibilities of the States
17
. 
The states are responsible for provision of services such as health, education, policing 
and transport. States‟ own revenues account for only 40% of their expenditure outlay, 
and they are therefore substantially dependent on fiscal transfers from the 
Commonwealth (ibid). Total government health expenditure as a percentage of total 
government expenditure was at 17% in 2006 (WHO, 2009). Transfers to State 
governments are in two forms: Specific Purpose Payments (conditional grants) and 
General Purpose Grants. Over 50% of the transfers to States are in the form of 
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specific purpose grants, while approximately 45% of the transfers are in the form of 
general purpose grants (Institute On Governance, 1998).  
 
Responsibility for funding health services is shared almost evenly between the 
Commonwealth (52%) and the States (48%). Interestingly, the health system is the 
constitutional responsibility of the State, but the Commonwealth has significant 
overlapping responsibilities. The States and Territories have their own health 
authorities and are responsible for hospital services, mental health programmes, dental 
health services, home and community care, child, adolescent and family health 
services, women‟s health programmes, health promotion, rehabilitation systems, 
regulation, inspection, licensing, and monitoring of premises and personnel. The local 
governments are responsible for immunisation services, community based services for 
people with disabilities and a variety of environmental services that contribute to good 
health (Liu and Lee, 1998).. Transfers for the health sector from the Commonwealth 
to the States are in the form of specific purpose grants, allowing the Commonwealth 
to influence expenditure on health at the State level. The Commonwealth uses the 
specific purpose grants (SPGs) to steer the policies of sub-national governments. 
These SPGs are also used as a vehicle for the extension of the Commonwealth‟s 
policies into areas for which the States are held accountable. It has been noted that in 
some cases, SPGs are little more than a mechanism for directing funds towards the 
Commonwealth‟s areas of priority rather than permitting States to pursue their own 
priorities (Warren, 2006). The health system offers universal access to health care, 
regardless of ability to pay, through a government insurance system. Geographically, 
the distribution of health care resources is fairly equitable, although the government is 











for equity concerns the indigenous Australians, who have a considerably lower life 
expectancy than other population groups (Health Systems in Transition, 2006). 
 
2.5.2 Canada 
The Canadian Federal system is characterised by three tiers of government: the 
Federal, Provincial/Territorial
18
 and the Municipal governments (Henceforth, 
provincial government is used to include both provincial governments and territorial 
governments). The federal and provincial governments have concurrent jurisdiction 
on the same tax bases, and both tiers collect personal and corporate income taxes as 
well as taxes on goods and services (VAT). However, customs duties and some excise 
taxes are used exclusively by the central government. Provinces therefore have access 
to considerable financial resources (Rangarajan and Srivastava, 2004).  
 
Provincial responsibilities include education, health, municipal institutions, social 
welfare, police, natural resources and highways. Other responsibilities handled by 
provinces jointly with the federal government are pensions, immigrations, agriculture 
and industry. Given that the majority of resource intensive expenditure 
responsibilities rest with the province, there is a vertical imbalance between revenue 
capacity and provincial expenditure responsibilities. In recent years however, 
provincial expenditure has been almost fully covered by provincial own revenue. 
Different revenue generating capacities across provinces results in horizontal 
imbalances. These imbalances are corrected through fiscal transfers from the federal 
government to the provinces. There are three main avenues of transfers to provinces: 
Equalisation grants, the Canadian Health and Social Services Transfer (CHST) and 
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Territorial Formula Financing (TFF). Recently a small facility called the Health 
Reform Fund (HRF) has been introduced. The equalisation grants are aimed at 
ensuring that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably 
comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation. 
Equalisation grants are mandated by the constitution (ibid).  
 
The federal and provincial governments are jointly involved in the financing universal 
publicly insured and administered health care to Canadians, while the provinces are 
responsible for providing health care.  The federal government‟s primary role in 
health services has been in the provision of financial transfers to provincial 
governments. (Lazar et al., 2002). As at 2006, 17.8 of total government expenditure 
was spent on the health sector (WHO, 2009). Transfers from the federal government 
to the provinces for health services are done through the CHST (which includes the 
recently created Health Reform Fund). The CHST is the largest federal transfer to 
provincial governments (comprising about 72 – 74 percent of total transfers from the 
federal government to the provincial governments). The CHST is meant to support 
health care, boost education and support social assistance. It is a general purpose grant 
and therefore allows the provincial governments flexibility to allocate funds among 
the social programmes according to their own priorities (Rangarajan and Srivastava, 
2004). However, for provinces to receive this transfer from the federal government, 
conditions as set out in the Canada Health Act must be adhered to. These conditions 
among others include: 
 Accessibility of medically necessary services without being impeded by financial 
or other barriers, 











 Comprehensive provision of all medically necessary services 
 Provincial governments to provide the federal government with information about 
how the conditions set out in the Canada Health Act are met as well as how the 
federal government‟s financial contribution to health services has been used (Li, 
2006). 
Similar to Australia, the Canadian health system offers universal coverage for health 
care through the government. Indeed, research shows that there are no significant 




India‟s federal system comprises a central government, 28 states, 7 union territories 
(two with legislatures), over 3,500 urban local bodies and 234,078 rural local bodies 
(Srivastava, 2003, Fjeldstad, 2001). The central government is responsible for 
functions required to maintain macroeconomic stability, international trade and 
relations. Responsibilities assigned to the states include public order, public health, 
agriculture, irrigation, land rights etc. The tax system in India is based on a principle 
of separation. Tax categories are exclusively assigned either to the centre or the states. 
Most broad based taxes have been assigned to the centre, including taxes on income 
and wealth from agricultural sources, corporation tax, taxes on production and 
customs duty. A long list of taxes is assigned to the states, however, only the tax on 
the sale and purchase of goods has been significant for state revenues. The tax 
assignment and expenditure assignment arrangements (between the central 











2002-2003, the states on average raised about 38 percent of government revenues, but 
incurred about 58 percent of expenditures (Singh, 2004).  
 
India has multiple channels for transfers from the central governments to the states to 
address vertical and horizontal imbalances. One channel of transfer is tax sharing: 
shares of personal income tax and union excise duty to states. The criteria for general 
tax sharing among the states are based on: population size, distance from the highest 
per-capita income state (equity), area and infrastructure deficiency, tax effort and 
fiscal discipline
19
. A second is a general purpose grant called the grants-in-aid. These 
are unconditional grants meant to fill the gap between assessed expenditures for each 
state and the sum of projected own revenue and shares in central taxes (Srivastava, 
2003). Both are made under the recommendations of the Finance Commission. A 
third channel is the dispensation of funds (for development purposes) by the Planning 
Commission to states by way of grants and loans. In addition to these, various central 
ministries give specific purpose transfers with or without matching requirements 
(Rao, 2004). Government expenditure on health as a proportion of total government 
expenditure stood at 3.4% in 2006 (WHO, 2009) 
  
Provision of primary health care is the responsibility of the states. The central 
government‟s role in the provision of health care has been to fund centrally sponsored 
programmes, to develop policies and guidelines and to provide statutory grants or 
general transfers to the states. The central government makes all the decisions 
regarding new investments and programmes, such as the financing of new primary 
health care facilities. States account for approximately three-quarters of total health 
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care expenditure, and this is generally dominated by recurrent expenditure. In 
practice, states‟ plans for the health sector in any one year are updates and revisions of 
the plans of the previous year (i.e. they use a historical incrementalist approach). It is 
therefore not surprising that the quality and quantity of health care provision varies 
widely across states, reflecting their varying levels of economic development, their 
health sector priorities and their current and past investments in health. Similarly, 
there are wide variations in health outcomes across states, socio-economic groups and 
across urban and rural areas.  
 
States with the poorest health status tend to have the poorest health infrastructure in 
place. Even when additional funds are made available to address these gaps, the 
practice of the states have been to use the funds in a manner that does not address 
poor health care infrastructure and delivery. The launch of the centrally sponsored 
scheme for the universalization of elementary education has prompted Bajpai and 
Goyal (2005) to suggest a similar drive towards joint provision and financing of 
health by the central and state governments. Although states are heavily reliant on 
central transfers for the financing of primary health care, they appear to have 
significant autonomy in deciding how these funds are used.  
 
2.5.4 Nigeria 
Nigeria formally adopted a fiscal federal system in 1954. This decision was deemed 
suitable to accommodate Nigeria‟s diverse ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups 
under one politico-administrative entity (Adamolekun and Ayo, 1989). Nigeria 
operates a fiscal federal system with the assignment of government functions among 











states, a federal capital territory (FCT) and 774 local government areas (Federal 
Ministry of Health, 2007). 
 
Expenditure responsibilities for matters of national interest such as defence, foreign 
affairs, currency, aviation, and price control are assigned to the federal government. 
The states are responsible for primary education (post-primary is shared with the 
federal government), health and social welfare, culture, commerce and industry. Local 
governments are responsible for land use, markets, primary health care, social 
welfare, sewage and refuse disposal (Ayodele, 2003). The provision of health care is 
the joint responsibility of the federal, state and local governments. The federal 
government is responsible for tertiary health services, the states are responsible for 
secondary health services (specialised services for patients referred from primary 
health care level) and the local governments are responsible for the provision of 
primary health care services, with the support of the state government (National 
Population Commission, 1999). Effectively, state and local governments are not 
accountable to the federal government with regard to how they spend the transfers 
made to them. 
 
The federal government has the rights to revenue from import duties, excise duties, 
export duties, mining rents and royalties, petroleum profit tax, companies-income tax, 
etc. The states collect capital gains tax, personal income tax (other than personal 
income tax for armed forces, police and residents of the Federal Capital Territory 
(FCT), which are collected by federal government), motor vehicle licenses, etc. The 
local governments collect revenue from taxes such as market and trading license and 











collects a significant share of tax revenue. More than 90 percent of total tax revenue is 
collected by the federal government. A small portion of the federally collected 
revenue is retained by the federal government as its independent revenues. The 
balance is paid into the federation account (Ayodele, 2003). Consequently, local 
(Khemani, 2004) and state governments are heavily dependent on transfers from the 
federation account. Vertical revenue sharing of funds from the federation account to 
the federal, state and local levels has been a controversial issue even in the pre-
independence era. The formula for vertical allocations has been modified several 
times in the past. Currently, the revenue sharing formula gives the federal government 
53%, States 27% and local governments 20% (Ekpo, 2004). The horizontal 
allocations to the states are based on criteria outlined in Table 2.2. 
 




Social development 10 
Land mass and terrain 10 
Internal revenue effort 10 
Total  100% 
Source: Udeh J. (2002) 
 
Nigeria operates a three-tier health system. The Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH), 
State Ministries of Health (SMOH) and Local Government Health Departments 
(LGHD) broadly have responsibilities for tertiary, secondary and primary health care 
respectively. In comparison to other countries reviewed, government spending  on 
health as a proportion of total government expenditure is low. In 2006, this figure was 
3.5% (WHO 2009). While the 1998 health policy lists the functions of the different 
government levels, there still exists no legal framework that articulates the roles and 











some extent in stewardship, financing and service provision (Federal Ministry of 
Health, 2007). Although the national health policy has been revised twice since 1998, 
these newer policies do not clearly outline in detail the roles and responsibilities of 
each tier of government in the provision of health care.  This lack of clarity has 
resulted in overlaps and neglect in service delivery, and is identified as the major 
weakness of the Nigerian health system (Federal Ministry of Health, 2004). 
 
Transfers to the federal, state and local governments are in the form of general 
purpose grants (not tied to any conditions). Each tier of government then decides how 
to allocate their budget to the various sectors under their jurisdiction. States and local 
governments are not required to provide budget and expenditure reports to the federal 
government, thus the federal government does not have any influence on the size of 
funds allocated to secondary and primary health care (Federal Ministry of Health, 
2007). 
 
In effect, the local governments have full autonomy in deciding PHC budgets, without 
any guidelines from the federal or state government. Theoretically, such high levels of 
autonomy should result in better responsiveness to the needs of the community. 
However, as literature on decentralisation of the health sector indicates, this may 
result in huge inequities in the public financing of PHC. Recent research conducted in 
Nigeria (Okorafor et al., 2007) revealed that equity is not considered as a priority at 
the state and local government level. In fact, the decision on how much (if any) is 
allocated to PHC is usually made unilaterally by the local government chairperson, 
and not based on any indicator of need. There is little or no community participation 











resources between local government areas is considered inequitable
20
. Some local 
government officials concerned about the lack of accountability and insufficiency of 
PHC expenditure suggested that PHC be funded as a specific purpose grant from the 
federal government (Okorafor et al., 2007) indicating a need for intervention by the 
federal government.  
 
2.5.5 Brazil 
The Brazilian federation has a federal government, 27 state governments (including a 
federal district) and numerous local governments (municipalities). The history of 
federalism in Brazil has been characterised by cycles of decentralisation and 
centralisation of taxation in the amount of financial resources shared by each level of 
government. The Constitution of 1988 produced significant decentralisation of 
revenue and power to SNGs (Castanhar, 2003). Intergovernmental relations cannot be 
established or modified by the federal political and economic authorities according to 
their own arbitrary wishes. Under the national Constitution, the states and 
municipalities enjoy broad autonomy with regard to levying their taxes, deciding 
expenditure, hiring public employees and determining salaries (Afonso, 2004). 
 
Tax assignment is defined by the federal Constitution, and the proceeds of most taxes 
are transferred to SNGs according to non-discretionary constitutional rules. The 
federal government is responsible for import, export and income taxes, tax on rural 
properties, tax on financial operations, a VAT on industrialised products and a tax on 
general wealth. The states are responsible for VAT on goods and services, tax on 
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property transfers due to inheritance, legacy and donation and tax on vehicles. The 
municipalities are responsible for urban property tax, tax on real estate transactions 
and the tax on services (Guardia and Sonder, 2004). In 2002, own revenue generated 
by municipalities was approximately 35% of their total expenditure budget. This 
means that 65% of their total expenditure budget was due to transfers from the federal 
government. On average, states‟ own revenue covered three-quarters of their total 
expenditure. These figures vary significantly across units and the dependence of each 
unit on transfers from the federal government is directly related with its level of 
development (Afonso, 2004). 
 
There are, in general, five types of intergovernmental transfers in Brazil. There are: 
1. Tax Devolution 
2. Tax Compensation 
3. Intra-State Redistributive Transfers (from states to municipalities) 
4. Inter-State Redistributive Transfers  
5. Voluntary Transfers 
 
Tax devolution and tax compensation have no horizontal redistributive effects. These 
simply transfer tax revenue that were centrally collected on behalf of lower levels. 
Therefore they are made strictly according to each SNG‟s tax base and reflect the 
spatial allocation of tax sources across the country. Intra-state redistributions are 
resources reallocated among municipalities within a state, based on criteria other than 
tax collection capacity. These resources are from a fixed portion of the state‟s revenue 
and the distribution among municipalities is based on formulae devised by each state 











states to poorer states (with the federal government as an intermediary) and hence 
address horizontal imbalances. A proportion of the revenues from richer states‟ tax 
bases are sent to the federal government, and these are transferred to poorer states 
(with smaller tax bases) – thus reducing regional disparities in spending capacity. The 
central government also has the ability to do voluntary transfers to states, which 
fluctuate according to the yearly budget (Guardia and Sonder, 2004).  
 
Brazil‟s health care system consists of a complex network of providers and purchasers 
of services, which are interrelated, complementary and competitive. The sections of 
this system are the public sector, which comprises publicly financed and provided 
services; the privately contracted sector, financed by the public sector through 
reimbursement systems; and free choice (private sector) financed by personal or 
corporate medical insurance schemes. The Unified Health System (Sistema Unico de 
Saude –SUS), created in 1990 integrates all public health care services and is 
supplemented by private facilities (Buss and Gadelha, 1996). The three levels of 
government are mandated by law to participate in the SUS. The federal government is 
responsible for formulating national health policies and guidelines, participates in 
financing the SUS, coordinates, monitors and evaluates the health system‟s 
operations, amongst other functions. It is also responsible for regulating health service 
delivery by the private health sector (Pan American Health Organisation, 2005). 
  
The municipality is defined as the sole federal entity assigned the constitutional 
mission of providing health care services to the population. The federal and state 
governments are responsible for providing technical and financial cooperation 











boosted and regulated through specific Basic Operating Norms. These are specific and 
negotiated guidelines, emanating from the Ministry of Health and approved by the 
national representatives of municipal and state health offices, which contemplate the 
budget share between the government levels and the assignments for the management 
and organisation of the health care model. These Basic Operational Norms were 
introduced in 1991 and were modified in 1993 and 1996. These guidelines were 
introduced to assess the managerial capacity of municipalities to effectively deliver 
health services, as a basis for assignment of health care provision. These requirements 
are that, municipalities are committed to: 
 Amplify the management capacity to plan, evaluate and control health services 
 Establish a Health Council 
 Create a Health Fund 
 Elaborate a Management Report for the auditor that should contain the balance 
sheets of the health fund, minutes of the Health Municipal Council‟s meetings, 
and data concerning appropriate fiscal expenditures allocated to health 
 Provide information on local organisational resources for auditing expenditures on 
contracted out-patient and hospitalisation services 
 
Municipalities that have the capacity to meet these requirements achieve autonomy in 
health care delivery. These municipalities obtain 
 The entitlement to authorise, control and evaluate out-patient and hospital services 
(private or philanthropic) 
 Permission to hospitalise (Autorização de Internação Hospitalar (AIH)) 











 The incorporation of epidemiological and health inspection actions, to service 
networks, etc (Center for Public Policies Studies, 2004). 
 
Based on these criteria, municipalities are able to apply for one of only two levels of 
management autonomy (Lobato and Burlandy, 2000). Municipalities with the higher 
grade (referred to as “full management of the municipal system”) possess full 
responsibility for municipal health services (which includes PHC). They receive 
periodic transfers from the National Health Fund and are fully responsible for 
contracting with a range of SUS private and public provider networks. Second grade 
municipalities (referred to as “full management of basic care”) have restricted 
responsibilities - responsibility for all primary health care. However, the SUS 
provider networks receive payment directly from the National Health Fund for other 
municipality health services. In essence, these second grade municipalities have less 
autonomy. Municipalities not able to do any of these remain SUS services providers 
under the control of the state government (Collins et al., 2000, Lobato and Burlandy, 
2000).  
 
There are three sources of income for health care expenditure. The first is from 
municipality own revenue. Municipalities are expected to allocate approximately 10% 
of the municipal budget to health. This is not obligatory, but recommended, and so is 
not always realised. The second source is federal transfers. These are made through 
SUS for payments to providers for care provided, and are done on a monthly basis 
(Collins et al., 2000). For hospital services, these reimbursements are based on 
average hospital costs and not based on actual medical costs of individual patients. 











actual costs but is calculated on the basis of other criteria such as local population size 
and number of treatment facilities (Buss and Gadelha, 1996).  
 
The recipients of the transfers depend on the “grade” of municipalities. In 
municipalities not registered under the BOR (Basic Operating Rule) of 1996, these 
transfers go directly to the provider institutions of outpatient and hospital care. For 
municipalities registered as “full management of basic care”, the funds are only 
transferred directly to the private provider institutions for hospital care. For 
municipalities classified as “full management of the municipal system”, their transfers 
are made to the Municipal Health Fund, and the municipalities have significant 
autonomy in terms of how the money is spent. For these municipalities, the sum of 
their transfer is calculated by the federal level by up-dating previous sums formerly 
transferred under the SUS payments.  
 
The third source is through monthly transfers from the National Health Funds to the 
Municipal Health Funds. This transfer has a fixed and a variable component. The 
fixed component is based on a fixed per-capita value to cover basic care. The variable 
component is made up of five sub-programmes
21
 which establish their own specific 
areas of activity and criteria for allocation of funds. They are designed as an incentive 
for municipal action in the specific areas set out in the programmes. Both fixed and 
variable components come with conditions, and are deposited in special accounts to 
maintain transparency and ensure that the funds are not used for other purposes  
(Collins et al., 2000).  
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 These are: (1) Community Health Worker Programme and Family Health Programme; (2) Basic 
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Although the SUS emphasises universalism and equity, Collins et al (2000) observe 
that there are still concerns regarding the impact of the decentralisation of the health 
system on equity. First, the devolution of responsibility for health service provision 
could exacerbate inequities in the health system. Local revenue collection for 
financing municipal health services favours the well-off areas. Secondly, transfers 
through the SUS for hospital and out-patient care are made directly to the Municipal 
Health Fund for the first grade municipalities. These are calculated based on previous 
SUS transfers. This allocation tends to be based on where hospital and out-patient 
institutions are located, which historically tend to be the richer areas. This type of 
transfer potentially reinforces the unequal allocation of resources in the country.  
 
On the other hand, the fixed element of the transfer of National Health Funds to 
Municipal Health Funds has meant that poorer municipalities have experienced an 
increase in funds for financing health care. The variable element is not specifically 
designed for correcting inequities, and the sub-programmes they fund are limited in 
the amount of funds and impact they have. Nevertheless, there are significant 
inequities in the services offered by the SUS. Access to health care in Brazil varies 
with income, irrespective of region; while there are also regional disparities in the 
availability of health services and utilisation thereof (Buss and Gadelha, 1996). In 
comparison with countries such as Australia and Canada, the Brazilian government‟s 
expenditure on health as a percentage of total government expenditure is low. As at 












2.5.6 Summary of International Experience and Relevance to South Africa 
Before summarising the key lessons from the review of international experience, a 
brief description of the South African context is introduced. This is to allow for some 
discussion and comparison with the experience of countries reviewed. A detailed 
discussion of the South African context is provided in Chapter 4. The provision of 
health and PHC services in South Africa rests with the provincial governments. 
Unconditional grants to the provinces comprise over 60% of total transfers (not only 
for the health sector) to provinces (National Treasury, 2005). So, although provincial 
own-revenue is less than 5% of their expenditure budget, they generally have 
substantial autonomy in deciding budgets for health programmes outside the few that 
are funded through conditional grants. Transfers to provinces in the form of 
conditional grants form a relatively high proportion of total provincial revenue. 
However, PHC is not one of the programmes financed through conditional grants. 
Previous research has shown that decision-making and criteria for allocations to PHC 
are largely done on a historical basis, therefore creating inertia in the move towards a 
more equitable distribution of PHC resources (Thomas et al., 2005).  
 
In Australia, the state and the federal government share the responsibility of financing 
health services. Although the states raise approximately 40% of their resource 
requirements through own revenue, they are still dependent on federal transfers for 
expenditure on health. Transfers to the state for health are in the form of specific 
purpose grants, giving the federal government (commonwealth in Australia) 
significant control over the distribution of health care resources across all of 
Australia. In the Canadian system, the provinces‟ contributions to health care 











unconditional grants, potentially giving the provinces autonomy in prioritising health 
care expenditure as they see fit. With respect to autonomy, this is similar to the South 
African scenario. However, the set of horizontal equalisation transfers and 
constitutional mandates in Canada, ensure that each province provides health services 
that are reasonably comparable at reasonable levels of taxation.  
 
The case of India is similar to that of South Africa. Primary health care is the 
responsibility of the state, and there is little intervention from the federal government 
in terms of determining the size of the budget for PHC. With the historical approach 
to budgeting, health service quality and quantity reflect the level of socioeconomic 
development of the states, as in South Africa. Similarly, in Nigeria, local government 
authorities are responsible for financing and providing PHC without any intervention 
from the state or federal government. Of all the countries reviewed, this is the most 
extreme case as the local governments have complete autonomy in deciding on the 
size of PHC budgets and, “how” and “what” to spend their PHC budget on. Brazil 
differs from all other countries reviewed. Health and PHC services are the 
responsibility of the municipalities. The level of autonomy in providing and managing 
these services depends on the managerial capacity of the municipalities. Although 
municipalities are encouraged to commit a percentage of their own revenue to health, 
this is not generally adhered to. As in India and South Africa, the quality and quantity 
of health services are better in richer states and poorer in poorer states.  
 
Differences in levels of service delivery and expenditure on health and PHC have 











provides a summary of the key features of fiscal federal systems reviewed in this 
section. 
 
Table 2.3 Summary of Country Experiences 
Country Key features 
Australia  States and Territories generate about 40% of expenditure budget 
 Transfers for the health sector from the national government to state 
and territories are in the form of specific purpose grants 
 Commonwealth has substantial influence in amount of resources 
allocated to each state/territory 
 Government health expenditure as percentage of total government 
expenditure is 17% 
Canada  PHC is the responsibility of provinces 
 Provinces generate most of their expenditure requirements 
 National legislation ensures that the quality and quantity of services 
provided in each province is comparable  
 Government health expenditure as percentage of total government 
expenditure is 17.8% 
India  PHC is the responsibility of states 
 States generate about 38% of their expenditure budget 
 Transfers from central government to states are in the form of general 
purpose grants 
 States have full autonomy in determine the amount of resources 
committed to PHC recurrent expenditure 
 Inequities in the distribution of PHC resources 
 Government health expenditure as percentage of total government 
expenditure is 3.4% 
Nigeria  Local governments are responsible for PHC 
 Local governments completely dependent on transfers from the 
central government 
 Transfers to local governments are in the form of general purpose 
grants 
 No accountability to states or the federal government 
 Local governments have full autonomy in determining PHC 
expenditure 
 Inequalities in distribution of PHC resources 
 Government health expenditure as percentage of total government 
expenditure is 3.5% 
Brazil  Municipality is responsible for the provision of PHC 
 Municipalities generate about 35% of their expenditure budget 
 Level of autonomy enjoyed by municipalities depends on their 
capacity to deliver on the functions they have been assigned 
 Transfers from the federal government are of two types; 
- Reimbursement of services (exacerbates inequity) 
- Fixed transfer that ensures a certain level of funds for 
municipalities 
 Transfers are not designed to deal with inequities 
 Inequities in the distribution of PHC 
 Government health expenditure as percentage of total government 











 Literature review of country experiences reinforces the perspective that greater 
autonomy in expenditure responsibilities for health care at local levels can exacerbate 
inequities in the distribution of health care resources. With regards to equity, South 
Africa may well be out of line in giving significant autonomy to provincial 
governments in the determination of PHC funds within their jurisdictions. Another 
apparent anomaly in South Africa (as will be discussed in chapter 4) is that it is the 
most expensive, tertiary health services that are “protected” by specific purpose grants 
(referred to as conditional grants in South Africa). 
 
Evidence from the detailed review of country experiences (although comprising a 
small sample) also shows that in high-income countries, the federal government exerts 
more influence on the distribution of health care spending than in low- and middle-
income countries. Central influence may therefore be a necessity in achieving 
country-wide equity oriented objectives, unless local and central objectives are the 
same. For example, with decentralised units enjoying moderate levels of autonomy, 
countries such as Chile and Colombia have achieved a more equitable distribution of 
public health resources as a result of centrally enforced resource allocation criteria for 
the services that decentralised units provide (Bossert et al., 2003). 
 
Another important issue relates to the overall health policy and level of expenditure. 
For countries such as Canada, Brazil and Australia, universal access to care is part of 
the government‟s policy. This is not the case in India and Nigeria. In addition, 
government expenditure on health in Canada and Australia as proportions of total 
government expenditure is far higher than in other countries. This points to the 











easier to promote equity in a resource rich environment than in one with severe 
resource constraints.  
 
2.6 Summary of Fiscal Federalism and Equity in the Health Sector 
Fiscal federalism involves the decentralisation of authority in expenditure 
responsibilities (and in some cases revenue generation) from the central government 
to lower levels of government. Arguments in favour of decentralisation of authority 
have cited efficiency and increase in welfare as key benefits of this form of 
decentralisation. On the other hand, it is also argued that decentralisation can 
exacerbate inequities in the financing and provision of public services across local 
jurisdictions. In addition, the lack of capacity to deliver on the functions assigned to 
lower levels of government and manage available financial resources to them can be a 
limiting factor in realising the „benefits‟ of decentralisation.  
 
The issue of how decentralised or centralised a system should be is still debatable. 
However, what is known is that the level of decentralisation and the type of functions 
assigned to lower levels of government varies across different fiscal federal systems. 
This is because the nature of fiscal federalism adopted by any country is usually 
dependent on the context of the country – its history, political context, and socio-
economic and other characteristics. Empirical studies have shown that the level of 
decentralisation is positively associated with the size of the country, income per-
capita, level of democracy and the number of ethnic groups within the country 
(Panizza, 1999). The level of decentralisation of a public function is also dependent 












The underlying principles such as community participation and increased 
responsiveness to local needs, which underpin the PHC approach, pose strong 
arguments for decentralisation of this service. On the other hand, the nature of PHC, 
as basic health care such that it is a right for everyone, invokes a very strong notion of 
equity. It is argued that the central government is in a better position to promote 
equity in the distribution of goods and services throughout a country.  
 
Fiscal federalism is a system of governance and therefore affects the structure and 
design of all public sectors. In general, the adoption of a fiscal federal system is not 
done primarily with health sector concerns in mind (Okorafor and Thomas, 2007). 
The public health system is designed around the prevailing fiscal federal system and 
not vice versa. Consequently, the nature of fiscal federalism will have implications for 
the performance of the public health sector. Factors such as the level of government 
that is responsible for a health service, the level of autonomy enjoyed by that level of 
government and its capacity, differences in local preferences and needs, and the 
nature of intergovernmental transfers to that level of government can impact on the 
equitable distribution of the service across local jurisdictions. This is the focus of the.  
 
The next chapter develops a conceptual framework that describes the linkages 
between intergovernmental fiscal arrangements and their implications for the 
equitable distribution of resources for services that are of national concern, such as 















The conceptual framework developed in this chapter explores key issues pertaining to 
fiscal federalism and PHC and how these can impact on patterns of distribution of 
financial resources for PHC. The framework is introduced by first reviewing the key 
issues relevant to financing of services within a fiscal federal context. The next step 
introduces the PHC approach and how it fits into a fiscal federal context. These will 
then form the basis for the framework developed in the chapter.  
 
Literature identifies at least two major reasons why countries that have moved to a 
fiscal federal system have done so (and these are not mutually exclusive). First is that 
fiscal federalism entails potential welfare and efficiency gains to the population. This 
is based on the premise that lower levels of government are better informed about the 
needs and preferences of the populations within their jurisdiction than the central 
government. These gains are said to be best achieved if responsibilities for each type 
of public expenditure are assigned to the level of government that most closely 
represents the beneficiaries of these services. The second is that fiscal federalism 
promotes democracy by promoting community participation in public decision-
making. While these are the main arguments in favour of fiscal decentralisation, the 
reason for and type of fiscal federal system adopted in any country is significantly 












Literature also identifies potential problems with fiscal federalism. Decentralisation of 
responsibilities to SNGs requires more managers at lower levels of government and 
these are usually in short supply, especially in developing countries. This contributes 
to problems of managerial capacity for SNGs in delivering on their responsibilities. 
Secondly, fiscal federalism erodes the benefits from economies of scale in the 
financing and provision of services that are decentralised to lower levels of 
government. Also, literature is of the view that decentralisation can adversely affect 
the equitable distribution of financial resources across regions within the country. 
This is primarily due to SNG differences in all or some of the following: revenue 
generating capacity, ability to utilise resources, and differences in local preferences. 
These three factors form the core of the discussion on fiscal federalism and equity. 
Each is discussed in turn.  
 
It is not surprising that fiscal federalism is deemed to have the potential to create 
inequities in resource distribution across SNG jurisdictions. Within most processes 
that have both equity and efficiency implications, there is often a trade-off between 
promoting equity and promoting efficiency. The main consideration for adopting a 
fiscal federal system (at least theoretically) is to improve efficiency in resource use. 
Moreover, equity is usually not a major consideration in decision-making to introduce 
fiscal federal systems.  
 
Differential revenue generating capacity at SNG level results in differences in 
available financial resources that can be committed to the provision of any service by 











own revenue are invariably wealthier (with wealthier populations), this leads to 
inequities in financing of services such as health care.  
 
Differences in ability to utilise available resources at SNG levels are due to 
differences in capacity across SNGs. Capacity here refers to SNG‟s ability to perform 
appropriate tasks effectively, efficiently and sustainably. These abilities (or lack 
thereof) are associated with the mix and quantity of human resources, organisational 
structure and management style, the level of coordination amongst units of 
government operating within and across SNGs, the broader institutional environment 
and the overall socio-economic and political environment of the country within which 
all government agencies operate. Of course the last two aspects of capacity can affect 
all local jurisdictions similarly and therefore are not as critical for this discussion.  
 
Regions with greater capacity to utilise funds are better able to efficiently convert 
available resources to goods and services that are needed by the communities they 
serve. This can lead to inequities in the level and quality of health services provided in 
different localities; and even further exacerbates existing inequities if SNGS have 
differential capacity to generate their own revenue. This is especially true where 
regions with lower capacity are not able to fully utilise the funds available to them or 
absorb additional funds allocated to them. In addition, and as highlighted in earlier 
sections, fiscal federalism requires a greater number of managers, and in regions 
where managers are in short supply, managerial capacity is compromised.  
 
The third factor refers to differences in local preferences. This factor is very critical to 











fiscal federalism is based on differential preferences at local levels. If the needs and 
preferences at all local levels are the same, then there is no need to decentralise 
decision-making as the centre can efficiently and effectively respond to the needs and 
preferences of the entire population within the country. If the responsibility for 
providing public services is transferred to the level of government that most closely 
represents the beneficiaries of the service (condition for maximising efficiency and 
welfare gains), then services such as PHC should be the responsibility of SNGs.  
 
For SNGs to adequately respond to the preferences of their communities, the SNGs 
would need to have some decision-making authority around expenditure on services 
that they are responsible for. If SNGs have autonomy in deciding how to spend 
resources available to them, then there would most likely be differential spending on 
any public goods and services as the perceptions of need and preferences for any 
service will differ across geographic areas. Financial autonomy necessary to respond 
to the specific preferences of communities is therefore an important aspect of fiscal 
federalism‟s ability to produce efficiency and welfare gains, without which fiscal 
federalism may not be necessary. Interestingly, this means that differences in 
preferences for public services across regions (the basis for arguments in favour of 
fiscal decentralisation) promote differences in the amount of financial resources 
committed by SNGS to such services under a fiscal federal system. Of course, with 
competing services and differential preferences at SNG levels, there is a greater scope 
for inequities in expenditure on any one particular service across SNGs.  
 
To make this last point clearer, consider two SNGs (A and B) under a fiscal federal 











health care and primary education. Suppose that the population size and available 
expenditure budget in both regions are the same, and also with similar PHC needs (as 
calculated by some uniform measure of need). However, local preferences under these 
two jurisdictions are such that region A has a greater preference for PHC, while 
region B has a greater preference for primary education. If local preferences drive 
resource allocation within these two regions, then region A will spend more of its 
budget on PHC, while region will spend more of its budget on primary education. 
While the two SNGs are indeed responding to the preferences of their jurisdictions, 
and hence acting in line with the tenets of fiscal federalism, this results in an 
inequitable distribution of PHC expenditure.  
  
Based on the literature, intergovernmental relations within fiscal federal systems 
differ from country to country. However, each fiscal federal system must grapple with 
some key questions. How these are addressed in any system will determine to a large 
extent how revenue generating capacity, differences in ability to utilise funds and 
differences in local preferences will impact on equity in the distribution of finances; 
these are: 
 What types of taxes are assigned to different levels of government? 
 How much expenditure responsibilities are assigned to different levels of 
government? 
 What types of transfers are employed to address any fiscal imbalances that 
may arise? 
 
Ultimately, the way in which a fiscal federal system deals with these questions also 











SNGs is such that they create large differentials in revenue generating capacity 
between SNGs, then there is greater scope for inequities in the financing of public 
services at SNG level. For example taxes based on natural minerals within SNGs can 
create differential revenue generating capacities because all regions would not have 
the same amount of natural mineral resources. However, differences in availability of 
resources to SNGs can be eliminated through transfers from the centre. If transfers are 
designed in such a way that SNGs with lower capacity to generate own revenue have 
the same amount of financial resources as those that have a greater capacity to 
generate own revenue, then the problem of differential capacity to generate own 
revenue is eliminated – as is the scope for inequities arising from differential capacity 
to generate own revenue. 
 
The amount of expenditure responsibility assigned to SNGs in relation to their 
revenue generating capacity can create fiscal imbalances. If SNG‟s expenditure 
responsibilities require more resources than are available from own revenue, then 
SNGs will depend on transfers from the centre to offset this gap. The greater the fiscal 
gap, the greater the level of dependence of SNGs on transfers from the centre. In this 
scenario, SNGs may well become more accountable to the centre with regards to how 
they use these transfers. In this case the central government can gain influence over 
the expenditure behaviour of SNGs, thus reducing SNG autonomy. However, if the 
transfers to SNGs are largely in the form of general purpose grants, this effectively 
results in an increase in SNG revenue and less accountability of SNGs to the central 
government over the use of transferred funds. So, the level of vertical imbalance, and 
the type of transfers from the centre to offset vertical imbalances can determine the 











greater the autonomy that is enjoyed by SNGs, the more adequately empowered they 
are to respond to the unique needs of their communities. If the needs and preferences 
of communities differ considerably (as they should if the country has adopted a fiscal 
federal system), then there is greater scope for inequities in spending on public goods 
and services across SNGs within the country. 
 
Review of literature on equity within fiscal federal systems suggests that achieving 
equity in the distribution of resources is a responsibility that is best managed by the 
central government. This assertion is in line with predictions of the literature on fiscal 
federalism and equity. However, if intergovernmental arrangements are such that they 
allow for substantial interference by the central government in SNG fiscal matters
22
, 
then SNGs lose autonomy. The loss of fiscal autonomy at SNG level reduces their 
ability to adequately respond to the unique preferences of their communities and 
therefore negates the very reason for adopting a fiscal federal system.   
 
In summary, literature on the subject leads to the prediction that fiscal federalism 
creates greater scope for the inequitable financing of services that are the 
responsibility of SNGs. 
 
Literature on PHC supports the view that PHC should be managed by a lower 
administrative level of the health system, with substantial decision-making autonomy. 
This is to allow for effective responsiveness of the health system to unique needs of 
different communities. The PHC approach also encourages community participation. 
In this regard there is a parallel between the PHC approach and fiscal federalism; and 
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PHC fits in very well within a fiscally decentralised government system. Based on the 
nature of PHC, it should be managed by a SNG level.  
 
The discussions above provide sufficient material for constructing a conceptual 
framework that allows for the assessment of the likely implications of various 
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements on the equitable distribution of PHC resources. 
The framework is developed on certain premises: 
1. PHC is the responsibility of SNGs 
2. The central government considers equity in expenditure on PHC as a priority 
3. Differences exist in local needs and preferences between SNG jurisdictions, 
and these preferences determine the allocation of resources to competing 
services that SNGs are responsible for 
 
Figure 3.1 provides a diagrammatic illustration of the implications of 
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements on equity in PHC expenditure across SNGs. 
The diagram shows that differences in SNG capacity create scope for inequities in 
PHC allocation. Differences in capacity result in varied abilities of SNGs to prioritise 
and allocate resources (accordingly) to PHC services. The effect of differences in 
SNG capacity on equity can be reinforced by high levels of fiscal autonomy at SNG 
levels, as this leaves less room for the central government to interfere in SNG 
shortcomings as a result of low capacity. As discussed earlier, the proportion of total 
expenditure requirements generated by SNGs determines their level of dependence on 
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Fig. 3.1 Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements and Equity in PHC Allocations 
                  Direct Cause    (+) Positive influence on target box (greater scope for inequity)   
             Reinforcement   (-) Negative influence on target box (creates less scope for inequity)   












However, the effect of revenue generating capacity on autonomy is subject to the 
nature of transfers from the central government and more directly by the 
constitutional provisions on the responsibilities and authority of each tier of 
government. The nature of taxes assigned to SNGs obviously determines their 
revenue generating capacity. 
 
Differences in local preferences, high levels of autonomy at SNG level and 
differences in SNG revenue generating capacity also directly create greater scope for 
inequities in allocations to PHC. Differences in local preferences between SNGs and 
high levels of autonomy at SNG levels reinforce each other to create greater scope for 
inequities. However, if grants from the central government have an equalisation 
component, then this will dampen the effect of different revenue generating capacity 
between SNGs on inequity in PHC allocations. 
 
Based on this framework, it may be necessary for the central government to intervene 
in the financing of national priorities such as PHC to achieve a more equitable 
distribution of the services (such as health care and PHC). Whatever the case, SNGs 
in a fiscal federal context generally prefer to have greater autonomy in planning, 
financing and providing good/services under their jurisdiction. Subsequently, any 
intervention from the centre is likely to meet with some resistance from SNGs. Any 
form of intervention from the central government in fiscal arrangements, to promote 













3.1 Predictions for the South African Context 
Based on the conceptual framework developed, it is then possible to make predictions 
concerning the equitable distribution of PHC allocations for South Africa. In South 
Africa, there are three levels of government: the national, provincial and local 
governments. Provinces are responsible for financing and providing PHC, through a 
district health system. In general, provinces depend on transfers from nationally 
collected revenue for 95% of their expenditure budget. Under this scenario, there 
should be a significant level of accountability of provinces to the national 
government. However, most of the transfers to provinces are in the form of general 
purpose grants and this therefore restores the fiscal autonomy of provinces; and 
specific purpose grants to the health sector are not for PHC. Transfers to provincial 
governments are designed to ensure that all provinces are able to deliver on their 
responsibilities, irrespective of their individual revenue generating capacities. This 
therefore dampens any potentially adverse equity effect of differential revenue 
generating capacities amongst provincial governments.  
 
Previous research has shown that the more rural provinces find it difficult to attract 
and retain the right mix of personnel, especially managers at provincial and district 
offices. Incidentally, these rural provinces are those that have greater needs for PHC. 
Therefore, differences in human resource capacity exist between SNGs. If it is 
assumed that local preferences for various services provided by provinces differ (and 
it is reasonable to do so), then considering the high level of autonomy enjoyed by 
provinces and the differences in provincial capacity, the distribution of PHC 











PHC expenditure across provinces and districts has in recent years been moving 
towards a more equitable distribution.  
 
Subsequent chapters will provide a more detailed review of the South African context 
and analysis of data collected for South Africa. The analysis of the data will provide 
answers to why the distribution of PHC resources in South Africa goes against the 
predictions of the literature and the conceptual framework. 
 
The next chapter provides a more detailed overview of the South African context. In 
this next chapter, the history and nature of intergovernmental arrangements are 
discussed; this will also include a summary review of research on equity in the 
distribution of resources for health and PHC in South Africa. This chapter on the 
South African context precedes the chapter on methods because a good understanding 
of the South African context allows for better appreciation of the methods used for 














The South African Context 
 
This chapter provides more detailed information about the South African context. A 
brief history of South Africa‟s health system and general policy environment is 
described. The policy goals of the newly democratised South Africa, the political 
environment that shaped the nature of the fiscal federal system adopted and current 
intergovernmental arrangements are also described. In the literature review chapter, it 
was identified that contextual factors such as historical, political, economic, social and 
cultural (to name a few) factors are important determinants of the nature of fiscal 
federalism adopted. They are therefore important issues to consider in assessing the 
performance of a fiscal federal system.  
 
4.1. Pre-1994 South Africa 
As early as the 1930s, it was recognised that the haphazard growth of entrepreneurial 
medical services could not adequately provide for the diverse and growing South 
African population. However, suggestions for the institution of a national health 
service to address this problem by the Medical Association of South Africa in 1931, 
and the National Health Service Commission in 1944 were rejected. In 1948, a 
Nationalist government was elected and with it, the institution of apartheid policies 
(Benatar, 1997). Under this regime, and contrary to suggestions of a national health 
service, there was a strong emphasis on privatisation of the health system. Also, a 
policy of racial segregation and discrimination was systematically implemented. The 
country‟s political and administrative system was structured along racial lines into ten 











„white‟ South Africa. Most of the „whites‟ lived in cities that had modern 
infrastructure, with well funded schools and modern hospitals. Most urban African 
(Black) localities had much poorer services, and large numbers lived in informal 
squatter settlements. Although there were approximately 800 local governments 
across the country and administrative structures at the province level, South Africa 
remained in practice a highly centralised state. Major decisions on policy, planning, 
budgeting and resource allocation were controlled by the central government (Gilson 
et al., 1999, National Treasury, 1999). These policies where associated with a health 
system characterised by racial discrimination, fragmentation, poor coordination, 
duplication of services, and a predominant focus on hospital-based services, rather 
than primary care. Within this era, the private health sector flourished; providing 
excellent health care services for predominantly white patients who had health 
insurance (Benatar, 1997, Chetty, 2007). The apartheid policies of the pre-1994 era 
left a legacy of severe socio-economic disparities in South Africa (Yemek, 2005). 
This was the situation that the newly elected democratic government inherited.  
 
4.2. Post-1994 South Africa and Fiscal Federalism 
The first democratic election in 1994 was characterised by an overwhelming victory 
by the African National Congress (ANC) (Chetty, 2007).  This first democratic 
government faced the immense task of resource redistribution and ensuring the 
provision of a range of social services to meet prevailing socio-economic challenges 
within resource constraints (Okorafor et al., 2003, Yemek, 2005). The ANC, in 
preparation to govern the country had prepared a Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) (ANC, 1994) and a National Health Plan (ANC, 1994). The RDP 











a result of the apartheid era.  The ANC Health Plan advocated for a single well 
coordinated, unified and comprehensive national health system, with a strong 
emphasis on equity and the primary health care approach. The main objective was to 
reduce inequities and improve access to better health services for the poor, 
underserved and vulnerable. Subsequently, the new government used these plans as 
the basis for drafting the “White Paper for the Transformation of the National Health 
System for South Africa” (McIntyre and Klugman, 2003, African National Congress, 
1994, Chetty, 2007).  In 1994 a resource allocation formula was introduced by the 
Department of Health, aimed specifically at addressing the geographic inequities in 
public health care spending. At that time, the Department of Health was given a 
national budget for health, and through the Function Committee for health, 
determined provincial allocations based on a formula. The formula supported major 
shifts in resources to areas formerly under-funded, with the aim of meeting a five-year 
plan for achieving equity. However, the significant reduction in allocations to some 
provinces and large increases in others raised concerns around financial instability 
and provinces‟ capacity to cope with the changes.  Subsequently, in 1996/97, this 
process of achieving equity within 5 years was slowed down (Chetty, 2007).   
 
This slow down in the redistribution of health care resources coincided with the 
adoption of a new constitution in South Africa. In 1996, South Africa adopted a new 
constitution that established three separate, independent and interrelated spheres of 
government: a national government, nine provincial governments and local 
governments
23
. The adopted constitution and level of autonomy assigned to the 
national and regional governments was a result of a compromise reached between the 
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different political parties. When the constitution and the blueprint for fiscal federalism 
was being developed, the outgoing white minority National Party, and the Zulu 
nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party advocated for a strong form of federalism. 
However, the alliance of the ANC, the South African Communist party and Council 
of South African trade Unions, preferred strong central government structures. The 
ANC feared that autonomous regional government structures would decrease its 
ability to govern and also would entrench existing disparities. The result was a 
compromise, with the constitution describing the country as one sovereign democratic 
state, and at the same time establishing three spheres of government that are distinct, 
interdependent and interrelated. In essence, the constitution calls for unity of the 
country and at the same time provides for decentralisation of the government 
(Dollery, 1998, Wehner, 2000). 
 
In the new South Africa, each sphere of government was assigned its own powers, 
functions and responsibilities, with the national government responsible for managing 
the country‟s affairs while sharing the responsibility for providing basic social 
services with the sub-national governments. The provinces were mandated to deliver 
most basic services including education, health and welfare. Local governments are 
responsible for certain local services and infrastructure such as water, sanitation, 
municipal health services
24
 and electricity. The national government‟s intervention in 
provincial and local government decisions was and is still defined and limited by the 
constitution (National Treasury, 1999). The constitution allows the national executive 
to intervene when a province cannot or does not fulfil an executive obligation, by 
taking any appropriate steps to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation. This could be 
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in the form of issuing a directive or assuming direct responsibility for the relevant 
obligation (Republic of South Africa, 1996). In the 1997/98 financial year, provinces 
for the first time (since they were created in 1994) were responsible for independently 
drafting and implementing their own budgets (Wehner, 2000). This has continued to 
date.  
 
South Africa‟s fiscal system is based on a revenue-sharing model, with provinces 
largely dependent on transfers from the national government, while local governments 
are only partially dependent (National Treasury, 2001). The constitution stipulates 
that nationally raised revenue be distributed equitably between the three spheres of 
government, and the provincial share must be divided equitably between the nine 
provinces, and that other allocations may be made from the national share with or 
without conditions. Despite their significant expenditure responsibilities, provinces 
have limited sources of own revenue. While the constitution confers significant 
decision-making autonomy on provincial governments, it creates a monitoring and 
coordination role for the national government to ensure macroeconomic stability, 
achievement of national policy goals and obligations, and a consistent standard of 
services so that citizens are not prejudiced based on their place of residence. These are 
to be achieved through framework legislation or setting norms and standards 
(National Treasury, 1999).  Promoting a consistent standard of services across the 
country by the national government through norms and standards is a policy objective 
in the right direction, considering the geographic inequalities in the country. However, 
it is not clear what mechanisms are in place to ensure that nationally defined norms 
and standards are adhered to by the provincial governments. As will be fully 











provinces is such that the national government can do very little to influence fiscal 
operations at the provincial levels. This is a disjoint between policy statements and the 
institutional structure. 
 
Provinces are responsible for implementing national policies affecting concurrent 
functions (National Treasury, 1999). The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC)
25
 
originally established in the 1993 Interim Constitution is to play a key role in the 
development and maintenance of inter-governmental fiscal and financial relations in 
South Africa (Financial and Fiscal Commission, 1999). Since then, and also based on 
recommendations of the FFC, intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa have 
evolved over the years, although still maintaining the general framework adopted by 
the 1996 constitution.  
 
4.3. Revenue Generation 
Based on the constitution, revenue raising powers still remain highly centralised in the 
national government. The most productive taxes such as the value added tax (VAT) 
and personal and corporate income tax are reserved for the national government. This 
is because collection is easier to administer at the national level. Also this avoids 
duplication associated with a more decentralised system (Ajam, 2005). Provincial 
own revenue is from road traffic fees, hospital patient fees, gambling levies, and other 
once-off revenues, which amount to less than 5% of their total expenditure budgets 
(National Treasury, 2001, Ajam, 2005). Local governments have a higher revenue 
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generating capacity. They are entitled to impose rates on property and surcharges on 
fees for services provided by or on behalf of the municipality (e.g. electricity or 
sewage). For example, in 2007/2008, only about 22% of total local government 
operating revenue was due to national transfers (National Treasury, 2008). 
 
4.4. Expenditure Responsibilities 
The functions allocated to the national government include expenditures related to 
defence, tertiary education, justice, correctional services, water affairs and foreign 
affairs. Pensions and unemployment compensation are also the responsibility of the 
national government (Yemek, 2005).  
 
The constitution assigns certain responsibilities for the delivery of goods and services 
to provinces and local governments with or without concurrent national government 
responsibility. Schedule 4 of the constitution lists the functional areas with concurrent 
national and provincial legislative competence (complete list in Appendix A). These 
include agriculture, disaster management, education at all levels (excluding tertiary 
education), environment, health services, housing, road traffic regulation and tourism. 
Part B of schedule 4 lists concurrent national and local government responsibilities, 
including air pollution, building regulations, local tourism, municipal health services, 
trading regulations etc (complete list also in Appendix A).  
 
Schedule 5 (Part A) of the constitution lists functional areas of exclusive provincial 
legislative competence, such as abattoirs, ambulance services, liquor licensing, etc; 
while Part B lists exclusive local government matters such as beaches, cemeteries, 











4.4.1 Responsibilities for Health 
Currently, and based on the National Health Act (NHA) of 2003, the responsibility for 
health lies with the National Government, the Provincial Governments and every 
Local Government
26
. Each of these spheres plays a different role in the health sector. 
Local Governments were previously responsible for the provision of preventive 
primary health care services and infectious diseases control (McIntyre and Klugman, 
2003). The 2003 NHA narrowed the roles of Local Government in health to 
environmental health services; which comprise of: 
1. Monitoring water quality 
2. Food control 
3. Waste management 
4. Health surveillance of premises 
5. Surveillance and prevention of communicable diseases (excluding 
immunisations) 
6. Vector control 
7. Environmental pollution control 
8. Disposal of the dead 
9. Chemical safety (Republic of South Africa, 2004) 
 
Provincial Governments have the greatest responsibility for the provision of health 
care services. They are currently responsible for the provision of both hospital 
services and the full range of PHC services. The NHA of 2003 also established a 
district health system. The districts are administrative arms of the provinces and are 
responsible for the provision of PHC services. In total there are 53 health districts in 
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South Africa. The National Government is primarily responsible for health policy 
development and overall coordination of the health sector (ibid).  
 
In the following section the process for financial allocations to provinces and local 
governments is detailed. The section focuses heavily on transfers to provinces, as 
these are the transfers that finance the health sector and therefore PHC.  
 
4.5. Revenue Sharing  
Nationally collected revenue is divided between the national, province and local 
government in what is termed the “vertical split” of revenue. Before the vertical split, 
a certain proportion of nationally collected revenue is reserved (unallocated to any 
sphere of government) for unforeseen expenditure and new policy priorities in future 
years. Currently, the national government receives 49.5% of nationally collected 
revenue, while provinces and local government spheres receive 43% and 7.6% of 
nationally collected revenue respectively (National Treasury, 2008). The total amount 
of funds available to provinces and local governments through the vertical split is by a 
combination of specific purpose and general purpose grants (National Treasury, 
2003). Within the South African context, the specific purpose grants are referred to as 
conditional grants, while the general purpose grants are referred to as equitable shares. 
A detailed discussion on these transfers follows in the next section. 
 
The constitution entitles provincial governments to an equitable share of the revenue 
collected nationally, in line with their expenditure responsibilities and functions 
(Ajam, 2005). Conditional grants are meant to support national priorities, particularly 











 Enable national priorities to be provided for in the budgets of other spheres of 
government 
 Promote national norms and standards 
 Compensate provinces for cross border flows and inter-provincial benefits 
 Effect transition by supporting capacity-building and structural adjustments 
 Address backlogs and regional disparities in social infrastructure (National 
Treasury, 2003).  
 
Both provinces and local governments receive funds through conditional grants and 
equitable shares. The FFC makes recommendations on the size of conditional grants 
and equitable chares, and services that are funded through conditional grants, but the 
ultimate responsibility for deciding on these allocations rests with the National 
Treasury.  
 
4.5.1 Conditional Grants to Provinces 
Conditional grants were first introduced in the 1998 budget. Interestingly, the health 
sector was the only sector that received a conditional grant at that time. Conditional 
grants to provinces included a supplementary component to augment provincial 
funding of social services and assist in improved financial management. The third 
component was to assist in the transfer of functions and staff to local government and 
to ease local government adjustment to the formula distribution of the equitable 
shares. The conditional grants for the health sector were to support medical training, 
provision of specialised health services, hospital rehabilitation and construction, and 













Since then, more sectors have received conditional grants, and health sector 
programmes funded through conditional grants have also increased. For example in 
the 2006/07 financial year there were conditional grants in the following sectors: 
Agriculture, Arts and Culture, Education, Health, Housing, Land Affairs, National 
Treasury, Provincial and Local Government, Sport and Recreation South Africa, 
Trade and Industry, and Transport. Conditional grants to provinces for the health 
sector were: 
 Comprehensive HIV and Aids Grant 
 Forensic Pathology Services Grant 
 Health Professionals Training and Development Grant 
 Hospital Revitalisation Grant 
 National Tertiary Services Grant (National Treasury, 2006) 
 
Conditional grants to the health sector in recent years have funded approximately 20% 
of overall health expenditure
27
. Table 4.1 shows the amount allocated to each 
conditional grant within the health sector in the 2006/07 financial year.  
 
Table 4.1 Conditional Grants in the Health Sector – 2006/07 
Conditional Grant ZAR Million 
Comprehensive HIV and AIDS grant 1,616 
Forensic pathology services grant 562 
Health professionals training and development grant 1,520 
Hospital revitalisation grant 1,527 
National tertiary services grant 4,981 
Source: 2007 National Budget Review (National Treasury, 2007) 
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By far the national tertiary services grant receives the highest amount of resources in 
comparison to other programmes funded through conditional grants. 
 
The Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Grant is to enable the health sector to develop a 
specific response to the HIV and AIDS epidemic.  The grant also supports (in addition 
to other HIV and AIDS prevention programmes) specific interventions such as 
voluntary counselling and testing, prevention of mother to child transmission, post 
exposure prophylaxis and home based care. 
 
The Health Professions Training and Development Grant (HPTD) compensates 
provinces for their role in supporting teaching and training of health science students. 
It enables the shifting of teaching activities from central to regional and district 
hospitals. The largest portion is distributed to provinces according to a formula based 
on the number of current medical students. A further component provides for a phased 
increase in the number of medical specialists and registrars in historically under-
served provinces to address inter-provincial inequities in post-graduate training 
capacity. 
 
The Hospital Revitalisation Grant is meant for transforming and modernising 
infrastructure and equipment in hospitals. It focuses on projects in which an entire 
hospital is upgraded. The Hospital Management and Quality Improvement Grant 
which facilitates management development initiatives including personnel, 
procurement delegations and financial management capacity has been phased into the 
Hospital Revitalisation Grant (See review of previous conditional grants to health 












The National Tertiary Services Grant is to fund national tertiary services delivered in 
27 hospitals across the nine provinces and ensure the equitable access to basic tertiary 
services in the country. Given the specialised nature of the services, they are currently 
concentrated in large cities such as Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban and 
Bloemfontein (National Treasury, 2005). 
 
Programmes in the health sector funded by conditional grants have changed in the 
past years. Table 4.2 provides a list of conditional grants to health in the past 5 years. 
Over time, the number of conditional grants to the health sector has reduced, as has 
the overall number of conditional grants to provinces (National Treasury, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006).  
 
Conditional grants to provinces form a small proportion of the transfer from 
nationally collected revenue. For example, in the 2007/08 financial year, conditional 
grants form about 15% of total transfers to provinces (National Treasury, 2007). This 
value has reduced over the years. In the 2005/06 financial year conditional grants 
formed about 35% of total provincial budgets (National Treasury, 2005). The 
proportion of health expenditure funded through conditional grants is similarly low. 
For example in the 2006/07 financial year about 19% of total provincial health 
expenditure was from conditional grants   (National Treasury, 2007). 
 
It is puzzling that PHC has never been funded through conditional grants. Since 1994, 
national health policies have advocated for a unified health system with a strong 











Table 4.2 Conditional grants to the health sector in South Africa: 2000 - 2008 
Financial Year Conditional Grants to the health sector 
2007/08 
(National Treasury, 2008) 
1. Comprehensive HIV and AIDS 
2. Forensic Pathology Services 
3. Health Professionals Training and Development 
4. Hospital Revitalisation 
5. National Tertiary Services 
2006/07 
(National Treasury, 2007) 
1. Comprehensive HIV and AIDS 
2. Forensic Pathology Services 
3. Health Professionals Training and Development 
4. Hospital Revitalisation 
5. National Tertiary Services 
2005/06 
(National Treasury, 2006) 
1. Comprehensive HIV and AIDS 
2. Forensic Pathology Services 
3. Health Professionals Training and Development 
4. Hospital Revitalisation 
5. National Tertiary Services 
2004/05 
(National Treasury, 2005) 
1. Comprehensive HIV and AIDS  
2. Health Professionals Training and Development  
3. Hospital Management and Quality Improvement 
4. Hospital Revitalisation  
5. Integrated Nutrition Programme  
6. National Tertiary Services  
2003/04 
(National Treasury, 2004) 
1. Comprehensive HIV and AIDS  
2. Health Professional Training and Development 
3. Hospital Revitalisation 
4. Integrated Nutrition Programme 
5. National Tertiary Services  
6. Hospital Construction – Academic Hospitals 
7. Medico-legal 
2002/03 
(National Treasury, 2003) 
1. HIV/AIDS 
2. Health Professionals Training and Development 
3. Hospital Management and Quality Improvement 
4. Hospital Revitalisation  
5. Integrated Nutrition Programme  
6. National Tertiary Services 
7. Cholera Epidemic – KwaZulu Natal 
8. Pretoria Academic Hospital 
2001/02 
(National Treasury, 2002) 
1. HIV/AIDS 
2. Health Professionals Training and Development 
3. Hospital Revitalisation  
4. Integrated Nutrition Programme  
5. National Tertiary Services 
6. Nkosi Luthuli Academic Hospital 
7. Pretoria Academic Hospital 
2000/01 
(National Treasury, 2001) 
1. HIV/AIDS 
2. Integrated Nutrition Programme  
3. Professional Training and Research 
4. Hospital Rehabilitation 
5. Central Hospital 














Conditional grants are used in order to enable national priorities to be provided for in 
the budget of other spheres of government and to promote national norms and 
standards. Given the emphasis on the PHC approach and equity, it would appear that 
PHC services should have been funded through conditional grants. Prior to the 
formulation of conditional grants, the FFC proposed strict conditionality on grants for 
supporting PHC and the district health system (Financial and Fiscal Commission, 
1996). This proposal was rejected by government; instead higher levels of hospital 
services were protected through conditional grants as can be seen in Table 4.1 and 
Table 4.2.   
 
4.5.2 Equitable Shares 
The second type of transfer to provinces is the “equitable shares”. The equitable 
shares are general purpose grants and therefore can be viewed as additional provincial 
revenue. This transfer allows the provinces to provide services and perform functions 
assigned to them (i.e. targets the problem of vertical imbalances). Equitable shares to 
provinces are determined by an equitable shares formula that is updated annually, 
taking into account the recommendations of the Financial and Fiscal Commission 
(FFC). For example, in the 2007 budget, the equitable shares formula has three main 
components and three smaller components. The components of the formula are 
designed to capture the relative demand for services between provinces, while taking 
into account particular provincial circumstances. The weights and components of this 
formula are not indicative budgets or guidelines to provinces as to how much is to be 












If it is assumed that the equitable shares formula allocates resources to provinces in a 
way that allows each province to provide the same quantity and quality of services in 
each sector, then they should be used as indicative budgets for different sectors at the 
level of the province. However, under South Africa‟s intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements, provinces are supposed to have some fiscal autonomy in order to 
respond to the unique preferences of their constituencies. This being the case, the use 
of the equitable share formula can only be viewed as a process for ensuring that no 
province is relatively financially disadvantaged in meeting the functions it has been 
assigned.  This raises two key issues. First, is whether the equitable shares formula 
actually distributes resources equitably? This will be discussed in a later section. The 
second issue has already been raised in the Chapter 3. Allowing provinces fiscal 
autonomy to respond to local preferences will inevitably lead to differences in the 
amount of financial resources committed to any sector or programme within a sector 
across provinces. This is because the preferences of different local communities will 
invariably be different. So, based on this line of reasoning, the per capita health 
budgets for each province will be different and the per capita PHC budget will also be 
different. Considering that PHC is such an important aspect of national health policy 
within the broader objective of achieving equity in health, it is surprising that the 
process for determining its budget is left to budgetary processes within provinces that 




Table 4.3 provides a summary of the components of the equitable shares formula for 
2007/08, and the resulting proportion of total funds for equitable shares that are 
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distributed across provinces. A more detailed explanation of each component is given 
in Box 4.1. 
 
Table 4.3 Equitable shares formula in South Africa: 2007 Budget 
 
Percentage 








Weighting 51.0 % 26.0% 14.0% 3.0% 1.0% 5.0% 100.0% 
Eastern Cape 16.9 15.1 14.5 21.2 8.1 11.1 15.8 
Free State 5.7 6.3 6.2 7.4 5.5 11.1 6.3 
Gauteng 14.8 18.8 20.1 11.4 33.3 11.1 16.5 
KwaZulu Natal 22.9 21.5 20.9 23.2 16.7 11.1 21.6 
Limpopo 14.1 12.1 11.3 16.5 6.7 11.1 13.1 
Mpumalanga 8.6 7.6 7.4 7.0 6.8 11.1 8.2 
Northern Cape 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.2 11.1 2.7 
North West 6.5 7.0 7.1 7.0 6.3 11.1 7.0 
Western Cape 8.2 9.2 10.0 3.8 14.4 11.1 8.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Budget Review 2008, National Treasury, Republic of South Africa 
*Note that all figures are in percentages 
 
The “equitable share” transfer is designed to have a strong equity bias, taking into 
consideration the different demographic and economic profiles of provinces and local 
governments.  Besides ensuring that SNGs are able to provide the services assigned to 
them, the equitable shares is also designed to promote redistribution of wealth among 
regions and dealing with regional backlogs (Yemek, 2005, National Treasury, 1999). 
  
Box 4.1 Components of the Equitable Shares formula 
 
Source: Budget Review 2006, National Treasury, Republic of South Africa 
 
 The education share (51%) is based on the size of the school-age population (ages 5-
17) and the average number of learners (Grade R to 12) enrolled in public ordinary 
schools for the past three years. 
 
 The health share (26%) is based on the proportion of the population with and 
without access to medical aid 
 
 A basic share (14%) derived from each province‟s share of the national population 
 
 An institutional component (5%) divided equally between provinces 
 
 A poverty component (3%) reinforcing the redistributive bias of the formula 
 














The weighting for the education share and health share are derived from average 
provincial expenditure on the respective sectors (in total provincial expenditure) for 
the past three years excluding conditional grants. Within the health component, 
people without medical scheme cover are assigned a weight four times the weight of 
those with medical scheme cover. This is on the grounds that those without medical 
scheme cover are more likely to use public health care facilities. The poverty 
component provides for some redistribution within the formula. This component is 
allocated based on the proportion of each province‟s population that is considered 
poor. The poor is defined as those whose incomes fall within quintiles 1 and 2 
(quintiles with lowest income groups) based on the 2000 Income and Expenditure 
Survey. The economic activity component is a proxy for provincial tax capacity. The 
institutional component is distributed equally across all provinces on the grounds that 
there are costs associated with running a provincial government and providing 
services that are not directly related to the size of the population (National Treasury, 
2006).  
 
Equitable shares were first introduced in the 1998 budget and have been updated 
every year. The formula for the horizontal division of revenue included consideration 
of the recommendations and submissions of the FFC. In its first submission  
(Financial and Fiscal Commission, 1996), the FFC recommended that the provincial 
grants formula should have 5 components:   
1. A Minimum National Standards Grant: to ensure that each province can 
provide a minimum national standard of basic human capital. This is specifically 
to provide primary and secondary education; and primary and district health-care 











2. Spillover Grant: which provides for the financing of services that have inter-
provincial spillover effects 
3. Fiscal Capacity Equalisation Grant: to ensure that provincial functions are 
financed from an equitable provincial taxing capacity and to encourage 
accountability and democratic institutions associated with the establishment of a 
provincial legislature 
4. Institutional Grant: for each province to finance the core of its legislature as 
required by the Constitution 
5. Basic Grant: to support provincial functions; establishing and maintaining 
institutions necessary for the fulfilment of their constitutional obligations 
according to their own priorities. 
 
The FFC proposed that the value of the health care component be determined by 
calculating the costs of providing within 10 years, an average of 3.5 visits per year to 
a primary health care clinic by people who do not have access to medical schemes, 
and 0.5 visits by those with access to medical schemes. Also this component includes 
the cost of providing services by district hospitals (ibid). This formula as presented by 
the FFC was to be phased in over a 5 year period (National Treasury, 1998). The 
Government amended the equitable share formula as proposed by the FFC; the first 
equitable shares formula to provinces (for the 1998/99 financial year) had 6 
components: 
1. An education share based on average size of school age population and number of 
learners enrolled 
2. A health share based on proportion of the population without private health 











3. A social security component, based on the estimated number of people entitled to 
social security grants 
4. A basic share, based on total population with a 50% weighting in favour of rural 
communities 
5. An economic output share based on the estimated distribution of gross domestic 
product (GDP) 
6. An institutional grant divided equally among provinces (National Treasury, 1998). 
 
The components and their respective weightings have generally remained at the same 
levels over the years until the 2005/06 financial year. Table 4.4 shows a summary of 
the components of equitable shares to provinces from1998 to 2006. 
 
Table 4.4 Weighting of the Equitable Shares 1998 - 2006 
 Weights of Components by Financial Years 
Components 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 
Education 39.0 40.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 51.0 
Health 18.0 18.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 26.0 
Social Welfare 16.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 - 
Basic 15.0 9.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 14.0 
Economic Activity 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 1.0 
Institutional 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Backlogs - 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 - 
Poverty - - - - - - - 3.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Figures sources from the National Treasury‟s Budget reviews of 1998 to 2006 
 
For the 1999/00 financial year, weightings for some of the components were revised; 
also, an additional component was included in the equitable share formula. The 
weightings for education and social welfare were increased to reflect actual 
expenditure trends. The institutional component was increased by one percentage 
point. The basic share component was split into a basic share and a backlog 











other components. The backlogs component was introduced to address criticisms of 
the previous formula (failing to account for significant backlogs faced by some 
provinces). The backlogs component was to finance capital spending on rural 
infrastructure and facilities in the health and education sectors (National Treasury, 
1999). Only minor changes to the weightings of the formula were made until 2005.  
 
For the 2005/06 financial year, the education and health components were increased 
substantially to 51% and 26% respectively. These revisions are based on expenditure 
patterns and indications of relative need for the purpose of allocating funds. This 
increase in the education and health components is largely because the „social 
welfare‟ component was removed and the „economic activity‟ component was 
significantly reduced; therefore strengthening redistribution. The responsibility for 
social welfare was transferred upwards to the national government, and is now 
managed by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA). The transfer of this 
responsibility to the national government was because of concerns that other areas of 
provincial service delivery were being squeezed by the statutory obligation to pay 
social security grants (National Treasury, 2006).  
 
The welfare and backlog components were removed from the formula, but a poverty 
component was introduced to retain some degree of redistribution within the formula. 
This is the current formula in use. The new formula does produce changes in the 
proportions of the equitable shares received by each province. Table 4.5 shows the 
proportions of the equitable shares that are targeted for each province based on the 











State, Limpopo, North West and the Western Cape now receive a smaller proportion 
of the entire equitable shares resource envelope.  
 
Table 4.5 Target shares based on Equitable Shares formula 
 
Percentage 
Target shares based on Equitable 
Shares Formula for 2004/05  
Target shares based on Equitable 
Shares Formula for 2006/07 
Eastern Cape 16.6 15.8 
Free State 6.5 6.3 
Gauteng 15.3 16.5 
KwaZulu Natal 20.9 21.6 
Limpopo 13.7 13.1 
Mpumalanga 7.4 8.2 
Northern Cape 2.3 2.7 
North West 8.3 7.0 
Western Cape 9.0 8.8 
Total 100 100 
 
 
There have concerns around the equity implications of the equitable shares formula, 
especially concerning the components that have the highest weights (health and 
education). The education component is based on the school age population (5 – 17 
years) within each province and actual enrolment. These two measures are weighted 
equally (National Treasury, 2008). However it is argued that although the use of 
“school age population” in the formula is a good measure of potential need it can be 
disadvantageous to provinces that have a high occurrence of repetitions. In such 
provinces, there would be many children beyond the age restriction that are accessing 
primary and secondary education. On the positive side, the use of actual enrolment 
alone can create incentives for provinces to increase school enrolment in order to 
access more of the equitable share on education (Rao and Khumalo, 2004). 
 
The health component of the equitable shares formula is calculated using the 
proportion of provincial population that are covered by medical aid and the proportion 











Arguments around the appropriateness of this component are that the formula does 
not consider the possibility of economies of scale or input cost differences among the 
provinces. Also, the weighting of the two groups is based on the assumption that the 
population without medical aid is likely to use public health facilities four times as 
much as those with medical aid support. The weights are based on subjective 
judgement rather than on any survey data. Lastly, the formula does not capture 
differences in the use of health services based on demographic characteristics such as 
women of child bearing age, the elderly and infants (Rao and Khumalo, 2004). 
 
These criticisms of the equitable share formula raise concerns about the ability of the 
formula to equitably distribute resources among provinces. A detailed analysis of the 
equity implications of the current equitable share formula is beyond the scope of this 
study. Nevertheless, these points are taken into consideration in analysis of 
differences in PHC expenditure across geographic areas in South Africa.  
 
4.6. The Budgeting Process and Health Budgets  
Since the 1998/99 financial year, the South African Government prepares its budgets 
according to three-year cycles, called a Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF). The MTEF consists of a top-down estimate of aggregate resources available 
for public expenditure that is consistent with macroeconomic stability; and bottom-up 
estimates of the costs of carrying out existing and new policies. The MTEF is a rolling 
process that is repeated every year. The rationale and objectives for adopting this 
process has been to: 
 Improve predictability of funding of public services 











 Strengthen cooperative governance 
 Promote accountability 
 Improve the prioritisation process within budgeting (Ministry of Finance, 
2000) 
So, at each point in time, each government sphere has an idea about how much money 
would be available to it in the next three years, and therefore can plan its present and 
future expenditure accordingly. 
 
From 1997/98, the National Department of Finance (now the National Treasury) has 
allocated block grants (equitable shares) to provinces on the basis of differential need. 
Total provincial budgets comprise of conditional grants, equitable shares and own 
revenue (forms a very small portion). Conditional grants are tied to specific 
programmes and therefore outside negotiations for budgets for the various sectors at 
the level of the province. The remaining funds (equitable shares plus own revenue) 
are divided up amongst various sectors through negotiations involving the provincial 
legislature and the provincial treasuries. This is based on provincial priorities, 
provincial spending pressures and the capacity of each provincial department to 
motivate for funding. Thus, provincial Departments of Health have to negotiate their 
budget in competition with other departments. This means that provincial 
governments, through this budgeting process have the freedom to determine spending 
on health care, with little influence from the national Department of Health. In fact, 
the budgeting process does not allow for the national Department of Health to directly 













Health programmes currently funded through conditional grants are listed in Table 
4.1. Funds for PHC activities are not funded though conditional grants and so are at 
the mercy of budgetary negotiations at the provincial level (for the health sector 
budget). Since the NDoH has little influence over resource allocation within 
provincial Departments of Health, resulting funds available for PHC activities are 
further dependent on decisions made by the provincial Department of Health.  
 
4.7 Summary: Intergovernmental Arrangements and PHC 
The South African fiscal federal system is a result of a compromise reached by 
political parties with opposing views on the degree of autonomy that different level of 
governmental structure should have. As is common with most fiscal federal systems, 
the national government collects most of the lucrative taxes, while substantial 
expenditure responsibilities are assigned to SNGs.  The resulting vertical imbalance is 
addressed by a combination of specific purpose and general purpose grants –referred 
to as conditional and equitable shares grants respectively in the South African context. 
 
The intergovernmental arrangements for South Africa presented in this chapter raise 
some issues with respect to achieving equity in the financing of PHC. The first issue 
refers to the extent of autonomy enjoyed by provinces. Considering the amount of 
revenue generated by provinces and the proportion of transfers to provinces in the 
form of equitable shares, provinces have autonomy in deciding how to spend 
approximately 80% of financial resources available to them. Also, PHC is not funded 
through conditional grants. Based on the conceptual framework developed for this 
study, the level of autonomy in deciding PHC allocations enjoyed by provinces 











provinces. Some form of influence from the national government in determining PHC 
allocations at the province level is required. The roles assigned to the National 
Department of Health by the constitution include overall policy development and a 
monitoring and evaluation role which includes the promotion of uniform standards of 
service. In 2000, the National Department of Health published a set of norms and 
standards to guide the level of quality and quantity of services necessary to provide a 
uniform but comprehensive package of PHC services (Department of Health, 2000). 
However, it is not clear what mechanisms are in place to ensure that any norms and 
standards developed by the national government are adhered to by the provinces. An 
obvious option for promoting equity in the distribution of PHC resources is to fund 
PHC through a conditional grant.  
 
It is indeed surprising that the range of services funded as conditional grants does not 
fully reflect the policy thrust of the government on the health sector. Conditional 
grants are designed to fund national priorities and to promote national norms and 
standards. On this basis and considering South Africa‟s history, PHC services should 
be a strong candidate for financing through conditional grants or at least funded in a 
way that allows for greater influence from the national government. 
 
A second issue arising from the description of South Africa‟s fiscal federal system 
refers to the appropriateness of the equitable shares formula that is used to transfer 
general purpose grants to provinces. The equitable shares grant to a very large extent 
determines the resource envelope available to each province. However, there are 
concerns that important indicators of need are not included in the formula, especially 











formula‟s ability to distribute resources equitably.  On a positive note, the equitable 
shares formula is by definition designed to acknowledge the differential needs of 
provinces – a reflection of intent in the right direction. This is critical considering how 
unequal the South African society is. Also, it is encouraging to see that education and 
health care comprise a large proportion of the total equitable shares grant.   
 
 
A third issue refers to the responsibilities of the national government in the health 
sector. The national government plays a monitoring and coordinating role, without 
any authority to influence allocations to health care priorities funded outside 
conditional grants. PHC and equity in the health sector are key priorities for the 
national government, but current fiscal and constitutional arrangements limits national 
government‟s ability to influence the amount of resources committed to PHC.  
Equity in the distribution and provision of public goods and services has been a 
priority for the country since the end of apartheid. Literature on equity, redistribution 
and fiscal federalism suggests that the goals of equity and redistribution are best 
achieved where the responsibility lies with the central government. The nature of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa gives significant fiscal autonomy to 
provinces around major areas of social services such as health and education.  It was 
not designed solely for the purpose of achieving equity. The design of the South 
African fiscal federal system is a result of its history and mainly political pressures 
from different interest groups.  
 
This preliminary analysis as presented in this chapter highlights some key issues that 











between geographic areas in South Africa. In subsequent chapters, more in-depth 
analysis based on recently collected data will be conducted; these are preceded by a 















This chapter describes the methods used in carrying out this study. The process for 
data collection, sources of data, sampling technique, identification of study sites, and 
analysis are outlined in detail. A combination of quantitative and qualitative analyses 
was used in this study. The mixed methods approach was used as it is considered to 
be the most appropriate approach for the study. A quantitative approach is weak in 
understanding the context in which study observations operate, and the voice of 
participants of the study is not directly heard. On the other hand a qualitative 
approach is considered deficient because of the potential bias arising from personal 
interpretations made by the researcher, and the difficulty in generalising findings to a 
large group because of the often limited number of participants studied. A mixed 
methods approach therefore offsets the weaknesses of each individual approach, and 
provides more comprehensive evidence for studying a research problem (Creswell 
and Clark, 2007).  
 
Another justification for the mixed methods approach is based on the nature of the 
study. Assessing the impact of fiscal federalism on the equitable distribution of PHC 
resources requires analysis of expenditure data. This necessitates the use of 
quantitative analysis. The process of resource allocation is an inherently political 
process and so any investigation into the process will require a good understanding of 
the context in which policy is made and the influences of stakeholders and their 
interest. A qualitative approach is thus necessary to elicit the voices and perspectives 












Quantitative analysis was used in assessing the trend in intergovernmental transfers, 
allocations to the health sector and to PHC. Also, it was used in assessing equity in 
the distribution of PHC finances, using data on PHC expenditure and levels of 
deprivation. Qualitative analysis was applied to data collected through interviews with 
government officials. This section of the analysis focused on answering research 
questions around: “who” is involved in determining PHC allocations? How much 
influence do these stakeholders wield? What criteria are used in allocating PHC 
finances across geographic areas? What level of autonomy do provinces and health 
districts enjoy? What are the constraints to achieving equity in PHC financing? What 
mechanisms are in place to promote equity in PHC financing PHC? How well do 
community preferences and priorities feed into decision-making for PHC budgeting?  
 
Most of the data used in this study was collected through a research project (Okorafor 
et al, 2007) in which the author was the principal investigator. The research project 
was carried out in collaboration with the National Department of Health, South 
Africa, although the NDoH‟s involvement was restricted to data collection support 
and feedback on the project‟s analysis. The project investigated the implication of 
fiscal federalism on the equitable distribution of PHC finances in South Africa and 
Nigeria. For the research project, the author conducted all the literature review, 
developed the conceptual framework for the study, undertook most of the data 
collection and analysed the data. Input from other research members of the research 












A key difference between the research project and this thesis is that the research 
project focused on a comparative analysis between the South African and Nigeria 
experience in financing PHC. However, this thesis has much more detailed and 
expansive research into the impact of fiscal federalism in South Africa on the 
distribution of PHC finances. This thesis builds on the work done on the research 
project. 
 
5.1. Data Collection 
The main sources of information for this study were document reviews, primary data 
from interviews with government officials, and secondary data from national 
household surveys and public health expenditure data bases.  
 
5.1.1 Document Reviews 
An extensive review of documents and literature was carried out for this study. The 
review focused on three broad areas: government publications, theoretical and 
empirical literature on relevant concepts used in the study and literature on the 
experiences of other countries that operate a fiscal federal system in the financing of 
health and PHC. In more detail, the following documents were reviewed: 
 Government publications on the nature and history of fiscal federalism and 
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements in South Africa. These included budget 
reviews, intergovernmental fiscal reviews, health bills, the South African 
Constitution, health acts, and other government publications on budgeting and 
resource allocation guidelines. Government publications such as budget reviews 











criteria for intergovernmental transfers. The constitution, health bills and various 
health acts provided information on the roles and responsibilities of each level of 
government. A review of these documents provided an understanding of the 
nature of intergovernmental relations in South Africa, the basis for 
intergovernmental transfers to provinces and resource allocation to health and 
PHC in South Africa. 
 Theoretical and empirical literature on equity, PHC, need, resource allocation and 
fiscal federalism. These provided the study with a clear understanding of concepts 
used in the study. A review of literature on fiscal federalism provided the study 
with a good understanding of the tenets of fiscal federalism, including the nature 
and effect of intergovernmental transfers on SNG autonomy and equity in the 
financing and provision of services. 
 International literature on the experiences of other countries operating a fiscal 
federal system in financing PHC and other health services. A review of 
international experience provided a valuable reference point for exploring the 
equity implications of different intergovernmental arrangements, including forms 
of transfers for funding PHC activities.  
 
Information from reviewed documents and literature was used in designing the 
conceptual framework that guides this study. The conceptual framework was the basis 












5.1.2 Primary Data from Interviews with Government Officials 
The study collected primary data from interviews with government officials at 
national, provincial and health district levels. In summary, the interviews were 
designed to collect information around: 
 Processes for resource allocation and budgeting for health care and PHC,  
 Stakeholders involved in the process, their interests and their influence on the 
budgeting and resource allocation processes, 
 Information on guidelines, mechanisms or criteria within the budgeting and 
resource allocation process at all levels of government that influence the 
amount of resources allocated to PHC  
 Level and nature of community participation in decision-making around the 
financing of PHC 
 Views on the meaning of equity and how equity can be achieved 
 Level of management capacity available at district, province and national 
levels 
 Working relations between different levels of government and government 
agencies involved in determining PHC allocations 
 Relative importance of PHC and equity for different levels of government and 
government agencies 
 Financing options for PHC to achieve equity 
  
Semi-structured interview guides were used to collect primary data, as it allowed for 
flexibility to probe for details on issues that needed further clarification (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, Bowling, 1997). The interview guides were designed according to 











provincial health officials were interviewed with the same interview guide, but 
officials at National Department of Health had a different interview guide. This was 
because officials at different levels of government are involved in different ways in 
decision-making for PHC allocations. In total, there were five sets of interview guides 
for officials from the following offices: 
 National Department of Health  
 Provincial Departments of Health 
 National Treasury 
 Provincial Treasury 
 Health Districts 
 
In total, 35 officials were interviewed. In all, 13 officials from health districts were 
interviewed, 5 officials from Provincial Treasuries, 2 from National Treasury, 11 from 
Provincial Departments of Health and 4 from the National Department of Health. All 
interview data was transcribed to allow for more detailed analysis and better coding of 
qualitative data. Copies of the interview guides are included in Appendix B. 
 
 
Government officials interviewed were identified through purposive sampling. 
Government officials eligible for interview were those that were involved in decision-
making around budgeting and resource allocation for PHC. The researcher worked 
with a representative of the National Department of Health in identifying government 
officials at the national, provincial and district levels who met the above criterion. The 
representative‟s other contributions to primary data collection was in setting up 











from the NDoH also participated in interviewing the subjects. The use of a 
representative from the NDoH proved to be very helpful as government officials were 
more receptive to requests for appointments once they were aware that the NDoH was 
involved in the research. Also, the representative‟s knowledge of the public health 
system proved useful in framing interview questions. 
 
The study also employed a “snowball” technique in identifying additional interview 
subjects. At the end of each interview, interviewees were asked if they were aware of 
someone else who had a good understanding of the subject area. In total, 6 out of the 
34 interviewees were identified through this technique. 
 
Before interviews were carried out, the author obtained ethics approval for the study 
from the University of Cape Town, Ethics Committee. Also, the author obtained 
written permission from the Department of Health allowing the author to interview 
the departments‟ officials for the project. All interviewees were contacted and 
informed about the project before they were interviewed. Subsequently, their consent 
to participate in the interviews was obtained. Although the author had obtained 
permission to interview Department of Health Officials, interviewees only 
participated of their own free will. Also, it was made clear to the interviewees that 
they had the right to terminate the interview session at any point, and that all 
information from the interviews would be treated in confidence. Hence, no names or 
characteristics of interviewed officials that could reveal their identities will be 
mentioned in this thesis. Anonymity granted to each interviewee was to allow for 
richer data, as it was assumed that individuals would speak more freely if they could 











would be completely anonymous. For most of the quotations, including the province 
or the office of the respondent makes it easy for most people familiar with the 
governmental structures and offices to identify the respondent. So, this has been done 
to protect the respondent 
 
The interviews were recorded (with the permission of interviewees) and transcribed 
by an independent private transcribing company. All transcripts were thereafter 
checked for errors by the author. Interviews were carried out between January 2007 
and August 2007. Follow up interviews were conducted by the author where 
clarification was necessary. These were done in November 2008, at the point of data 
analysis. It is important to note at this point that based on responses given by some 
interviewees, an interview was carried out with a member of a non-governmental 
organisation. The non-governmental organisation works with the government to 
promote equity and strengthen the public health sector. This interview was done to 
corroborate claims made by some government officials.  
 
5.1.3 Study Sites for Interviews and Sampling Technique 
Interviews were conducted with government officials from four out of the nine 
provinces. The researcher could not interview officials from all the nine provinces 
because of financial resource constraints. Provinces visited for interviews were 
Gauteng, Western Cape, Limpopo and Eastern Cape provinces. These provinces were 
chosen because they provide the study with an even split between provinces that 
historically have had relatively high PHC per capita expenditure and those with 
relatively low PHC per capita expenditure. Gauteng and Western Cape have relatively 











per capita PHC expenditure was R238 and R213 respectively. In the same year per 
capita PHC expenditure for Limpopo and Eastern Cape were the lowest: R70 and R91 
respectively
29
. In each of these provinces, two districts were selected for district-level 
interviews.  
 
Districts selected for site visits are based on nominal changes in non-hospital PHC 
expenditure from 2001/02 to 2005/06 financial years. Within each of the selected 
provinces, districts with the highest and lowest nominal increases
30
 in non-hospital 
PHC expenditure were selected. The rationale behind this selection criterion is that 
since the study investigates the impact of fiscal federalism on equity in PHC 
allocations, it is important to find out what factors prevent or facilitate changes in 
PHC expenditure across districts. Based on this criterion, the districts presented in 
Table 5.1 were selected for site visits. 
 
Table 5.1 Districts selected for site visits 
Province District PHC per capita 
2001/02 (Rand)* 




W. Cape West Coast DM 275 307 32 
Overberg DM 240 201 -39 
Gauteng Sedibeng DM 151 225 74 
Ekurhuleni MM
†
 389 270 -119 
Limpopo Vhembe DM 124 237 113 
Gr. Sekhukhune DM 87 115 28 
E.Cape Ukhalamba DM 48 207 159 
Nelson Mandela MM 129 201 72 
Source: Health Systems Trust  - (Day and Gray, 2008) 
* Note that PHC per capita refers to “per capita non-hospital PHC expenditure” calculated using the 
population within districts without access to any form of medical scheme cover. All are measured in 
South Africa Rands (ZAR). 
†
MM refers to metropolitan Municipality. These are metropolitan cities. 
DM refers to District Municipality 
 
                                                 
29
 Note that these figures are from the National Treasury‟s Intergovernmental Fiscal Review of 2003.  
30
 In some provinces, some districts experienced a decrease in nominal PHC expenditure per capita. 
The district that experienced the largest decrease in PHC expenditure per capita was then chosen. This 











5.1.4 National Household Survey Data Sets and PHC Expenditure Data 
One of the objectives of this study is to assess the extent of equity in the distribution 
of PHC allocations between geographic areas in South Africa - district and provincial 
levels. In order to achieve this, the study compared levels of health care needs with 
PHC expenditure. A measure of need (deprivation index) was generated using 
information from national household survey data sets. A full description of the 
process of generating the deprivation index is discussed in a later section of this 
chapter. PHC expenditure per capita was used as a measure of the level of expenditure 
on PHC for each geographic area. 
 
The study used data on district level PHC expenditure per capita from the Basic 
Accounting System (BAS) data base of the National Treasury, which was obtained 
through the 2008 District Health Barometer (Day and Gray, 2008). Data on district 
PHC expenditure per capita was available for the 2001/02, 2005/06, 2006/07 and 
2007/08 financial years. There was no data on district PHC expenditure for the years 
in-between. Unfortunately, PHC data for these years were not disaggregated to the 
district level. Primary health care expenditure comprises expenditure on the following 
programmes: 
1. District Management 
2. Community Health Clinic services 
3. Community Health Centres 
4. Community Based services 












Data on per capita expenditure calculations are based on the population within each 
district that do not have access to private health insurance (called medical schemes in 
South Africa). This adjustment is made to capture the population within each district 




The data on PHC expenditure per capita was checked against other data sources in 
order to confirm its validity. The data for the 2001/02 PHC expenditure per capita was 
compared with data on PHC expenditure per capita compiled by Thomas et al (2003) 
for the same financial year. Thomas et al (2003) compiled PHC expenditure by 
collecting information on direct provincial spending on PHC (sourced from Provincial 
Departments of Health and Provincial Treasuries) and adding them to local 
government contribution to PHC (sourced from National Department of Provincial 
and Local Government). The data compiled by Thomas et al (2003), calculated per 
capita PHC expenditure by using the entire population in each district. Direct 
comparison of this study‟s data set and that of Thomas et al (2003) revealed that per 
capita PHC expenditure figures for this study are slightly but consistently higher. This 
is because the Thomas et al (2003) study used the entire population of the district as 
the denominator in calculating PHC per capita expenditure. This study uses the 
population without access to medical aid as the denominator in calculating per capita 
PHC expenditure. 
 
A test of correlation between the two sets of expenditure data (data used in this study 
and data from Thomas et al (2003)) revealed that the correlation coefficient is 0.97. 
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 This is a different weighting from the equitable shares formula. However, this is how district-level 
PHC expenditure per-capita is recorded in the data base from which the information was sourced.  












The variation in PHC per capita expenditure at district and provincial levels is of 
much more importance for this study than the actual amounts spent on PHC. Based on 
this consideration, a 0.97 correlation coefficient is good enough for this study. No 
other data source of per capita PHC expenditure could be found for 2005/06, 2006/07 
and 2007/08 financial years. However, given that the data source for the 2005/06 to 
2007/08 PHC per capita expenditure data is the same as the data for 2001/02 it is 
assumed that the data sets are equally reliable. Also, the methodology for data 
collection was the same. 
 
To measure levels of need at district levels, the study made use of national household 
surveys that collected information on variables identified as indicators of social and 
material deprivation. Data sets used for this analysis are summarised in table 5.2 
(section 5.4). Household surveys used were selected on the basis of the following 
criteria: 
1. The surveys should correspond to the years that PHC expenditure at district 
level is available 
2. The surveys should be nationally representative and the data can be 
disaggregated  to the health district level   
3. The variables in the surveys that are indicators of social and material 
deprivation should be collected and measured in a similar way; allowing for 
the same composition of “need” measure from all surveys. 
 
5.2. Qualitative Analysis 
Data from interviews were coded according to broad themes. These themes formed 











issues identified in the literature review, conceptual framework and the South African 
context. In addition, the data collected from the respondents influenced the definition 
of the themes. Also, the analysis considered differences in results between the 
relatively well funded provinces and those that were not very well funded. The themes 
are: 
1. Process and criteria for vertical split of revenue between the three levels of 
government: This is important as the size of the resources available for the 
equitable shares to provinces places some limit on how much a province can 
commit to health care and therefore PHC. Also, the process for the split of 
revenue across government levels defines the level of autonomy each of the 
spheres of government can enjoy. 
 
2. The process and criteria for budget allocations to provinces and sectors 
within provincial governments: This explores issues such as criteria for budget 
allocations to various provinces and provincial sectors, and allows for 
analytical investigation of the implications of current allocation processes for 
equity. Also, this allows for identification of alternative allocation processes 
and criteria that may have a better impact on the equitable distribution of PHC 
resources.  
 
3. Influence of key stakeholders: This focuses on identifying key players in 
determining equitable shares to provinces, budgetary allocations to sectors 
within provinces and allocations to PHC. Identifying the major players and the 













4. Community participation and health policy: one of the major reasons (both in 
theory and in practice) for decentralisation either of the entire governing 
system or the health sector is to bring the government closer to the people, and 
for communities to have a greater influence in decision-making that affects 
their lives. The PHC approach also subscribes to this philosophy. This theme 
assesses the extent to which community voices influence health policy for 
PHC within the South African context. The intention is to find out whether 
fiscal federalism and the decentralisation of health care provision to provinces 
and districts have encouraged community participation.  
 
5. Financing options for PHC: This allows for the identification and discussion 
of possibilities and implications of alternative financing options (conditional 
grants, norms and standards) for SNG autonomy and equity in PHC resource 
allocation. 
 
6. Expenditure capacity and sufficiency of funds for PHC: managerial capacity32 
at lower levels of government is a frequently cited problem in decentralised 
health systems. Managerial capacity is necessary for the appropriate utilisation 
of health care resources at lower levels. In the South African case, this is 
particularly important for the motivation of funds for health and PHC, and 
more especially where health and PHC budgets are driven by historical 
expenditure. 
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 Managerial capacity refers to the ability of an administrative unit to efficiently utilise available 











7. Understanding equity: this focuses on assessing the views of officials on what 
an equitable distribution means, their views on the current distribution of PHC 
funds and what definition of equity should guide resource allocation to PHC. 
Equity as we have seen is a subjective concept, and different views of what is 
equitable amongst officials involved in decision-making for health and PHC 
budgets could undermine or promote the achievement of equity. 
 
Although the analysis is structured around the themes listed above, a common thread 
running through the analysis is the assessment of the impact of processes, actors, 
systems and regulations on the achievement of equity in the financing of PHC. Also, 
accountability and transparency in governance is evaluated. 
 
5.3. Quantitative Analysis 
This part of the analysis focused on assessing the extent of equity in the distribution 
of PHC finances between provinces and districts. Also, the trend in allocations to 
districts and provinces with respect to equity is assessed. These analyses are done at 
the district and province levels. Health districts are the administrative structures 
charged with the provision of PHC, so it follows that any analysis around the 
equitable funding of PHC should be disaggregated to the district level. Analysis at the 
level of provinces provides valuable information around the level of commitment to 
PHC by the different provincial governments.  
 
Deprivation indices were used as measures of health needs. These indices were 
constructed from socio-economic and demographic variables, using principal 











measurement of need as proposed in Chapter 2. Basic characteristics of the data sets 
used are listed below in table 5.2. These data sets correspond to the years in which per 
capita PHC expenditure at district levels is available. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Survey Data 
Survey Sample Size 
 Households Individuals 
2001 Census data
†
 948,592 3,725,655 
2005 General household survey data 28,129 107,987 
2006 General household survey data 28,002 105,727 
2007 Community Survey 246,618 949,105 
†
 This is a 10% sample of the census 
 
5.3.1 Variables Included as Indicators of Social and Material Deprivation 
The variables included in the PCA are listed in Table 5.3. These variables were 
chosen based on criteria discussed in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 in the second chapter. 
The variables included in the development of deprivation indices for this study were 
based on two criteria. Variables included were those identified in the literature review 
as indicators of social and material deprivation, and those that are indicators of greater 
health care needs.  
 
Deprivation refers to the material and social conditions that are experienced by 
households and individuals, where these conditions are inadequate relative to what is 
usually available or experienced in society (McIntyre and Okorafor, 2003). Material 
deprivation refers to the lack of food, clothing, housing, sanitation, water etc; 
including living in a deprived environment where there may be air and noise 











includes no or low levels of education and employment opportunities, lack of 
recreation, lack of integration into the community etc (ibid). 
 
Some variables were also included based on their contextual (for South Africa) 
relevance as indicators of deprivation. A full description of the variables included and 
the rationale for their inclusion is described below. The variables used in generating a 
deprivation index are listed in Table 5.3. The second column of the table lists the 
variable names used in analysing the data. 
 
It is important to note that the variables included in constructing the deprivation index 
were also limited by the data sets. For example, variables such as the levels of gender 
discrimination, mortality, level of access to recreation facilities and level of 
community integration are good measures of social deprivation (McIntyre and 
Okorafor, 2003), but these were not captured by the data sets used. They are therefore 
not included in the analysis. 
 
Table 5.3 Variables for Constructing the Deprivation Index 
 Variable Name Definition 
1 p_child The proportion of the population below the age of 5 
2 p_black The proportion of the population that are black Africans 
3 p_unemp The proportion of the population between 25yrs and 59yrs 
old not working and looking for work or not working and not 
looking for work 
4 p_shacktrad The proportion of the population living in traditional 
(informal) dwelling or shacks  
5 p_nocloseaccess The proportion of the population that do not have piped 
water in the house or on site 
6 p_pitbucketnone The proportion of the population that use a pit latrine, bucket 
latrine or have no toilet facility 
7 p_headnoeduc The proportion of the population that are from households 
headed by an uneducated individual 
8 p_femhhhead The proportion of the population that are from households 
headed by a female 
9 p_noenergy The proportion of the population that do not use either 












Children that are below the age of 5 are particularly vulnerable to many illnesses and 
require more health care services. Indeed, this population groups is also targeted as a 
vulnerable groups by the South African health system for improved health service 
provision (McIntyre and Gilson, 2002). As a result of racial discrimination during the 
apartheid era, the black African population are still the most socio-economically 
disadvantaged group (Woolard, 2002). They are therefore the racial group least able 
to maximise their health status. Also, based on the definition of need in chapter 2, 
black Africans are most likely to be in greater need of health care services. For similar 
reasons, unemployment status of the working age population and gender of the 
household head have been included. Female headed households are often families that 
have a single parent. Such families depend on the income of only one parent, instead 
of income from two parents as is often the case for male headed households.  
 
The proportion of the population living in informal dwellings, have no access to piped 
water within the house or on site, have no access to good toilet facilities and depend 
on unclean energy sources have also been included. The variables identify households 
that live in conditions that make them more vulnerable to ill-health. They are also 
indicators of poor living conditions and material deprivation. 
 
The proportion of the population that are from households headed by an uneducated 
individual is a measure of social deprivation. Household heads are responsible for 
household decision-making that determine behaviours and practices within the 
household. An uneducated household head is more likely to have a lower capacity to 
appreciate health information on say, nutrition, benefits of utilising formal health care 











the lack of formal education of a household head limits his/her earning potential in the 
labour market. 
It is important to note that a deprivation index based on socio-economic and 
demographic variables is not the only appropriate approach to measuring need. Other 
indicators such as burden disease (morbidity) and mortality could also be used. The 
choice of a deprivation index is in part as a result of the huge socio-economic 
inequalities in South Africa, and also because it has a close relationship with mortality 
(as elaborated in the literature review).   
 
 
5.3.2 Principal Components Analysis and the Deprivation Index 
Principal components analysis (PCA) is a statistical technique that reduces the 
information contained in a large number of variables to a smaller number of variables, 
by summarising the patterns of correlation among observed variables. PCA aims to 
explain the total variance in the set of variables and creates a set of mutually 
uncorrelated components of the data (Filmer and Pritchett, 1999). In essence, PCA 
can be used to estimate the variation in an un-observed (latent) variable(s), using a set 
of variables for which their outcomes are partially determined by the unobserved 
variable.  The variations in each of the observed variables are assumed to be 
influenced by different factors (processes), and that these different processes cause a 
unique dimension of variation in each of the observed variables. PCA isolates the 
different dimensions of variations (caused by the different processes or factors) as 
components. These components are supposed to reflect different and uncorrelated 
dimensions of variations caused by the different underlying processes. In the case 
where PCA is used to estimate the variation in one unobserved variable,  it estimates 
the unique dimension of variation that has created the correlations among observed 











(Gwatkin et al., 2000) in measuring household economic welfare, and in constructing 
deprivation indices (McIntyre et al., 2002, Havard et al., 2008, Salmond et al., 2006) 
to measure social and material deprivation. 
 
To construct a deprivation index, PCA is applied to the set of variables listed above 
that are indicators of material and social deprivation. There is general consensus that 
variables included in the construction of a deprivation index should be additive; and 
that the weight assigned to each variable should reflect the relative contribution of the 
variable to deprivation (McIntyre et al., 2000). The concept of an additive set of 
variables can be illustrated with the variables used in this study. If two of the variables 
are considered only, say, the proportion of the population living in informal dwellings 
and the proportion of the population without access to clean sources of energy, then 
they are additive if:  A district with high values for proportion of the population living 
in informal dwellings and high values for the proportion of the population without 
access to a clean source of energy is worse off than a district with a high value for 
population of the population living in informal dwellings and a low value for the 
proportion of the population without access to a clean source of energy.  For this 
study, the primary unit of analysis is the health district. PCA assigns weights to each 
variable based on the level of correlation (contribution) of the variable with the 
generated components (the underlying process driving observed variation in the 
variable), thus meeting the second condition.  
 
As previously mentioned, PCA produces several components that are mutually 
uncorrelated. These are linear combinations of observed variables (Tabachnick and 











highest amount of information common to all of the variables (Filmer and Pritchett, 
1998); and therefore explains the most variation in the set of observed variables. 
Based on the selection criteria for the variables used, the first component, which 
explains the most variation in the set of observed variables, will be used to construct 
the index. PCA also generates coefficients for each variable, and these are the weights 
assigned to each variable. The coefficients show the strength and direction of the 
relationship between each variable and the generated component (index). The signs of 
the coefficients for each component will also be used as criteria for determining 
which component is to be used as an index of deprivation. The result of the principal 
component should be an index, which is a linear combination of the observed 
variables that reflects the underlying process responsible for correlations among the 
variables – deprivation. The index for each health district (Dj) is calculated based on 




























1   
       Equation 5.1 
 
Where f1 is the „scoring coefficient‟ assigned to the first observed variable, dj1 is the 
district‟s value for the first variable, d1 and s1 are the mean and standard deviation of 
the first variable over all observations respectively. This operation is repeated for all n 
observed variables, and then summed up to give the deprivation index for the district. 
 
Although PCA has been used in the construction of indices for measuring socio-
economic status (SES) in many instances, such as asset indices and deprivation 
indices, it does have its drawbacks. For example, in the construction of an asset index, 











included and the appropriateness of weights attached to each variable (O'Donnell et 
al., 2008). However, for this study, PCA is not used to generate an asset index, but a 
deprivation index, and the variables included in the study are selected based on theory 
and context. Nonetheless, there is still the possibility of bias due to non-inclusion of 
relevant variables. This is particularly relevant for this study as the variables included 
in constructing the index are limited by availability in the survey data used. 
 
Another potential drawback of using PCA is that there is no objective way of 
determining whether the generated component is significantly related to the actual 
phenomenon that it is intended to estimate, i.e. there is no criterion variable against 
which to test the solution (Tabachnick and Fidell). There have been several studies in 
South Africa that have used similar variables in constructing a deprivation index for 
geographic areas in South Africa  (McIntyre et al., 2002, Barron et al., 2005, Barron 
et al., 2006, McIntyre and Okorafor, 2003, Thomas et al., 2003, Noble et al., 2006) 
and the results have been generally accepted as a good reflection of deprivation across 
geographic areas in South Africa.  
 
5.3.3 Assessing Equity in PHC Allocations across Districts 
The deprivation indices generated for each district using the 2001 census data was 
compared with PHC per capita allocations in each district, for the different years. So, 
the index from the 2001 census data was compared with the 2001/02, 2005/06, 
2006/07 and 2007/08 PHC per capita expenditure. The analysis was done this way 
because the distribution of deprivation indices for different years are sample specific, 
therefore making trend analysis with regression analysis impossible. This method is 











over the period of analysis. Correlation analysis of the deprivation indices for the 
different years show that the correlation coefficients between deprivation indices from 
later data sets and the 2001 index are all above 0.96. 
 
This comparison was done with the aid of regression analysis. In each case, the 
deprivation index was used as the independent variable and PHC per capita 
expenditure was the dependent variable. The model is specified this way as it is 
assumed that the amount of resources committed to PHC should be a reflection of the 
level of health needs in the district; and this study has used the level of social and 
material deprivation in districts as a proxy for the level of health needs. All 
expenditure data was converted to 2007/08 real prices based on the consumer price 
index for South Africa. So references to expenditure and changes in expenditure are 
real expenditure and real changes in expenditure. 
 
The unit of analysis was the district level. The analysis was carried out using STATA 
9. Each data set included sampling weights to make the data more representative of 
the South African population. These weights were considered in generating the 
„proportions‟ of district or province populations that have the characteristics for which 
we are interested in. So, for example, the proportion of the population in a district that 
has access to piped water in the house or on site is calculated based on the weighted 
number of households without access to piped water in the house or on site as a 












5.4. Limitations of the Study 
A limitation of the study is that all nine provinces were not visited for qualitative data 
collection. This was a result of both time and resource constraints. Four out of the 
nine provinces and two districts in each of these four provinces were included as 
study sites for interviews with government officials. Nevertheless, the basis for 
selecting provinces and districts, and the inclusion of officials from the National 
Department of Health and National Treasury should increase the reliability of the 
results for generalisation about the practice of South African intergovernmental 
relations.  
 
Unfortunately, the study could not access data on per capita PHC expenditure at the 
district level for the years between 2001 and 2005. Had these data sets been available, 
the study would have been able to provide a much more detailed trend analysis of 
PHC expenditure over the years. The accuracy of the data could not be fully 
confirmed. The data set on PHC expenditure is from one source only. Comparisons 
with PHC data from one previous research (based on other data sources) show some 
differences in the value of PHC per capita expenditure. The data used for this study is 
the most reliable data available. It is possible that the data may not be very accurate. 
 
The definition of PHC expenditure for analysis (quantitative) is a narrow definition as 
it does not account for PHC activities carried out in district hospitals. Discussions 
with government officials revealed that district hospitals in some provinces also 
provide PHC services. The implication of this is that in some provinces, PHC 
expenditure may be underestimated. Previous research (Okorafor et al., 2003) 











actual proportion of district hospital expenditure that is dedicated to PHC activities in 
these provinces could not be determined.  
 
The study considers that there is potential for bias in the response from interviews in 
the primary data collection process due to factors such as the presence of a staff of the 
NDoH in all interviews, different agendas of the respondents, ignorance on the part of 
the respondent or responses based on hearsay. The presence of a staff of the NDoH 
could influence the responses of interviewees, especially those that are from the 
provincial health department (head office or district offices). They may not be as 
forthcoming with information and their perspectives on issues for fear of some 
repercussion from the NDoH. The presence of the staff of the NDoH was unavoidable 
as the NDoH insisted on having their staff member present in all interviews.  
 
 
The deprivation index used as a proxy for need is widely accepted as a good indicator 
of need for allocating resources between geographic areas. In the case of this study, a 
potentially important variable could not be included in the index. This is refers to 













Results of Quantitative Data Analysis 
 
In this chapter, results of the quantitative analysis of survey data sets and PHC 
expenditure are presented. The first section of this chapter provides a summary of the 
outcome of PCA on the survey data sets and a description of the deprivation indices 
generated from the various data sets. This is followed by a presentation of regression 
analysis that estimates the relationship between PHC expenditure per capita and the 
deprivation index. The results of further analysis such as trends in the distribution of 
PHC per capita expenditure are also presented. Lastly, the chapter is concluded by a 
brief discussion on the results.  
 
6.1. Results of the Principal Components Analysis 
Principal components analysis was applied to the variables listed in the methods 
section for the four household survey data sets. For the Census data, the sample size 
of the data was 21,094. Each sample observation represents a sub-place, which is a 
combination of a few coterminous enumerator areas, and is a geographic area that is 
small enough for the population to be homogeneous, yet large enough to allow for 
statistical analysis. The average number of observations per sub-place was 2,121 
observations. These sub-places can be and were aggregated up to health districts level 
– the basic unit for our analysis. Data from the GHS and Community Surveys were 
already defined by districts. 
 
The results of the PCA on all the variables for the 2001 Census data, the 2005 and 











presented in Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. Each table is in two parts. The first part of 
each table shows the various uncorrelated components generated by the PCA exercise 
and the proportion of total variation captured by each component. The second part of 
each table lists the scoring coefficients associated with each variable that is used to 
calculate the deprivation index. Scoring coefficients are the weights attached to each 
variable in the calculation of the deprivation index. There are denoted as fi, … fn in 
equation 5.1 in Chapter 5.  
 
Table 6.1 Principal Components Analysis on 2001Census Data 
Component Eigenvalue* Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 5.511 4.661 0.612 0.612 
2 0.851 0.250 0.095 0.707 
3 0.601 0.100 0.067 0.774 
4 0.501 0.063 0.056 0.829 
5 0.438 0.079 0.049 0.878 
6 0.359 0.042 0.040 0.918 
7 0.317 0.031 0.035 0.953 
8 0.286 0.150 0.032 0.985 
9 0.136 - 0.015 1.000 
     
Variable Component 1 
Proportion of the population that are children below the age of 5 0.2973 
Proportion of the population that are Africans (Black) 0.3523 
Proportion of the working age population that are unemployed  0.2738 
Proportion of the population that live in a shack or traditional dwelling 0.3340 
Proportion of the population with no close access to safe water 0.3807 
Proportion of the population that use a pit latrine,  bucket latrine or 
have no toilet facility 
0.3808 
Proportion of the population that are from households headed by a 
female 
0.3251 
Proportion of the population that do not use either electricity or solar 
energy as their main energy source 
0.3285 
Proportion of the population that are from households headed by an 
uneducated individual 
0.3122 
*All eigenvalues have been rounded to three decimal places 
 
For the first part of Table 6.1, the first column lists the various components derivable 
based on the variation of all 9 variables. They are ordered from the component that 











accounts for the least variance. The second column shows the eigenvalues
33
 of each 
component. The third column shows the difference between the eigenvalue of each 
component and the eigenvalue of the next component. A sharp drop in eigenvalues 
suggests that subsequent eigenvalues are just sampling noise (StataCorp, 1999). There 
is a sharp drop from the eigenvalue of the first component to the eigenvalue of the 
second component. This value is equal to 4.661, whereas the differences in 
eigenvalues for the rest of the components are all below 0.26. This therefore suggests 
that only one identifiable underlying process influences the values of these variables, 
and this is captured by the first component. Also, the eigenvalues for components 2 
to9 are all below 1. Which means that their explanatory power are all individually less 
than the explanatory power of one variable. Following the criteria for selecting the 
variables, this underlying process is deprivation. Figure 6.1 provides a scree plot of 
the eigenvalues for the various components. The fourth column of Table 6.1 shows 
the proportion of total variance of the variables accounted for by each component. As 
can be seen, the first component accounts for just over 61% of total variance of all 
variables. The last column shows the cumulative value of variance accounted for by 
the components. The first component is retained for construction of the deprivation 
index.   
 
For the second part of Table 6.1, the first column lists the variables, while the second 
column displays the scoring coefficients associated with each variable that is used to 
calculate the deprivation index.  The results show that all variables included in the 
PCA have weights that are of similar value. This means that the contribution of each 
of the nine variables in calculating the deprivation index is similar. The weights range 
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 This is a standardized measure of the proportion of total variation explained by each component. The 
sum of all eigenvalues should be equal to the number of variables included in PCA; in this case this 











from 0.27 (proportion unemployed) to 0.38 (proportion with no access to safe water 
and no access to proper toilet facilities). 















Also, the sign of each scoring coefficient is consistent with expectations for a 
deprivation index. They are all positive, which means that an increase in any of the 
values of the variables reflects greater deprivation within any district. The calculated 
deprivation index ranged from -3.129 to 1.824. Lower deprivation index scores 
represent lower levels of deprivation and vice versa.   Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 below 
show the corresponding results for PCA on the 2005 and 2006 General Household 
Survey and the 2007 Community Survey respectively. 
 
The results for the 2005 data are similar to those of the 2001 census data, however in 
this case, the first component explains just over 66% of the total variation of the nine 
variables. This first component is retained for construction of the deprivation index. 
Scoring coefficients range between 0.249 (proportion of the population that that live 
in a shack or traditional dwelling) and 0.3791 (Proportion of the population that do 











2005 data, the deprivation index ranged from -4.3397 to 4.6037. The complete result 
of the PCA analysis including the deprivation indices for all districts using the various 
data sets are presented in Appendix C. 
 
Table 6.2 Principal Components Analysis on 2005 GHS Data 
Component Eigenvalue* Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 5.966 5.059 0.663 0.663 
2 0.907 0.226 0.101 0.764 
3 0.681 0.217 0.076 0.839 
4 0.465 0.079 0.052 0.891 
5 0.386 0.149 0.043 0.934 
6 0.237 0.055 0.026 0.960 
7 0.182 0.070 0.020 0.980 
8 0.112 0.048 0.012 0.993 
9 0.641 - 0.007 1.000 
     
Variable Component 1 
Proportion of the population that are children below the age of 5 0.3011 
Proportion of the population that are Africans (Black) 0.3148 
Proportion of the working age population that are unemployed  0.3673 
Proportion of the population that live in a shack or traditional dwelling 0.2490 
Proportion of the population with no close access to safe water 0.3753 
Proportion of the population that use a pit latrine,  bucket latrine or 
have no toilet facility 
0.2758 
Proportion of the population that are from households headed by a 
female 
0.3780 
Proportion of the population that do not use either electricity or solar 
energy as their main energy source 
0.3791 
Proportion of the population that are from households headed by an 
uneducated individual 
0.3315 
*All eigenvalues have been rounded to three decimal places 
 
From the analysis of the 2006 GHS data (presented in Table 6.3), the first component 
explains approximately 57% of the total variation of all the 9 variables.  As in the 
results of PCA on 2001 and 2005 data, there is a sudden drop in the eigenvalues after 
the first component. However, the eigenvalues of components 2 and 3 are above 1. A 
closer examination of the signs of the variables for components 2 and 3 (see Appendix 
C) shows that the first component is most likely to represent deprivation.. The range 
of the scoring coefficients is similar to those for 2001 and 2005 data. However, the 











unemployed” is very low compared to its value in previous analyses. This implies that 
this variable has become a weaker indicator of deprivation, with time. The deprivation 
index generated from the 2006 GHS data ranged from -3.833 to 4.586.  
 
Table 6.3 Principal Components Analysis on 2006 GHS Data 
Component Eigenvalue* Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 5.149 3.912 0.572 0.572 
2 1.237 0.135 0.138 0.710 
3 1.102 0.542 0.123 0.832 
4 0.560 0.121 0.062 0.894 
5 0.439 0.199 0.049 0.943 
6 0.240 0.094 0.027 0.970 
7 0.147 0.076 0.016 0.986 
8 0.070 0.015 0.008 0.994 
9 0.055 - 0.006 1.000 
     
Variable Component 1 
Proportion of the population that are children below the age of 5 0.2618 
Proportion of the population that are Africans (Black) 0.3436 
Proportion of the working age population that are unemployed  0.0315 
Proportion of the population that live in a shack or traditional dwelling 0.2691 
Proportion of the population with no close access to safe water 0.4123 
Proportion of the population that use a pit latrine,  bucket latrine or 
have no toilet facility 
0.4164 
Proportion of the population that are from households headed by a 
female 
0.3969 
Proportion of the population that do not use either electricity or solar 
energy as their main energy source 
0.3370 
Proportion of the population that are from households headed by an 
uneducated individual 
0.3543 
*All eigenvalues have been rounded to three decimal places 
 
 
Table 6.4 shows the results for the 2007 Community Survey. The first component 
accounts for over 64% of the total variation in the 9 variables. As in the results for the 
previous years, the signs of the scoring coefficients for the variables associated with 
the first component are all in line with expectations. As in the analysis of the 2006 
GHS data, the scoring coefficient for the “proportion of the working age population 











for this is investigated in the next section. The deprivation indices generated from the 




Table 6.4 Principal Components Analysis on 2007 Community Survey Data 
Component Eigenvalue* Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 5.827 4.629 0.648 0.648 
2 1.198 0.333 0.133 0.781 
3 0.865 0.517 0.096 0.877 
4 0.347 0.049 0.039 0.915 
5 0.298 0.032 0.033 0.948 
6 0.266 0.173 0.030 0.978 
7 0.093 0.034 0.010 0.988 
8 0.059 0.012 0.007 0.995 
9 0.047 - 0.005 1.000 
     
Variable Component 1 
Proportion of the population that are children below the age of 5 0.3538 
Proportion of the population that are Africans (Black) 0.3253 
Proportion of the working age population that are unemployed  0.0653 
Proportion of the population that live in a shack or traditional dwelling 0.3105 
Proportion of the population with no close access to safe water 0.3931 
Proportion of the population that use a pit latrine,  bucket latrine or 
have no toilet facility 
0.3837 
Proportion of the population that are from households headed by a 
female 
0.3767 
Proportion of the population that do not use either electricity or solar 
energy as their main energy source 
0.3445 
Proportion of the population that are from households headed by an 
uneducated individual 
0.3256 
*All eigenvalues have been rounded to three decimal places 
 
 
6.1.1 Comparisons between PCA Results  
The results of PCA on a set of variables from one survey dataset cannot be directly 
compared to the results of PCA on a similar set of variables from another survey 











of deprivation in South Africa from 2001 to 2007 can still be gleaned out of the 
results of PCA on the datasets. 
 
The scoring coefficients for each variable represent the weights attached to each 
variable in calculating the deprivation index. The weights therefore are a reflection of 
the strength of association between the variables and the generated index – 
deprivation. A comparison of the scoring coefficients for the 9 variables from the four 
datasets in Table 6.5 provides some additional information on how the strength of 
association between these variables and deprivation has changed over the years. 
 
Table 6.5 Comparison of Scoring Coefficients  
Variable Census 2001 GHS 2005 GHS 2006 CS 2007 
p_child 0.2973 0.3011 0.2618 0.3538 
p_black 0.3523 0.3148 0.3436 0.3253 
p_unemp 0.2738 0.3672 0.0315 0.0653 
p_shacktrad 0.3340 0.2490 0.2691 0.3105 
p_nocloseaccess 0.3807 0.3753 0.4123 0.3931 
p_pitbucketnone 0.3808 0.2758 0.4164 0.3837 
p_femhhhead 0.3251 0.3780 0.3969 0.3767 
p_noenergy 0.3285 0.3791 0.3370 0.3445 
p_headnoeduc 0.3122 0.3315 0.3543 0.3256 
 
The table shows that there has been little change in the weighting of these variables 
from 2001 to 2007. For most variables, the scoring coefficients have remained within 
a small range over the years. The exception is the proportion of the working age 
population that are unemployed. From the 2001 and 2006 datasets, the scoring 
coefficients for this variable were 0.2738 and 0.3672 respectively. However, the 
scoring coefficients reduced to 0.0315 and 0.0653 based on the 2006 and 2007 
datasets. 
 
Further investigation revealed the reason for the drop in the scoring coefficient from 











working age population that are unemployed” for districts in 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
There is greater variation in the value of the variable in 2005 in comparison to 2006 
and 2007. The range of the variable is wider in 2005 (from 0.168 to 0.758) than in the 
following years. This is further confirmed by the decrease in the standard deviation 
from 0.124 in 2005 to as low as 0.0458 and 0.039 in 2006 and 2007 respectively. The 
reduction in variation lowers the correlation between the variable with deprivation. 
This reduces the level of association between the variable and deprivation, hence a 
lower scoring coefficient.  
 
Table 6.6 Summary of Distribution: Unemployment 2005 – 2007
34
 
 2005 GHS 2006 GHS 2007 CS 
Mean 0.436 0.157 0.187 
Standard deviation 0.124 0.046 0.039 
Minimum 0.168 0.079 0.106 
Maximum 0.758 0.275 0.264 
 
At this point it is important to explain that even where a variable is considered to be 
an indicator of deprivation, the level of variation in that variable is important in its 
ability to reflect underlying patterns of deprivation. For instance, consider that based 
on literature and context, access to electricity is an indicator of deprivation. If in 
South Africa the government decides to provide electricity for every household such 
that 99% of the entire population have access to electricity, then the variable 
“proportion of the district‟s population with access to electricity” will not be a good 
indicator of deprivation. This is because the variable has very limited variability and 
therefore is less able to vary with deprivation between districts. So, what can be 
concluded from this section is that reduction in the level and variation of 
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unemployment across districts are the reasons for the drop in the value of the scoring 
coefficients.  
 
6.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Deprivation Index 
Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 provide some of the results of the district level deprivation 
index analysis. The tables lists the 5 most deprived districts and the 5 least deprived 
districts from the four datasets analysed. Table 6.7 shows that 4 districts have 
consistently been among the 5 most deprived districts.  
 
Table 6.7 Most Deprived Districts in South Africa: 2001 - 2007 
Census 2001 
Province District Dep_index 
Eastern Cape O. R. Tambo 1.8240 
Eastern Cape Alfred Nzo 1.6311 
KwaZuluNatal Umkhanyakude 1.5892 
KwaZuluNatal Umzinyathi 1.5876 
KwaZuluNatal Zululand 1.2120 
   
GHS 2005 
Province District Dep_Index 
E Cape O. R. Tambo 4.6037 
E Cape Alfred Nzo 4.4341 
KZNatal Umkhanyakude 4.2539 
KZNatal Umzinyathi 3.7304 
Limpopo Bohlabela 3.5096 
   
GHS 2006 
Province District Dep_Index 
Eastern Cape Alfred Nzo 4.5858 
KwaZulu Natal Umzinyathi 4.1301 
KwaZulu Natal Unkkhanyakude 4.0554 
Eastern Cape O.R. Tambo 3.4934 
KwaZulu Natal Sisonke 3.0602 
   
GHS 2007 
Province District Dep_Index 
KwaZulu Natal Umzinyathi 4.5767 
Eastern Cape O.R. Tambo 4.3486 
KwaZulu Natal Umkhanyakude 4.2792 
Eastern Cape Alfred Nzo 4.1464 













They are O.R Tambo, Alfred Nzo, Umkhanyakude and Umzinyathi. Also, the 5 most 
deprived districts have generally been from two provinces: KwaZulu Natal and the 
Eastern Cape. Table 6.8 shows the 5 least deprived districts for the four years. As in 
Table 6.7 above, most of the districts listed have consistently been among the least 
deprived districts. They are West Coast, Overberg and Cape Winelands. In all years, 
most of the districts that are among 5 the least deprived are from the Western Cape. 
Namakwa district from the Northern Cape joined the list of the 5 least deprived from 
2005. 
 
Table 6.8  Least Deprived Districts in South Africa: 2001 - 2007 
Census 2001 
Province District Dep_index 
Western Cape West Coast -3.2192 
Western Cape Overberg -3.0637 
Western Cape Cape Winelands -3.0124 
Western Cape Eden -2.7900 
Western Cape Central Karoo -2.775 
   
GHS 2005 
Province District Dep_Index 
Western Cape West Coast -4.3397 
Western Cape Overberg -4.0157 
Western Cape Cape Winelands -3.7806 
Northern Cape Namakwa -3.3069 
Western Cape Central karoo -2.9760 
   
GHS 2006 
Province District Dep_Index 
Western Cape West Coast -3.8327 
Western Cape Overberg -3.7301 
Western Cape Cape Winelands -3.4222 
Western Cape City of Cape Town -3.1774 
Northern cape Namakwa -2.7666 
   
GHS 2007 
Province District Dep_Index 
Western Cape West Coast -3.8021 
Northern Cape Namakwa -3.7673 
Western Cape Overberg -3.5344 
Western Cape Cape Winelands -3.2686 













Although the deprivation indices have been listed in the above tables, it is important 
to note that the values of indices generated by PCA from different datasets are not 
directly comparable. So, even though the deprivation index for West Coast district 
was -3.2192 in 2001 and then -4.3397 in 2005, this does not mean that West coast is 
less deprived in 2005 than it was in 2001 (although this may well be the case). The 
index generated for any district from a dataset depends on the distribution of the 
variables included in the PCA from that particular dataset. So, the results of PCA are 
sample-specific.  
 
This can be confirmed by looking at the formula for calculating a deprivation index 
using PCA as written in equation 5.1 in Chapter 5 and the scoring coefficients used 
for each dataset. The scoring coefficients used differ for each dataset because the 
variation in deprivation differs from year to year. Secondly and more importantly, the 
deprivation index calculated from each dataset depends on the following: 
 The mean of each variable included,  
 The standard deviation of each variable, and 
 The value of each variable for the district 
Since these values all differ for each of the datasets used, the value of the deprivation 
for any given district will be different for each dataset. Indeed, even where the actual 
values of each variable is the same for a particular district in the different years, 
differences in the means of the variables used and differences in their corresponding 
standard deviations will yield a different deprivation index for the particular district 
for different years. Essentially, the deprivation index calculated for any given district 











other districts – for only the particular dataset. So, if a district has a deprivation index 
of 2.34 in 2001 and a deprivation index of 3.45 in 2005, this does not conclusively 
mean that the district has become more deprived. Statements can only be made about 
the level of deprivation in a district relative to another district within the same year 
(i.e. from the same dataset).  
 
6.3. Assessing Equity in Primary Health Care Allocations Across Districts 
To investigate the extent trend of equity in PHC, per capita non-hospital PHC 
expenditure is compared with deprivation indices for all districts. Data on per capita 
non-hospital PHC expenditure (henceforth referred to as per capita PHC expenditure) 
for only four financial years were available. These are for the 2001/02 financial year 
and 2005/06 to 2007/08 financial years. Data on per capita PHC expenditure for these 
years are available in Appendix D. Data on PHC expenditure used in this section are 
based on 2007/08 prices. Regression analysis is used to compare per capita PHC 
expenditure and deprivation indices. The results are presented in Table 6.9. 
 
Table 6.9 Results for Regression Analysis 










-40.0644*** -21.8956*** -25.7750*** -27.5783*** 
Adjustd R
2
 0.2215 0.1705 0.2100 0.1885 
Prob >F 0.0003 0.0014 0.004 0.0008 
     
* = significant at 10% level 
** = significant at 5% level 
*** = significant at 1% level 
Note that the complete regression results are displayed in Appendix E 
 
The results from the regression analysis show that in the four years reviewed, there 











expenditure on PHC. This means that per capita spending on PHC in districts that are 
more deprived is lower than per capita spending on PHC in districts that are less 
deprived. This is contrary to the vertical equity perspective on how resources should 
be allocated for PHC. Based on a vertical equity definition, districts that are more 
deprived (and based on this study‟s definition – in greater need of health care) should 
be spending more on PHC than those that are less deprived. 
 
However, a closer look at the coefficients of the deprivation index shows a reduction 
in value from -40.0644 in 2001 to -27.5783 in 2007. This suggests that although there 
remains a negative relationship between the two variables, a unit increase in the 
deprivation index should result in a lower reduction in PHC per capita expenditure in 
2007 than in 2001. In other words, while there remains a negative relationship 
between the two variables, more recent expenditure outlays (2005-2007) are more 
equitable than what obtained in 2001.  
 
 
Table 6.10 shows the changes in per capita PHC expenditure between 2001/02 and 
2007/08 financial years for the ten least funed and ten  most funded districts in 
2001/02. Column three in the table lists the ranking of the districts based on the 2001 
census deprivation index. The ranking starts from 1 (the least deprived district) to 53, 
which is the most deprived. The other columns are self-explanatory. From the table it 
is clear that the 10 least funded districts in 2001/02 are among the most deprived 














Table 6.10: Changes in real per-capita PHC expenditure 2001/02 to 2007/08 

















10 least funded districts in 2001/02 
MP Gert Sibande DM 30 59.40 211.29 151.89 255.7% 
MP Nkangala DM 25 62.22 226.26 164.04 263.7% 
EC Ukhahlamba DM 42 67.88 238.58 170.70 251.5% 
EC Cacadu DM 17 97.58 338.60 241.02 246.9% 
FS T. Mofutsanyana 31 100.41 210.59 110.18 109.7% 
EC Alfred Nzo DM 52 106.06 197.66 91.60 86.4% 
LP Capricorn DM 36 108.89 256.26 147.37 135.3% 
LP Gr. Sekhukhune 
DM 
48 123.03 221.34 98.31 79.9% 
FS Fezile Dabi DM 22 125.86 229.61 103.75 82.4% 
EC O. R. Tambo 53 128.69 222.52 93.83 72.9% 
 
10 best funded districts in 2001/02 
NW Southern DM 21 305.47 342.45 36.98 12.1% 
WC Overberg DM 2 339.41 319.55 -19.86 -5.8% 
NC Namakwa DM 6 359.21 632.69 273.48 76.1% 
WC Eden DM 4 374.76 435.33 60.57 16.16% 
WC West Coast DM 1 388.90 466.20 77.30 19.9% 
WC Central Karoo DM 5 459.61 526.18 66.57 14.5% 
GT Johannesburg MM 9 483.65 371.42 -112.23 -23.2% 
WC Cape Town MM 7 504.87 444.69 -60.18 -11.9% 
NW Bophirima DM 34 534.57 367.33 -167.24 -31.3% 
GT Ekurhuleni MM 15 550.12 273.22 -276.90 -50.3% 
*All figures used are in real 2007/08 prices 
 
Data from Table 6.10 confirms the results of the regression analysis. In both 2001 and 
2007, the districts that are more deprived generally have less PHC per capita 




 column, it is clear that 
previously less funded districts have experienced a higher increase in PHC 
expenditure per capita than the best funded districts; both in absolute terms and in 
percentage increase. The changes in PHC expenditure across districts clearly show a 
move towards a more equitable distribution of PHC expenditure outlays. This 
suggests that provinces have been shifting more resources to districts that had much 












Deprivation indices were also generated at the provincial level. Table 6.11 shows the 
deprivation indices calculated for provinces from the four datasets. The provinces are 
listed according to their ranking in terms of deprivation using the 2001 census data – 
from the most deprived (9) to the least deprived (1). The rankings are the same for 
most provinces in 2005 to 2007 as they were in 2001. In 2001, the most deprived 
province was Limpopo, while the least deprived province was the Western Cape. By 
2005, Gauteng moved from the 3
rd
 least deprived province to the 2
nd
 least deprived 
province. Gauteng moved back to the 3
rd
 least deprived in 2007. The only other 
change in ranking is between Limpopo and the Eastern Cape. Their rankings 
remained the same for 2001, 2005 and 2006. By 2007, Eastern Cape became the most 
deprived province while Limpopo became the 2
nd
 most deprived province. All other 
provinces maintained their ranking for all years. In summary, the table shows that the 
relative ranking of provinces in terms of deprivation has generally remained the same 
from 2001 to 2007.  
 

















LP 9 0.173 9 0.413 9 1.766 8 1.813 
EC 8 0.101 8 0.402 8 1.692 9 1.817 
KZN 7 -0.094 7 -0.182 7 0.449 7 0.966 
MP  6 -0.193 6 -0.528 6 0.426 6 0.329 
NW 5 -0.292 5 -0.711 5 -0.688 5 0.056 
FS 4 -0.486 4 -1.008 4 -1.004 4 -1.053 
GT 3 -0.944 2 -2.106 2 -1.978 3 -1.847 
NC 2 -0.001 3 -1.717 3 -1.646 2 -1.877 
WC 1 -1.300 1 -2.878 1 -3.155 1 -3.075 
 
 
Figure 6.2 provides a graphical summary of per capita PHC expenditure for all years 
under review. The provinces are arranged from the most deprived to the least 












The graph shows consistent increase in per capita PHC expenditure for the 5 most 
deprived provinces between 2001 and 2007. Gauteng and Western Cape are the only 
provinces that have experienced a real reduction in PHC per capita expenditure, and 
they are among the least deprived provinces. Also Gauteng and Western Cape had the 
highest PHC per capita expenditure in 2001/02 financial year. The graph shows that 
since 2001/02, although provincial PHC per capita outlays have remained inequitable, 

















Limpopo Eastern Cape KwaZulu Natal Mpumalanga North West Free State Gauteng Northern
Cape
Western Cape
PHC_01/02 PHC_05/06 PHC_06/07 PHC_07/08
 
Note: PHC expenditure is in 2008 prices 
 
More deprived provinces have experienced a larger increase in PHC per capita 
expenditure than less deprived provinces. This is the same conclusion drawn from the 











maximum and minimum PHC per capita expenditure was R448.3 (in the Western 
Cape) and R101 (in Mpumalanga) respectively. Western Cape was spending more 
than 4 times the amount that Mpumalaga was spending on PHC for each member of 
their respective populations. In 2007, the maximum and minimum per capita PHC 
expenditure was R428.4 (in the Western Cape) and R233.5 (In the Free State) 
respectively. Western Cape spent less than twice the amount that Free State spent on 
PHC per person in their provinces. 
 
In summary, the analysis at the district and provincial levels shows that the 
distribution of PHC funds has remained inequitable (using deprivation levels as 
indicators of health care needs) from 2001 to 2007. However, the analysis also shows 
that there have been noticeable shifts towards a more equitable distribution of PHC 
funds across geographic areas in South Africa. In general, the increase in funds 
committed to PHC in more deprived regions (districts and provinces) is higher than 
increases in funds committed to less deprived regions (in some cases there was a real 
decrease in PHC per capita expenditure). The next section of this chapter reviews 
provincial revenue and expenditure trends. This is done with a view to assess how 
changes in the size and composition of intergovernmental transfers to provinces may 
have influenced the shifts in PHC per capita observed within the country.  
 
6.4. Trends in Provincial Revenue and Expenditure 
The results of the regression and correlation analysis are surprising. Provinces still 
enjoy high levels of fiscal autonomy, and PHC is funded through a general purpose 
grant (the equitable shares). Based on the conceptual framework developed in this 











expected. This section of the study investigates the pattern and size of 
intergovernmental transfers to provinces within the period to check whether changes 
in these could have influenced the pattern of geographic allocations to PHC.  
 
Table 6.13 provides a summary of equitable share transfers and conditional grants 
from the national government to provinces, including provincial own revenue for the 




Table 6.13  Conditional Grants and Total Provincial Revenue 
ZAR million Financial Years 
 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
Equitable shares 132,605 142,396 153,002 164,730 177,471 190,638 
Conditional grants 18,956 20,040 21,455 22,513 32,266 35,055 
Own revenue 8,451 8,121 7,897 8,985 9,364 8,541 
Total revenue 160,012 170,557 182,354 196,227 219,101 234,234 
Conditional grants as 
% of total revenue 
11.8% 11.7% 11.8% 11.5% 14.7% 15.0% 
Annual increase in 
equitable share 
- 7.4% 7.5% 7.7% 7.7% 7.4% 
Sources: National Treasury: Intergovernmental Fiscal Reviews (National Treasury, 2005, National 
Treasury, 2006, National Treasury, 2007) 
Note: All figures in real 2008 prices 
 
The table shows that the proportion of total provincial revenue that is made up of 
conditional grants has remained the same at approximately 12% from 2002/03 to 
2005/06. From 2006/07, this proportion increased significantly. This is due to the 
introduction of two new conditional grants: Further education and training college 
sector recapitalisation grant (Education sector) and a grant for the Gautrain rapid 
rail link (Transport sector) (National Treasury, 2006). Although the proportion of 
total provincial expenditure that is made up of conditional grants increased 
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 Reliable data for 2000/01 and 2001/02 could not be accessed. All data was confirmed for reliability 
by cross checking various data sources. Available data for these two years were not consistent for 











substantially from 2006/07, equitable shares to provinces have increased in real terms 
consistently throughout the period at around 7.5% per annum.  
 
In total, equitable shares increased by approximately 44% from 2002/03 to 2007/08. 
The increase in the proportion of total transfers to provinces that is made up of 
conditional grants has not put any constraint on the size of the funds that provinces 
can use at their discretion. Also, the new conditional grants are not in the health 
sector, and so have no effect on the funds available for PHC services. With the 
consistent increase in equitable shares to provinces, the study rules out the mix of 
transfers (conditional and equitable shares) as a possible explanation for the 
convergence of PHC allocations. 
 
However, the table provides a possible explanation for the convergence of PHC 
allocations. It could well be that the increased resources available to provinces in the 
form of equitable shares allowed for additional funds to be allocated to PHC, 
especially in the provinces in which PHC was relatively less well-funded. From figure 
6.2, only Gauteng and Western Cape experienced a real decrease in PHC per capita 
expenditure within the period of review. These two provinces had the highest per 
capita PHC expenditure in 2000/01 financial year. The most deprived provinces such 
as Limpopo, the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal, experienced huge increases in per 
capita PHC expenditure.  
 
It is possible that the disproportional increases in PHC expenditure in provinces such 
as Limpopo, the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal are as a result of disproportional 











information on expenditure and revenue patterns for all provinces. The focus is on 
revenue and expenditure from the equitable shares grant, as this is the source of funds 
for PHC expenditure. 
 
Table 6.14 shows the total amount of funds transferred to each province as equitable 
shares (in millions) for the period 2002/03 to 2007/08.  
 
Table 6.14 Trend in Provincial Equitable Shares allocations 
R’Million Financial Years Total 
change 
 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08  
Eastern Cape 21,373 22,579 24,464 27,184 29,010 30,135 8,762 
Annual % change  - 5.6 8.4 11.1 6.7 3.9 40.9 
        
Free State  9,014  9,553  9,982   10,616    11,296  11,960  2,946 
Annual % change - 6.0 4.5 6.3 6.4 5.9 32.7 
        
Gauteng  21,851   23,475    25,120    25,398   27,502  31,408  9,557 
Annual % change - 7.43 7.01 1.11 8.28 14.20 43.7 
        
KwaZulu Natal   26,445  28,380  29,983  34,704    37,733  41,259  14,814 
Annual % change - 7.3 5.6 15.7 8.7 9.3 56.0 
        
Limpopo 17,783 19,582 21,232 22,481 24,269 24,866 7,083 
Annual % change - 10.1  8.4  5.9  8.0  2.5  39.8 
        
Mpumalanga 9,653 10,587 11,466 12,211 13,217 15,739 6,086 
Annual % change - 9.7 8.3 6.5 8.2 19.1 63.0 
        
Northern Cape 3,105 3,347 3,637 3,826 4,063 5,118 2,013 
Annual % change - 7.8 8.7 5.2 6.2 25.9 64.8 
        
North West 11,207 11,952 12,845 13,577 14,535 13,327 2,120 
Annual % change - 6.6 7.5 5.7 7.1 -8.3 18.9 
        
Western Cape 12,174 12,943 14,273 14,733 15,845 16,827 4,653 
Annual % change - 6.3 10.3 3.2 7.5 6.2 38.2 
Note: All amounts are in 2008 prices 
Source: Intergovernmental Fiscal Reviews, National Treasury (2006, 2007) 
 
Provinces with the highest overall percentage increase in equitable shares are 











are not the most deprived provinces. The provinces with the lowest overall percentage 
increase in equitable shares for the entire period are Free State and North West. 
 
The overall increases in the equitable shares grant transferred to the Western Cape 
and Gauteng are not in any way considerably lower than for other provinces. The 
overall increase in equitable shares transfers to the Western Cape is 38.2% and 43.7% 
for Gauteng
36
. Information from the table shows that all provinces received 
substantial increases in their equitable shares from 2002/03 to 2007/08 financial years. 
These probably provided provinces with additional funds to allow for the substantial 
increase in per capita PHC expenditure observed for the more deprived provinces. 
Given that the changes in PHC expenditure per capita for provinces are not an exact 
reflection of the changes in overall equitable shares grants, it means that the size of 
the equitable shares grant has not been the sole influence on the changes in the 
amount of funds committed to PHC in all provinces. 
 
The amount of funds from the equitable shares grant that is committed to provincial 
health services is determined by provincial budgetary negotiations. So, even where 
there are substantial increases in equitable shares to provinces, this is not a guarantee 
that the health sector within each province will experience a proportional increase in 
health spending. Consequently, a more detailed assessment of provincial spending on 
health care services from the equitable shares grant is required.  
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 It is important to note though that the population size of Gauteng and Western Cape increased by 
about 16% from 2001 to 2008. Within the same period, the average increase in population size for 
other provinces is about 5%. Source:  
STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA (2008) Mid-year population estimates, South Africa 2008. Statistics 











Indeed, even after provincial health budgets have been determined, provincial 
departments of health determine how much is spent on PHC. So, while increases in 
the overall equitable shares grants to provinces creates more room for increases in 
PHC expenditure, provincial budgetary negotiations (for different sectors) and 
provincial department of health budgetary negotiations can also determine the pattern 
of PHC expenditure obtained. Table 6.15 shows the trend and annual percentage 
change in total provincial health expenditure from equitable shares grants.  
 
Table 6.15 Trend in Health Expenditure from Equitable Shares 
R’Million Financial Years Total 
change 
 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08
†
  
Eastern Cape        
Health expenditure 5,560 5,970 5,776 6,439 7,457 7,827 2,267 
% change HE  7.4 -3.2 11.5 15.8 5.0 40.8 
Free State        
Health expenditure 2,413 2,570 2,760 2,887 3,152 3,106 693 
% change HE  6.5 7.4 4.6 9.2 -1.5 28.7 
Gauteng        
Health expenditure 7,354 7,398 7,566 9,063 9,333 9,488 2,134 
% change HE  0.6 2.3 19.8 3.0 1.7 29.0 
KwaZulu Natal        
Health expenditure 9,138 9,179 9,823 11,283 11,833 12,840 3,702 
% change HE  0.4 7.0 14.9 4.9 8.5 40.5 
Limpopo        
Health expenditure 4,074 4,316 4,881 5,204 6,387 6,192 2,118 
% change HE  5.9 13.1 6.6 22.7 -3.1 52.0 
Mpumalanga        
Health expenditure 2,214 2,271 2,571 2,940 3,191 5,564 3,350 
% change HE  2.6 13.2 14.4 8.5 74.4 151.3 
Northern Cape        
Health expenditure 421 871 836 1,038 1,021 1,152 731 
% change HE  106.9 -4.0 24.2 -1.6 12.8 173.6 
North West        
Health expenditure 2,535 2,597 2,948 3,191 3,512 3,620 1,085 
% change HE  2.4 13.5 8.2 10.1 3.1 42.8 
Western Cape        
Health expenditure 3,568 3,983 4,535 4,770 5,255 5,563 1,995 
% change HE  11.6 13.9 5.2 10.2 5.9 55.9 
Note: All expenditure data are in 2008 prices.  
† The figures for total health expenditure the 2007/08 financial year are based on medium term 












The reason for reviewing this component of health expenditure is to find out how 
much of the equitable shares grant the different provinces have allocated to the health 
sector. This can shed some light on how the convergence of PHC expenditure has 
been achieved. It may well be that provinces that have historically spent less on PHC 
are in recent times committing more of the equitable shares grant to the health sector 
(than they previously did), allowing for the proportionally higher increase in PHC 
expenditure. Mpumalanga and the Northern Cape experienced the highest percentage 
increase in health expenditure, while the Free State and Gauteng experienced the 
lowest overall increase in health expenditure. Table 6.16 compares the changes in 
equitable shares allocation to provinces with changes in health expenditure and 
changes in PHC per capita expenditure. 
 
Table 6.16 Comparison of Change in Equitable Shares and Heath Expenditure 
Province % change in 
equitable shares 
allocation  
2002/03 – 2007/08 
% change in 
health 
expenditure from 
equitable shares  
2002/03 – 2007/08 




2001/02 – 2007/08 
Eastern Cape 40.9 40.8 -0.1 75.3 
Free State 32.7 28.7 -4.0 66.7 
Gauteng 43.7 29.0 -14.7 -22.7 
KwaZulu Natal 56.0 40.5 -15.5 33.5 
Limpopo 39.8 52.0 12.2 88.0 
Mpumalanga 63.0 151.3 88.3 132.4 
Northern Cape 64.8 173.6 108.8 91.1 
North West 18.9 42.8 23.9 17.7 
Western Cape 38.2 55.9 17.7 -4.45 
 
The fourth column of the table shows the difference in percentage points between 
column 2 and 3. A positive value means that the province increased its allocation to 
the health sector by a higher percentage than the increase in equitable shares to the 
province, and vice versa. The Northern Cape and Mpumalanga have the highest 
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positive values in this column. This means that they have increased their allocation to 
the health sector much more than the increase in equitable shares grants (by a greater 
percentage than other provinces). This is a reflection of greater priority given to 
health. Interestingly, these two provinces also record the highest increase in per capita 
PHC expenditure (from 2001 to 2008). Also, Mpumalanga had the lowest per capita 
PHC expenditure in 2001/02. KwaZulu Natal and Gauteng have the highest negative 
values in column 4. The negative values mean that the increase in health expenditure 
from the equitable shares grant expenditure over the period of review is lower than the 
increase in equitable shares allocated to the province. For Gauteng, per capita PHC 
expenditure from 2001 to 2008 reduced by 22.7% even though total expenditure on 
the health sector increased by 29% between 2002/03 and 2007/08. However, for 
KwaZulu Natal, the percentage increase in health expenditure from 2002/03 to 
2007/08 is not as high as the percentage increase in the equitable shares allocation, 
PHC per capita expenditure increased by 33.5% percent between 2001/02 and 
2007/08 financial years.  
 
Provincial level analysis shows that there has been a consistent increase in equitable 
shares allocations to all provinces from 2002/03 to 2007/08. Similarly, there have also 
been consistent increases in health expenditure from the equitable shares grant across 
all provinces, within the same time period. What can be deduced from the data on 
provincial equitable shares allocations and health sector expenditure trends is that the 
increase in equitable shares allocations has enabled provinces that had the least per 
capita PHC expenditure in 2001/02 (such as Mpumalanga, Limpopo and the Free 
State) to substantially increase their levels of expenditure on PHC.  This has resulted 












It is also important to assess whether provinces changed allocation patterns to their 
districts to a more equitable one. The tables below provide a summary of changes in 
per capita PHC expenditure by district within each province. Table 6.17 shows the 
change in PHC per capita expenditure from the 2001/02 financial year to the 2007/08 
financial year for the Eastern Cape. For each of these tables (6.16 to 6.24), the 
districts are listed according to levels of deprivation based on the 2001 Census data. 
The first district is the most deprived in the province, while the district in the last row 
is the least deprived in the province. The fourth column of these tables shows the 
ranking of each district based on the deprivation index calculated from the 2001 
census data. Districts that are more deprived have a higher rank; so O.R Tambo that is 
ranked as 53 is the most deprived district.   
 














O.R Tambo 128.7 222.5 53 93.8 72.9 
Alfred Nzo 106.1 197.7 52 91.6 86.4 
Ukhahlamba 67.9 238.6 42 170.7 251.5 
Chris Hani 154.2 302.9 39 148.5 96.5 
Amathole 193.7 304.9 35 111.2 57.4 














The table shows that for the Eastern Cape, the districts with the lowest per capita PHC 
expenditure in 2001/02 are not the most deprived districts. Nevertheless, these are the 
districts with the greatest increase (in real and percentage terms) in expenditure by 
2007/08. The result is that although PHC expenditure per capita in 2007/08 still 











range in per capita PHC expenditure between districts. In 2001/02 Ukhahlamba spent 
the least - only R67.9 per capita, while Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 
spent the most: R182.4 per capita – 2.7 times the amount spent in Ukhahlamba. 
However, by 2007/08, the highest per capita expenditure is recorded for Cacadu 
(R338.6), and the lowest is in Alfred Nzo (R197.7). The amount spent by Cacadu in 
2007/08 is less than double what was spent in Alfred Nzo.  
 
Table 6.18 Free State: Change in District PHC expenditure 2001/02 to 2007/08 













100.4 210.59 31 110.18 109.7 
Lejweleputswa 135.8 190.9 24 55.2 40.7 
Motheo 181.0 273.9 23 92.9 51.4 
Fezile Dabi 125.7 229.6 22 103.8 82.4 
Xhariep 205.1 387.2 19 182.1 88.8 
 
In the Free State, in 2001/02 and 2007/08, the most deprived districts are spending the 
least in per capita terms on PHC. Another interesting finding is that the most deprived 
district (Thabo Mofutsanyane) experienced the second largest increase (in real terms) 
in PHC per capita between 2001/02 and 2007/08. However, for the remaining 
districts, the increase in PHC per capita expenditure is higher in real terms for less 
deprived districts. Clearly, while all districts in the Free State experienced increases in 
per capita PHC expenditure, the increases in district level PHC per capita expenditure 
further exacerbates the level of inequity in PHC resource allocation in the Free State. 
 
Table 6.19 shows the changes in PHC per capita expenditure in Gauteng. Districts 
that are the most deprived spent less on PHC in per capita terms in 2001/02 than the 
least deprived districts. Change in per capita expenditure from 2001/02 to 2007/08 











capita expenditure for districts that spent the least in 2001/02. This is with the 
exception of Sedibeng DM. 
 
Table 6.19 Gauteng: Change in District PHC expenditure 2001/02 to 2007/08 











Metsweding 213.5 286.6 18 73.1 34.2 
West Rand 230.5 236.2 16 5.7 2.5 
Ekurhuleni MM 550.1 273.2 15 -276.9 -50.3 
City of Tshwane 
MM 
239.0 335.3 14 96.3 40.3 




483.7 371.4 9 -112.2 -23.2 
 
Clearly, there has been a conscious effort in Gauteng to equalise (at least within the 
time frame reviewed) the amount of funds committed to PHC per person for each 
district. 
 
Table 6.20 KwaZulu Natal: Change in District PHC expenditure 2001/02 to 2007/08 






Rank Difference % 
change 
uMKhanyakude 234.8 339.7 51 104.9 44.7 
uMzinyathi 189.5 263.3 50 73.8 38.9 
Zululand 213.5 280.2 49 66.7 31.2 
Sisonke 239.0 415.8 47 176.8 73.9 
Ugu 233.3 272.1 46 38.7 16.6 
uThukela 212.1 276.5 44 64.4 30.4 
uThungulu 212.1 277.6 43 65.4 30.8 
Ilembe 175.4 310.2 41 134.8 76.9 
Amajuba 209.3 219.9 28 10.6 5.1 
uMgungundlovu 282.8 275.8 26 -7.0 -2.5 
eThekwini MM 253.1 365.4 20 112.2 44.3 
 
For KwaZulu Natal, in 2001/02, PHC per capita expenditure was around R200 in each 
district. Districts with substantially higher figures are uMgundundlovu and eThekwini 











per capita PHC expenditure. Districts with the highest increases in per capita PHC 
expenditure are not restricted to those that are the most deprived. However, Ilembe 
district has the lowest per capita PHC expenditure in 2001/02 financial year, but by 
2007/08, PHC per capita expenditure had increased by R134.8 (one of the highest 
increases). In summary, it does not appear that changes in per capita expenditure in 
KwaZulu Natal are based on levels of deprivation or previous levels of expenditure. 
Indeed, PHC per capita expenditure outlays in 2007/08 have a wider range than what 
is observed for 2001/08, and district-level increases in expenditure does not 
particularly favour the most deprived districts.  
 
  Table 6.21 Limpopo: Change in District PHC expenditure 2001/02 to 2007/08 













123.0 221.3 48 98.3 79.9 
Vhembe 175.4 301.1 45 125.7 71.7 
Mopani 197.9 289.9 38 92.0 46.4 
Capricorn 108.9 256.3 36 147.4 135.3 
Waterberg 176.7 302.8 29 126.1 71.3 
 
Based on the deprivation index generated from the 2001 census data, Limpopo is one 
of the most deprived provinces. Table 6.21 shows that in 2001/02 financial year, per 
capita PHC expenditure for all districts in Limpopo were below R200. The most 
deprived district spent a relatively low amount on PHC per person. What is interesting 
is that the district with the lowest per capita PHC expenditure in 2001/02 experienced 
the highest increase in per capita expenditure by 2007/08. Also, the size of the 
increases for different districts is neither a strict reflection of the levels of deprivation 
nor a strict reflection of previous levels of expenditure (although the percentage 
increases are a better reflection of the 2001/02 expenditure outlays). For example, 











of the lowest increases in per capita expenditure. Also, Waterberg is the least deprived 
district, and by 2007/08, its per capita expenditure on PHC was the highest.  
 
The changes in PHC per capita expenditure have resulted in a convergence of 
expenditure outlays. In 2001/02 financial year, the district that spent the most in terms 
of PHC per capita (Mopani), spent 1.8 times the amount spent by Capricorn (the 
lowest) per person. In 2007/08, Waterberg spent the most on PHC per capita, while 
Greater Sekhukhune spent the least in per capita terms. In 2007/08, Waterberg spent 
only 1.4 times more per person than Greater Sekhukhune. 
 
Table 6.22 Mpumalanga: Change in District PHC expenditure 2001/02 to 2007/08 






Rank Difference % 
change 
Ehlanzeni 189.5 255.8 32 66.3 35.0 
Gert Sibande 59.4 211.3 30 151.9 244.7 
Nkangala 62.2 226.3 25 164.1 263.6 
 
The trend in PHC expenditure in Mpumalanga shows that in 2001/02 financial year, 
the most deprived district (Ehlanzeni) spent the most on PHC, in per capita terms. 
From 2001/02 to 2007/08, the other districts achieved much higher increases in per 
capita expenditure than Ehlanzeni. What is of note is that PHC per capita expenditure 
in Mpumalanga in 2001/02 was very low compared to what obtained in other districts 
nationwide. By 2007/08 PHC expenditure in the districts within Mpumalanga are 
more comparable to expenditure in districts of other provinces. Also, the most 
deprived district is still spending the most on PHC per capita in 2007/08. It appears 
that Provincial health authority in Mpumalanga has over time increased PHC 
expenditure in Gert Sibande and Nkangala to bring the per capita expenditure on PHC 














Table 6.23 Northern Cape: Change in District PHC expenditure 2001/02 to 2007/08 






Rank Difference % 
change 
Kgalagadi 197.9 353.3 37 155.4 78.4 
Frances Baard 190.9 314.3 13 123.4 64.6 
Pixley Ka Seme 230.5 375.8 12 145.3 63.0 
Siyanda 141.4 206.1 8 64.6 45.7 
Namakwa 359.2 632.7 6 273.5 76.1 
 
Table 6.23 shows the trend in PHC per capita expenditure for districts in the Northern 
Cape. In 2001/02, the least deprived district (Namakwa) spent the most per person on 
PHC – this remains the case in 2007/08. The most deprived districts experienced a 
higher increase in PHC per capita expenditure from 2001/02 to 2007/08 than the less 
deprived. The result is that the more deprived districts maintain a higher per capita 
PHC expenditure than the less deprived in 2007/08 (with the exception of Namakwa).  
 
Table 6.24 North West: Change in District PHC expenditure 2001/02 to 2007/08 






Rank Difference % 
change 
Bophirima 534.6 367.3 34 -167.3 -31.3 
Central 224.9 397.6 33 172.7 76.8 
Bojanala 
Platinum 
202.2 290.3 27 88.0 43.5 
Southern 305.5 342.5 21 37.0 12.1 
 
Table 6.24 shows that in 2001/02 financial year, the most deprived district in North 
West (Bophirima) had the highest per capita expenditure, followed by the least 
deprived district (Southern). Central and Bojanala Platinum recorded the lowest PHC 
per capita expenditure, however, these two districts experienced the greatest increase 











period, per capita PHC expenditure in Bophirima declined in real terms. The result is 
a convergence of PHC per capita expenditure in North West province for the period 
under review. 
 
Table 6.25 Western Cape: Change in District PHC expenditure 2001/02 to 2007/08 






Rank Difference % 
change 
City of Cape 
Town MM 
504.9 444.7 7 -60.2 -11.9 
Central Karoo 459.6 526.2 5 66.6 14.5 
Eden 374.8 435.3 4 60.5 16.2 
Cape Winelands 284.3 353.1 3 68.8 24.2 
Overberg 339.4 319.6 2 -19.8 -5.9 
West Coast 388.9 466.2 1 77.3 19.9 
 
For the Western Cape, in 2001/02, the most deprived district (City of Cape Town) 
spent the most on PHC per capita, followed by the second most deprived district – 
Central Karoo. Within this financial year, the least deprived districts (Cape 
Winelands, Overberg and West Coast) spent the lowest in terms of PHC expenditure 
per capita. Changes in per capita PHC expenditure from the 2001/02 to 2007/08 
financial years does not conclusively result in a convergence of PHC expenditure per 
capita. In 2001/02 financial year per capita expenditure on PHC in the City of Cape 
Town was 1.7 times more than the per capita PHC expenditure in the Cape Winelands 
(which had the lowest PHC per capita expenditure in 2001/02). By 2007/08 the 
district with the highest per capita expenditure was spending 1.6 times more per capita 
than the district with the lowest PHC per capita expenditure.  Interestingly, the City of 
Cape Town, which is the most deprived in the province experienced a real reduction 
in per capita PHC expenditure, while the West Coast (least deprived) experienced the 











be noted though that the City of Cape Town had the highest per capita expenditure on 
PHC in the 2001/02 financial year.  
 
 
6.5. Summary and Discussion 
The results of the analysis in this chapter show that the distribution of PHC per capita 
expenditure at the district and province levels are more equitable in 2007/08 than they 
were in 2001/02, even though the distribution of PHC per capita expenditure remains 
inequitable. Provinces still maintain a high level of fiscal autonomy in determining 
PHC expenditure, as PHC is funded through a general purpose grant. Under this 
dispensation and based on the conceptual framework developed by this study, it 
would have been more likely for inequities in PHC expenditure to be maintained 
rather than be reduced.  
 
Based on the predictions of the conceptual framework, achieving equity in the 
distribution of PHC funds across regions is feasible under any of the following non-
mutually exclusive conditions: 
 PHC is funded by a specific purpose grant, which gives the national 
government control over how much is spent on PHC in each province 
 A very high proportion of transfers to provinces are in the form of specific 
purpose grants (and provincial own-revenue is low), leaving little room for 
provincial or district-specific preferences to influence the size of funds 











 Constitutional arrangements allow for the national government to influence 
the size of funds committed to PHC through setting norms and standards; with 
adequate mechanisms to ensure compliance on the part of provinces 
 Local preferences for PHC in relation to all other provincially provided 
services are similar for all provinces and districts. 
 
Based on the review of the South African Context (chapter 4) and the results 
presented in this chapter, none of these conditions (with the exception of one) have 
been experienced in South Africa within the period of review. As previously 
mentioned in chapter 4, the National Department of Health (in 2000) set norms and 
standards to guide the provision and financing of PHC. However, as will be revealed 
in later chapters, these guidelines have been poorly disseminated and weakly 
implemented. The question therefore is: how has South Africa achieved a more 
equitable geographic distribution of PHC expenditure under conditions that are more 
conducive for maintaining or exacerbating the inequities in PHC expenditure? 
 
Analysis of quantitative data including the review of equitable shares allocations to 
provinces and provincial health expenditure trends provides information on how a 
more equitable distribution of PHC funds has been achieved. These are discussed in 
turn. 
 
Between 2001/02 and 2007/08 financial years, there has been a consistent increase in 
the amount of equitable shares allocated to each province. This allowed for increases 











increased the possibility for increasing the amount of resources allocated to PHC for 
districts that were previously relatively under-funded.  
 
Secondly, provinces such as the Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and the Free 
State that recorded relatively low per capita PHC expenditure in 2001/02 financial 
year increased their real per capita expenditure on PHC per capita by larger amounts 
than provinces that spent relatively more on PHC per capita in 2001/02 (Gauteng and 
the Western Cape). This caused a convergence in province-level per capita 
expenditure on PHC. 
 
Thirdly, as observed in intra-provincial analysis of per capita PHC expenditure trends, 
all provinces with the exception of Free State and KwaZulu Natal reduced the range 
of PHC per capita expenditure across their respective provinces between 2001/02 and 
2007/08 financial years. Also, provinces that had a district(s) with an extremely low 
level of per capita PHC expenditure in 2001/02 increased the expenditure on PHC for 
that district significantly.  
 
All these changes in district and province-level expenditure patterns for PHC resulted 
in a more equitable distribution of PHC per capita expenditure. What is clear from the 
analysis is that changes in district-level or province-level allocations to PHC have not 
been made solely based on health needs as defined by this study (deprivation). Per 
capita PHC spending in 2001/02 seem to have been the main motivation for changing 












Intra-provincial convergence of PHC per capita expenditure is not contradictory to the 
predictions of the conceptual framework. Provincial health authorities have significant 
influence in determining PHC allocations to the various districts within the province. 
What is very interesting is that provinces that recorded relatively low levels of PHC 
per capita expenditure in 2001/02 increased their expenditure to levels closer to those 
that are obtained in provinces that had a relatively high per capita expenditure. Indeed 
it would seem as if these provinces are attempting to reach a target level of per capita 
expenditure on PHC. The question is why? A possible reason is that these provinces 
that were previously relatively less funded in terms of PHC want to spend as much as 
other provinces. Another is that there is a national benchmark on PHC per capita 
expenditure that provinces are trying to achieve. If any of these reasons are true (or 
both), then this could explain why the relative increases in PHC per capita 
expenditure for districts is not a direct reflection of health needs.  
 
If provinces are attempting to achieve some benchmark expenditure on PHC, another 
question arises. Who set the benchmark? If the benchmark was set by the national 
government, then indeed there has been some national influence in fiscal 
arrangements for the financing of PHC. 
 
In summary, the results of the analysis of quantitative data raise some important 
questions: Has the national government been influencing health budgets and PHC 
expenditure? If so, how has the national government achieved this given that the 
constitution gives provinces autonomy in determining health budgets to a large extent 
and PHC exclusively? Have provinces achieved a more equitable distribution of PHC 












In the next chapter, qualitative data collected through interviews with government 













Analysis of Qualitative Data 
 
In this chapter, data collected from interviews are presented and analysed. As stated in 
the methods section, this will be done according to seven broad themes. For each 
theme, the central focus is to assess the impact of processes, actors and structures on 
the equitable distribution of PHC finances. Although the chapter focuses mainly on 
the analysis of qualitative data, information from the chapters on quantitative analysis 
and the South African context will be used to support arguments and discussions 
where necessary. 
 
7.1. The Vertical Division of Revenue 
This section focuses on the analysis of data on the process of vertical division of 
nationally collected revenue. Government officials were asked to describe the process 
for the vertical division of revenue. Officials unanimously agreed that the vertical 
split of revenue is not a “narrow formulistic approach”. They explained that the 
amount of funds transferred to provinces, and other spheres of government in the 
vertical split depends largely on the following: 
 The broad macro-economic situation within the country. This includes factors 
such as the growth rate of the economy, revenue targets, the amount of interest 
payments to be made by the government, etc. These determine the level of 
overall government expenditure that is set for each year. 
 Expenditure priorities of the government. These determine the amount of 











sphere in the vertical split of revenue is a reflection of the priority given to the 
functions that are the responsibilities of that sphere of government. 
As an official from the National Treasury commented: 
“For example, if the government puts a lot of emphasis on buying submarines… that 
will be at the national sphere … The vertical weighting must also reflect some sort of 
differential weighting  of priority across spheres (government levels)” 
 
 Spending pressures of different levels of government. These spending 
pressures are gauged from sector processes such as the 10x10s (expressed as 
“ten-by-tens”), and 4x4s (four-by-fours)
38
. These annual meetings that set 
different sector pressures and policy priorities. They also inform and identify 
expenditure priorities for the government. 
 
Nevertheless, the budgeting process begins with a soft division of revenue based on 
historical divisions across spheres (as a starting point). This is then adjusted based on 
the medium term expenditure framework adopted by government, following the 
assessment of the above listed factors. The health sector “ten-by-ten” is a forum 
where different provincial health departments and the national departments of health 
agree on national health priorities, and make bids for additional funds for particular 
health programmes – in line with their stated priorities. It is also a forum for 
individual provincial departments of health to make bids for additional resources 
based on province-specific health sector priorities. The ten-by-tens also serve as a 
monitoring and evaluation process. In these forums, the National Treasury and their 
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 The10x10s are forums that comprise all nine provincial treasuries, all nine provincial health 
departments in addition to the National Treasury and the national health department. The 4x4s are 
forums that comprise of representatives from the National Treasury, three provincial treasuries, the 
national department of health and three of its provincial counterparts. Only a few provinces are 
represented on a particular 4x4, but each province is involved in at least one 4x4. These 4x4s comprise 











provincial counterparts have the opportunity to evaluate the performance of the 
various departments of health in terms of how efficiently and effectively they 
(provincial departments of health) have used funds already allocated to them. This is 
taken into consideration in negotiations for granting additional funds for any 
programme or activity within the health sector.  
 
These ten-by-tens are held for other sectors that have provincial departments, such as 
education and transport. These forums form important conduits for collating 
provincial level priorities and assessment of spending pressures for provinces in 
relation to other spheres of government. 
  
7.1.1 Discussion 
Information gathered from interviewees suggests that the process for identifying 
national priorities for determining the vertical split of revenue is a consultative 
process that allows for inputs from different sectors and spheres of government. Also, 
most interviewees claimed that this process determines the size of funds transferred to 
each sphere.  
 
If indeed the claims of interviewees are true, then this process should result in a 
division of revenue that reflects the relative level of priority of different sectors within 
each sphere. Given that equity and PHC are priority areas for the government, this 
budgeting process (for the vertical split) should facilitate the distribution of the 
equitable shares in such a way that the health component reflects different provincial 











spending priorities and pressures for each sphere of government is effective and 
produces accurate estimations.  
 
Determination of the vertical split of revenue is about, for lack of a better phrase, 
“sharing money”. This invariably makes the process a political one. The outcome of 
any political process depends on which stakeholders wield the most power. 
Interestingly, most of the interviewees skirted direct questions that attempted to elicit 
this information. However, most interviewees did allude to the consistent presence of 
the National and Provincial Treasury in all forums around decision-making for the 
vertical split of revenue and even for the determination of allocations to different 
sectors within provinces.  
 
Further review of literature (Okorafor and Thomas, 2007, McIntyre and Nicholson, 
1999) revealed that the key players in the determination of the vertical division of 
nationally collected revenue are: 
 Minister‟s Committee on the Budget (MinComBud): This committee 
comprises of the Minister of Finance, Deputy Minister of Finance, Minister of 
Trade and Industry, Arts and Culture, Science and Technology, Health and 
Education 
 Budget Council: comprising of the Minister of Finance and the Members of 
Executive Council (MECs) of finance for each province 
 National and Provincial Treasuries 
 National and Provincial Departments from all sectors 
 Parliament 












Most budget decisions are made by the Budget Council, Cabinet and the Provincial 
Executive Committees. Civil servants within the different departments draw up and 
revise (with their Treasury counterparts) their respective budget estimates to follow 
the indicative budgets given by the MinComBud; these are also considered by the 
Budget Council. National Treasury collates revised departmental estimates and these 
are presented to the MinComBud for approval. The proposed budget then needs to be 
approved by the Cabinet and finally by the Parliament. Legislators within parliament 
can only vote in favour or against the budgets. Parliament cannot adjust budget 
estimates (McIntyre and Nicholson, 1999). The National and Provincial Treasuries 
feature prominently in this process and probably have a huge influence on the 
outcome of the vertical split of revenue. Given their interest in maintaining efficient 
use of resources, it may well be that the size of resource increase (or decrease) to the 
three spheres of government for any given year is largely dependent on each sphere‟s 
ability to effectively and efficiently utilise resources allocated to them in the previous 
year. Also, decisions that determine the size of allocations to each sphere can be 
politically motivated. For instance, towards the end of 1999, the South African 
government decided to modernise its defence equipment. This then required a 
substantial increase in national level allocations (National Treasury, 2000). 
 
While it appears that different levels of government are represented in this decision-
making process, no interviewee mentioned any form of engagement with citizens with 
regard to the determination of the vertical split of nationally collected revenue. 
Questions around community participation and community preferences were posed to 











section of this chapter. These will help in assessing how transparent the overall 
budgeting process is. 
 
The process of the vertical split of revenue is important in ultimately determining how 
much money any province can spend on the health sector and PHC. However, the size 
of national revenue allocated to the provincial sphere of government is not the only 
factor in determining equity in resource allocation to PHC across provinces and 
districts. Horizontal division of revenue is an equally important determining factor.. 
To make this point clearer, if fewer financial resources are allocated to the provincial 
sphere of government, this simply constrains the available resources for all provincial 
responsibilities, and not just PHC. Whether geographic distribution of PHC resources 
becomes more or less equitable will depend on how much each province receives, 
how much each province is willing to allocate to the health sector, and then how much 
each provincial department of health is willing to allocate to PHC across districts. 
 
7.2. Horizontal Division of Revenue and Provincial Budgeting 
In general, once provinces have received their equitable shares, based on the equitable 
share formula, they would then decide on the amounts of their total revenue that 
would be allocated to each sector, through their budgeting process. There are two 
budgeting processes here. First, provinces decide on how much will be spent on each 
sector (e.g health, education, etc). Second, and within the provincial department of 
health, the amount to be spent on PHC is decided. 
 
A concern that was raised by an official with respect to the equitable shares formula is 











provinces, based on general indicators of health needs, educational needs, etc, the 
official claimed that it is a flawed process. The government official from a Provincial 
Department of Health pointed out that the equitable shares formula uses out-dated 
population figures that do not reflect the actual population sizes of provinces and also 
does not properly estimate the number of patients that cross provincial boundaries to 
seek health care. The official did not have exact figures of how much PHC services 
were provided to patients from other provinces, however. The validity of this 
official‟s comment on cross-border flows is questionable as this (cross-border flows) 
is usually not a problem for PHC services; rather it is a more common phenomenon 
with the use of tertiary services. No other interviewee felt that the process of 
distributing equitable shares was a flawed process. Further discussion with the 
interviewee who claimed that the equitable shares process was flawed revealed that 
the interviewee felt that the population figures used for his province underestimated 
the true population figure. 
 
Based on interview data, the following are the key activities that inform the amount of 
funds from the equitable shares that are allocated to sectors within provinces. It is 
worth noting that these processes outlined below are the same for each province. They 
are based on guidelines set out  in the constitution to foster co-operative governance 
and aligning of policy and implementation (National Treasury, 2006): 
1. In August each provincial department submits a list of new programmes or 
expansion of programmes to their provincial treasuries that they would like 











2. Cabinet committees (including Heads of Departments and Members of the 
Executive Council (MECs) from the three provincial clusters
39
 (social; economic; 
and governance and administration) define the criteria for evaluating all listed 
policy options (listed programmes). These criteria are weighted by their relative 
importance. 
3.  These criteria are used by each department to rank the programmes and policies 
that they have planned for the next year. 
4. The end product is a list of programmes and policies for each department, ranked 
by priority. These, including the nationally identified priorities, are then the basis 
for deciding which programmes are funded. National priorities take precedence 
over provincial priorities, and are decided by 10x10s and 4x4s that would have 
taken place earlier in the year (between May and June). 
 
These activities as listed above indicate that there is a channel for the national 
government, through the National Department of Health and National Treasury to 
influence provincial expenditure behaviour. However, although this process has been 
in place for some time, it is only recently that the National Treasury has started to 
enforce adherence to nationally agreed priorities in provincial expenditure behaviour. 
According to interviewees at the national level, in the past, even with national forums 
such as “ten-by-tens”, provinces enjoyed high levels of autonomy in deciding on how 
much they could spend on each sector and programme. What this means is that at that 
time, even after national priorities were decided in forums such as the “ten-by-tens”, 
provinces still spent their equitable shares grants as they saw fit, regardless of what 
the national priorities were. This created a situation where there was some disjuncture 
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between national priorities and actual provincial expenditure on policies and 
programmes. Provincial expenditure patterns often did not reflect national priorities. 
As a government official from the national level explained: 
“…historically, there‟ve always been attempts at inter-governmental coordination 
because of the location of policy at national level and funding decisions at provincial 
level, and that creates inconsistencies. …many national departments have expressed 
the view that they are really finding it impossible to function given the inconsistencies 
in their own arrangements [being responsible for overall national policy development 
and not having any say in the way available funds are spent]” 
 
Information from interviews with officials within provincial Treasuries revealed that 
in recent years, the national government has become more and more involved in 
provincial budgetary decision-making. These officials claim that this has been to 
ensure that there is better coordination between nationally identified priorities and 
provincial expenditure on these priorities. One provincial official stated that: 
 
“The whole system has changed significantly in the past few years. Three years ago 
[2004], the equitable share was unconditional and there were probably some broad 
priorities that were outlined in the MTEF [Medium Term Expenditure Framework]. 
2006, you started to get the Budget Council memorandum and allocation letters [from 
the National Treasury] saying we have allocated X amount additional to your 
(province) equitable shares and the expectation is not only will it go to these priorities 
but that this percentage of it will go to this priority and that‟s something completely 
new element. Its one thing to say that generally we think the province should spend 
their money on job creation and social development and poverty alleviation, it‟s 
another thing to say that we are giving you this equitable share money and we expect 
that 50% of it is going to go to the following 5 priorities. That‟s what started 
happening in 2006, what happened in 2007 was even more so. We had X amount for 
additional equitable share I think a full 80% of it was designated by national – that is 












At this point, it is important to clarify some of the statements made by the interviewee 
above. The MTEF provides a framework for government expenditure in three-year 
cycles (expenditure funded through the equitable shares to provinces and local 
governments). Within this framework, the size of budgeted expenditure for a 
particular year based on previous MTEF projections is known as the baseline budget 
for the year. So, the actual expenditure in each year could be more than the baseline 
budget (and usually is). The additional funds for the equitable shares (over and above 
the amount set out by the baseline budget) are those that the interviewee referred to as 
being more “conditional”. Also, the interviewee indicated that some health sector 
programmes have received additional funds through these means, although the 
interviewee was not aware if PHC was one of such health sector programmes. 
 
The intervention of the national government in provincial fiscal affairs was confirmed 
by an official of the National Treasury. The official explained that provinces were 
now being pushed to adhere to spending patterns in line with national priorities. In 
response to the question on how the national government has managed to achieve this, 
he responded that:  
 “…Its largely force of arguments and pressurising, and in a sense embarrassing 
provinces that have been seen not to be complying with the national priorities, so 
what happened in the last budget is that there was a very strong articulation of 
national priorities and the cost”.  
 
The official noted that this had a positive impact on intergovernmental coordination, 
with provincial spending assuming a better reflection of nationally determined 











now being squeezed out. What was apparent from interviews on the subject was that 
pressure on provinces to spend according to nationally defined priorities came from 
the National Treasury. This confirms that the National Treasury indeed wields 
considerable power in determining financial allocations to provinces and provincial 
spending behaviour. 
 
7.2.1 Budgeting for Health and PHC  
Based on interview data, the size of PHC budgets within provinces depends on the 
priority of the health sector relative to other sectors; the relative priority of PHC 
within the health sector
40
, and the relative priority of PHC to other programmes in 
other sectors within the province. Consequently, the size of the health budget in any 
province will depend on how well the Departments of Health (province and national) 
present their policy priorities at sector forums (such as 10x10s and 4x4s) that 
determine the overall government expenditure priorities. As previously described, 
budgeting for sectors (including health) at the provincial level involves submissions 
of spending priorities and budget proposals by all provincial sectors to the provincial 
Treasury. These bids are evaluated by the provincial Treasury to see if they are in line 
with the three-year fiscal framework, national priorities (as agreed in 10x10s), and the 
indicative budget available for the province.  
 
Interview data further revealed that there is a collective bidding process by national 
departments (in consultation with their provincial counterparts), which is a national 
bid for funds that informs the size of equitable share transfers, and a local bid at the 
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level of the province by provincial sectors. The bids at the provincial level are usually 
in line with nationally agreed priorities, but they also address any needs peculiar to a 
sector within the province. As a provincial treasury official commented: 
 
“You may have a local requirement for some other thing that is a local anomaly, then 
you get a bid at the province level” 
 
This province-level bidding process, which should lead to priority-led allocations to 
sectors within provinces (the hallmark of an ideal fiscal federal system), is becoming 
increasingly constrained because more and more of the equitable share funds are 
being transferred with instructions from National Treasury on what these funds are 
meant for. What this means is that programmes or policies that are the responsibility 
of provinces, and are on the national priority list, have a better chance of being 
adequately funded by provinces.  
 
This recent development in intergovernmental relations between provinces and 
national government ensures that the provincial allocations to health programmes are 
a better reflection of nationally identified priorities. Under this dispensation, the 
realisation of a more equitable distribution of health and PHC resources between and 
within provinces stands a better chance, as equitable shares are no longer completely 
at the mercy of provincial budgetary negotiations. PHC is considered a priority by the 
national Department of Health. National health sector Strategic Plans since 2004 and 
the 2006 Annual National Health Plan
41
 of the National Department of Health have all 
listed the strengthening of PHC as a key priority (Department of Health, 2004, 
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Department of Health, 2006, Department of Health, 2006). Also the national 
government, as stated in its 2006 Budget Review (National Treasury, 2006), considers 
the improvement of access to PHC services a central policy priority.  
 
Nevertheless, an official from a provincial treasury confirmed that the provincial 
government still has authority to (and in some cases does) refuse to allocate their 
funds according to national priorities but rather according to their own priorities. This 
is also confirmed by an official from the NDoH. These interviewees preferred not to 
elaborate on this and did not want to cite examples of which provinces had refused to 




Within provincial departments of health, budgeting for primary health care requires 
submission of budget proposals by health districts (the providers of PHC services) to 
the provincial health department. These budget proposals are aggregated to generate a 
provincial budget proposal for PHC (or district health services). Almost all district 
managers believe that the budget proposals (district plans) they submit to their 
respective provinces do not influence their allocations. For example, a district 
manager commented that: 
 
“…we submit our budget tools … we do almost something like zero-based 
budgeting… we submit it to our head office in X and then basically that‟s the last we 
hear of it until we are told here‟s your budget for the year…” 
  
This response on the use of district plans by provincial health authorities was 
generally the same as for most interviewees at the district level. However, in a couple 
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of districts in the Western Cape, the managers felt that although the provincial 
departments considered their budget proposals, the amount of money the district 
eventually received was dependent on the total health budget and historical 
expenditure of districts. This was confirmed by a provincial official from the same 
province: 
 
“…we give each hospital and each clinic the budget they had in the previous year in 
real terms – so we add inflation. And then we ask them: what are the real critical 
needs that they have? We would consider those if additional funds are available” 
 
In the Eastern Cape, the process of aggregating district budget proposals apparently 
does not work at all. Some districts actually do not send in budget proposals. All 
district managers that were interviewed confirmed that they never receive exactly 
what they proposed. In all cases, the budget they eventually receive is lower than what 
they had proposed. Officials admitted that PHC budgeting is generally based on 
historical expenditure. 
 
What is interesting though is that while all interviewees at the district level claim that 
they never received as much as they ask for in their proposals, real expenditure on 
PHC (as seen in chapter 6) has consistently increased for almost all health districts in 
South Africa.  
  
Decentralisation of the health system requires the transfer of some decision-making 
authority to lower administrative levels. Within a district health system, district level 
managers need to have appropriate authority over decision-making for finances as this 











al., 1994). Indeed, early policy documents on the development of the district health 
system acknowledged that the devolution of “sufficient powers” around finances and 
personnel to managers of districts was necessary to promote accountability and 
efficiency (HPCU/DoH, 1995). However, since then (more than a decade ago) 
research has shown that district health management have very limited authority 
around finances (Thomas et al., 2005, The Local Government and Health Consortium, 
2004). Data from interviews confirms that up until the time that the field work for this 
study was carried out (2007), this has not changed. 
 
7.2.2 Other Issues that Influence the Size of PHC Funds 
Apart from the budgetary processes, there are other factors that influence the size of 
funds available to PHC. An official of the National Treasury identified some 
limitations to the equitable financing of PHC. First, while the amount of funds 
allocated to PHC across provinces has increased in the last 3 years, there has been a 
deterioration of performance indicators in certain areas such as maternal health and 
tuberculosis control in certain provinces
43
. These poor performance indicators have 
negated NDoH bids for additional funds to health and PHC, as National Treasury is 
concerned that funds already allocated are not being effectively utilised. Although the 
National Treasury is keen to assist the health sector in securing adequate funds to 
carry out its functions, the performance of the health sector has been a drawback in 
this regard. Of greater concern is that provinces with relatively poorer performance 
indicators are those that have been previously less funded. In addition, as commented 
by a National Treasury official, the NDoH is not giving provinces sufficient support 
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in terms of clear norms and guidelines on how much they should spend on PHC and 
how to achieve these targets.  
 
“…I think there‟s a strong sense by many that the NDoH needs to be more active in 
its norms and standards and support role … we are not talking about NDoH 
interfering in delivery but we are talking about NDoH setting much clearer norms 
and standards and supporting provinces to deliver on those” 
 
Also, the National Treasury is of the view that NDoH does not adequately articulate 
and back-up the collective bid for the health sector with “real hard information”. This 
has also reduced the effectiveness of the NDoH to secure additional funds that could 
be used to support a more equitable distribution of resources. A provincial health 
official commented that:  
 
“…in terms of the dynamics of increasing the funding to the health sector, our 
perception is that they [NDoH] have not done profoundly enough work to convince 
Treasury [National Treasury]. I don‟t think Treasury needs convincing. I do speak to 
them [Treasury], they are waiting for us to present the case: why should we get more 
money? I think that is my biggest concern at the moment is that NDoH does not have 
a strong enough economic unit to present a strong enough argument to Treasury as to 
why we should get more” 
 
7.2.3 Summary 
With the increased “conditionality” of equitable share grants, provincial budgeting 
processes have less influence on the total health budget than was the case in 2001/02. 
From interview data, district budget proposals also have very little influence, if at all, 











did not reveal any form of “conditionality” of funds for PHC. What is true is that 
priorities as developed by all provincial Departments of Health and the NDoH take 
precedence over individual provincial priorities. This has potentially reduced the 
autonomy enjoyed by the provinces and the provincial Departments of Health in 
determining the overall health budget and PHC expenditure outlays. A key point to 
note though is that provincial Departments of Health are part of the decision-making 
process for defining national health priorities. In essence, if a province(s) has health 
priorities that need more funding it stands a better chance to get increased funding if 
this health priority gets onto the national agenda and is identified (by consensus with 
other provinces and NDoH) as a national priority. 
 
Clearly, nationally determined priorities have some influence on the division of 
equitable share revenue between provincial sectors. The implication for the equitable 
distribution of PHC funds between and within provinces depends on whether the 
NDoH has the ability and commitment to drive this initiative in the national 
prioritisation processes. An official of the NDoH stated that the NDoH has been 
successful in getting the equitable distribution of PHC allocations on to the national 
prioritisation process. He also explained that the shift towards a more equitable 
distribution of PHC funds across districts and provinces was initiated by the NDoH; 
and also that the health component of the equitable shares allocated to provinces 
incorporates the cost of providing a comprehensive PHC package, determined by 
utilisation rates and unit costs.  
 
However, there is no indication in published reports on budgeting and resource 











included in the national prioritisation process. Also, the claim that the NDoH is 
responsible for the shift to a more equitable outlay of PHC expenditure (convergence 
of PHC per capita expenditure) could not be confirmed in any published work. What 
is true is that the NDoH had in 2000 defined a set of norms and standards
44
 as a 
guideline for the provision of a PHC package to ensure uniform quality of service 
throughout South Africa (Department of Health, 2000). This may have set the stage 
for substantial increases for PHC allocations to districts that were extremely under 
resourced, and could not deliver on the defined norms and standards. In addition, and 
as will be pointed out later, none of the interviewees at the provincial or district level 
thought that the NDoH had anything to do with the shift to a more equitable 
distribution of PHC expenditure. As for the claim that the health component of the 
equitable shares incorporates the cost of providing a comprehensive PHC package, 
this could not be confirmed. However, given the changes in PHC per capita 
expenditure observed from 2001/02 to 2007/08, this is plausible. 
 
In the current dispensation, and based on interview data, National Treasury is aware 
that the health sector needs more funds, and so is open to releasing more funds. 
National Treasury believes that the onus lies with the NDoH to articulate good 
evidence for extra funds and ensure that provinces are providing high quality care 
with good indicators of performance in terms of improved health status and higher 
cure rates. Only when the NDoH can do this would National Treasury be open to 
releasing more funds to the health sector or specifically, PHC. Examples given by the 
National Treasury concerning poor performance were around maternal health and 
tuberculosis. 
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South Africa has one of the highest HIV and AIDS prevalence rates in the world 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008). Maternal health and the incidence of tuberculosis 
can be seriously affected by HIV and AIDS. At the time these interviews were carried 
out, there was no official antiretroviral programme in place. It is surprising that no 
official from the departments of health (National or Provincial) mentioned that their 
performance indicators could have been affected by the HIV and AIDS epidemic. 
 
The budgeting process from the district level seems to contribute little to the overall 
provincial health budget. This is unfortunate as this limits the district‟s ability to 
respond to the needs of the population it serves. Also the use of the historical-led 
approach to budgeting at the province level further limits the possibilities for shifts in 
PHC funds to achieve a more equitable outlay between health districts.  
 
7.3. Influence of key stakeholders 
The key stakeholders involved in the financing of publicly provided health and PHC 
services are the Cabinet, the Budget Council, the National and Provincial Treasuries, 
the National and Provincial Departments of Health and the districts (part of the 
provincial health authority). Based on the current process for determining health 
budgets, the NDoH potentially has substantial influence in determining health 
budgets. This is because the NDoH coordinates the national prioritisation process for 
the health sector. Provincial Departments of Health also exert considerable influence 
on the outcomes of budget processes, as they have the authority to determine the 
actual expenditure budgets for PHC, and are involved in determining national health 











reflect nationally determined priorities strengthens National Government‟s role in 
provincial budgetary processes. 
 
Currently, and based on interview data, the NDoH and the provincial Departments of 
Health play a major role in the process for determining the overall size of the health 
sector budgets and therefore the PHC budget. However, because of poor output 
indicators (cure rates for TB for example), especially in previously less well funded 
provinces and districts, and that the NDoH is not able (from the National Treasury‟s 
perspective) to properly articulate the need for additional funds, the influence of the 
NDoH and provincial Departments of Health is substantially limited by the National 
Treasury. Provincial Treasuries essentially work within broad guidelines as defined 
by National Treasury. Within provinces, the provincial Departments of Health also 
submit budget bids to their provincial Treasuries. While operating within the 
guidelines as defined by national health priorities, provincial Departments of Health 
are able to influence the size of their budget depending on the strength of their bids. 
Within each province, district managers have very little (if any at all) influence on the 
health budget. It appears that their submissions in many cases are not considered in 
the budgeting process. They only have some influence in deciding how provincially-
determined PHC budgets are allocated to various cost centres.  
 
It appears that Provincial Departments of Health, NDoH and the National Treasury 
wield considerable influence over the outcome of budgeting processes for health and 
PHC. Provincial Departments of Health have less control over budgetary outcomes in 
more recent years. The NDoH is now in a better position to influence allocations to 











national health priorities) and the National Treasury in recent times enforces 
adherence to nationally agreed priorities. However, the National Treasury appears to 
wield the most power in budgetary and resource allocation processes for the health 
sector. This is because the National Treasury has the authority to agree to or reject 
proposed budgetary bids for additional funds by the NDoH and provincial 
Departments of Health 
 
Officials at all levels were asked to comment on the convergence of PHC expenditure 
per capita between districts in South Africa. Most of the officials were aware of these 
shifts but did not know who was responsible for them. In the Eastern Cape, officials 
attributed shifts in PHC to areas of greater need to the provincial health department. 
The author conducted a follow-up interview with the National Department of Health 
on the matter. The interviewees stated that the shift towards convergence in PHC 
expenditure across districts and provinces was initiated by the NDoH through the use 
of norms and standards for benchmarking PHC expenditure per capita. Also, the 
interviewees cited the abundance of research evidence on the disparities in PHC 
allocations across provinces and districts as an influencing factor in changes in PHC 
allocations. Interestingly and as previously explained, no official interviewed at the 
province or district level mentioned the use of norms and standards from the NDoH as 
a guide to PHC allocations. What this means is that NDoH may have come up with a 
ZAR 300 per capita benchmark for financing primary health care, but have failed 
dismally in communicating this to their provincial counterparts. This supports the 
assertion by Thomas et al (2005) that there is a lack of effective communication 












Most of the interviews with officials (national, provincial and district levels) admitted 
that they have been aware of the trends in PHC expenditure across the country. They 
also admitted to awareness of changes in PHC per capita expenditure in different 
provinces and districts outside their provinces, and the inequities in PHC expenditure 
between and within provinces. According to them, information on these was obtained 
through numerous research publications that had been carried out, direct interaction 
between government officials and researchers and non-governmental organisations 
such as the Health Systems Trust
45
 (HST), and direct interaction between government 
officials from different provinces and levels of government. According to them, they 
believe that knowledge of the inequities in PHC has made a strong case for additional 
resources to be committed to certain districts that are well known to be historically 
socio-economically disadvantaged.  
 
7.4. Community Participation and Health Policy 
All interviewees confirmed that there is some or other mechanism to elicit community 
preferences and views regarding the provision of PHC services. All districts 
acknowledged that constitutionally established structures such as clinic committees 
and hospital boards were operational in their districts and provinces. However, most 
district managers said that these structures were not working very well. Major reasons 
for this were the lack of attendance of committee members and lack of understanding 
of members‟ roles. In their (district managers) opinion, these structures are not 
effective in drawing community views, preferences or complaints into the policy 
agenda. In cases where the communities have the opportunity to air their views, they 
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do not see the desired change in the provision of health care. A district manager 
commented that:  
 
“The good thing is that we do have these meetings with the communities so that at 
least we‟re not hiding away or anything like that – so that does help. But the 
community say that you keep saying that you can‟t improve the service here because 
you don‟t have money to appoint staff, and what are you doing about it? And all you 
can say is that we are asking X [provincial authority] and X says you can‟t fill posts 
because there is no money” 
 
However an exception was a district in Limpopo where the district manager stated 
that these structures work very well. However, the manager was quick to say that their 
major limitation was adequacy of funding to respond to the revealed needs of the 
community. Interestingly, all provincial officials were of the opinion that their 
mechanisms for eliciting community views and preferences work very well. For 
example a provincial health official commented that: 
 
“We have a complaints and compliments system in place in each and every facility. 
People do not have to expose themselves, and these are monitored on a monthly basis. 
We are lucky, currently we get more compliments then complaints. We also do annual 
waiting time surveys. We try to reduce waiting time. At the governance level we have 
Provincial Health Council, an advisory body to the Minister and acts in accordance 
with the Act… Also there are individual health committees and health forums at the 
local level, and all these are working very well; we don‟t have a problem. We have 
created enough space for people to air their views… our Standing Committee is very 
open, our Chairperson opens the doors of the government to the people, and they tell 












Closer examination of interview data revealed that the provincial authority has 
alternative means for eliciting community inputs such as health summits and 
“Imbizos”
46
, where top ranking provincial health officials met with community 
members. However, these meetings between officials of the Provincial Department of 
Health and the community do not happen on a regular basis. 
 
On whether community views influence health policy and budgets, officials at the 
district level thought that community views were not taken into consideration. 
However, provincial officials believed that communities‟ views were well represented 
in the policy agenda. With respect to the provision of PHC, the districts are 
responsible for service delivery and are closer to community members. Based on this 
assumption, it is therefore more likely that health districts are more aware of any 
changes made with respect to service delivery based on communities‟ inputs. Also, 
the historical-incremental approach to budgeting within the province, does not ideally 
allow for any radical changes in service delivery based on community preferences. A 
key question then is that if communities‟ views are not incorporated into health 
policy, how does the province or the district respond to the health needs of the 
people? For the PHC approach to function effectively, it should be responsive to the 
needs of the communities. In the absence of or limited participation of the community 
in decision-making for PHC service delivery and financing, the responsiveness of the 
health system to community needs, and the level of accountability of the health 
system to citizens is compromised.  
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7.5. Financing Options for PHC 
PHC activities have been financed from equitable shares, through inter-sectoral 
negotiations and intra-sector (within the provincial health authority) budgetary 
negotiations. Provincial PHC budgets and PHC allocations are largely determined by 
the provinces, with the National and Provincial Treasuries playing a monitoring role 
on overall expenditure (their roles are increasingly influencing budgeting processes at 
provinces). Interviewees were asked if the funds for PHC should be transferred 
through another mechanism that protected the budget for PHC to ensure adequate and 
equitable funding. Most respondents did not see the necessity for the funding of PHC 
through some protected mechanism like conditional grants or having the funds for 
PHC ring-fenced. From a National Treasury perspective, it is believed that financing 
PHC as a conditional grant is not necessary considering the significant growth in PHC 
expenditure per capita experienced in recent years.  
 
“…I think if it [PHC expenditure] hadn‟t been growing strongly, we would have been 
much more receptive to mechanisms to ring fence but because it‟s growing so 
strongly, we haven‟t felt the need to do it. In fact, … we„re a little concerned at some 
of the constraints in hospital budgets, you know, because there are some things in 
health that are being funded, there are some things that are not being funded and, for 
example, some of the hospital budgets have been constrained for a decade and the 
services in some hospitals are really, we think, woefully inadequate. So, I‟m not 
really… not that worried about the growth in provincial primary health care budgets, 
what I‟m more worried about is the limited progress on district level allocation 
[referring to improving equity in allocations between districts]”. 
 
An official from the NDoH also maintained that it is not necessary to protect PHC as 
a conditional grant. The official argued that the same goals (increased budgets for 











with implementing norms and standards
47
. The official added that the use of norms 
and standards poses fewer problems for financial management. Using norms and 
standards gives the provinces an objective to aim for; using a conditional grant sets a 
definite amount that should be spent on PHC in a financial year. The problem with the 
use of conditional grants is that, unfortunately, those provinces that have greater 
health needs are those that are least able to utilise additional funds. So, if PHC is 
funded as a conditional grant, these provinces may not be able to fully utilise the 
funds ear-marked for PHC. Failure to use up PHC budgets from conditional grants 
would attract budget cuts and other financial management disciplinary actions. Such 
repercussions could further reduce the districts‟ or provinces‟ capacity to motivate for 
the needed additional funds. As an official of the NDoH commented: 
 
“Well, I think there are different ways of doing it, you know obviously if you can make 
it a conditional grant you are making it conditional upon a number of things. The 
question is what will it be conditional upon? The second thing to say is if you have a 
norms and standards approach it reaches the same goal. The problem with mandating 
that in a way that a conditional grant might do is absorptive capacity, so you might 
get the same result. You are getting more money but you are not able to spend it 
because 60% of the funds will be human resources. These are the same provinces that 
have difficulties in retaining and attracting personnel, so it might not give you the 
intended aim because of these other barriers, supply…issues….”.  
 
“I think there are two things here, one is that I think provinces can do more to 
strengthen primary health care. Secondly, national can provide more guidance to 
provinces around primary health care even without changing the financing…..I think 
that‟s missing. So even without changes to fiscal federalism we can do better” 
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The view that provinces should, on their own, be able to ensure that PHC is 
adequately and equitably funded is held by most interviewees at the national level. 
They believe that since PHC has been identified as a priority programme within the 
health sector, budgetary allocations within the PDoH should reflect this. Provincial 
Departments of Health, they felt, should be “mature” enough to adequately fund PHC 
without national prodding. One official commented that national and provincial 
treasuries did not “like” conditional grants. Specifically, the official said that 
conditional grants reduce the amount of control that provincial treasuries have within 
the province, and so are opposed to them. No official (who commented on options for 
financing PHC) proposed some form of protection for PHC funds.  
 
Interviewees were asked whether there were any guidelines from the NDoH or the 
provincial Departments of Health that influenced the size of PHC budgets or 
expenditure at the province or district level. One official at the district level 
mentioned a “national utilisation rate” for PHC facilities as a guide. All the other 
interviewees were not aware of any guideline from the NDoH on PHC. In fact an 
official from a provincial Department of Health said: 
“…That is also a problematic situation; I think I will expect the NDoH to give us 
more guidance in that; to tell us like we should have ZAR 10 [for example] per 
member of the population for PHC. Now we don‟t receive that guideline” 
 
Interestingly, an official of the NDoH noted that they (NDoH) had set the cost of the 
PHC package at ZAR300 per capita, and this was used as a benchmark to see how 
provinces were funding PHC. None of the provincial or district officials interviewed 
seemed to be aware of this benchmark, or more accurately, did not mention it in 











had set a benchmark for providing the full PHC package revealed that indeed the 
NDoH commissioned a study that recommended ZAR 300 per capita as a ball park 
estimate when planning for comprehensive PHC delivery (Chitha et al., 2004). It 
would seem that the NDoH has not been effective in communicating this guideline to 
provincial Departments of Health or health districts. This lends credence to statements 
made by some officials that the NDoH has not been “pulling its weight” in terms of 
monitoring and supporting the provision of health care. This is potentially a weak link 
in the drive for achieving any adjustments in PHC financing between provinces and 
districts. However, given the changes in PHC per capita observed in chapter 6, it 
appears that most provinces indeed attempted to attain a certain benchmark for PHC 
per capita expenditure. It is quite surprising that no interviewee at the provincial or 
district level admitted to knowledge of this ZAR 300 per capita benchmark 
 
7.6. Expenditure Capacity and Sufficiency of Funds for PHC 
A key issue in the progress towards a more equitable distribution of PHC funds is the 
ability of districts and provinces
48
 that are less well funded to utilise extra funds 
adequately. Interviewees were asked if the Provincial Departments of Health (head 
office) and the districts had sufficient capacity to manage health and PHC funds (and 
any extra funds for achieving equity) that were allocated to them.  
 
Most officials thought that the provincial authorities in general had sufficient capacity 
to manage and utilise any extra funds allocated to them. However, they thought that 
most districts did not have sufficient managerial capacity to adequately manage 
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finances allocated to them. All interviewees who responded to this question cited the 
lack of skilled personnel in financial management, and in some cases, a general lack 
of management level personnel. Previous studies have shown that capacity constraints 
to the effective absorption of PHC resources are not only limited to lack of human 
resources. For example, a study by Thomas et al (2005) concluded that other capacity 
constraints such as: unsupportive environments for managers, lack of adequate 
representation of the communities, ineffective communication and coordination 
between levels of government affected districts‟ abilities to varying degrees in 
absorbing  additional resources. So, it is interesting that most interviewees focused 
only on the human resource aspect of capacity. Unfortunately, the districts that 
experience the greatest lack of absorptive capacity are those that are in the rural areas, 
and are most deprived. One provincial Department of Health official commented that:  
 
“…in the Eastern Cape the big problem is turnover of staff. So you have staff, you 
train them, they are enthusiastic, they start learning things and then they move, then 
you have to start from scratch” 
 
Another PDoH official related the lack of capacity to inability to effectively utilise 
additional resources: 
 
“No, I don‟t think the capacity is there. You know, a few years ago there was a 
concerted effort to move money to areas that were previously disadvantaged, but they 
were not able to spend it, which meant a reverse in equity” 
 
This opinion is shared mainly by officials from the Eastern Cape. Interviewees from 
the Eastern Cape admitted that their provincial Department of Health had in recent 











very poor, and these districts failed to effectively absorb the additional funds allocated 
to them. 
 
These results are interesting in the sense that with respect to management of PHC 
funds, the districts‟ lack of capacity is seen as a provincial lack of capacity by 
National Treasury and NDoH. 
 
The lack of personnel in many rural districts and provinces has reduced their capacity 
to use extra funds allocated to them. In addition, such districts and provinces find it 
difficult to attract staff to work in those areas. This is a recognised problem within the 
South African public health system. This issue of lack of absorptive capacity within 
health districts (especially those in the rural areas) has been raised in previous studies 
(Masilela et al., 2001, Lehmann and Makhanya, 2005, Okorafor et al., 2005, Thomas 
et al., 2005).  
 
In 2003, a rural allowance for health professionals was instituted to attract health 
personnel to rural areas
49
. Research on the effect of this initiative shows it may have 
had some effect in retaining staff working in rural areas. However, the study showed 
that besides financial considerations, other factors such as career development, job 
satisfaction and postgraduate education opportunities, are equally important in 
influencing the site of practice for health personnel (Reid, 2004). The health sector is 
largely human resource driven, and so areas that are under-staffed are more likely to 
have lower per capita PHC expenditure. For example in the 2006/07 financial year, 
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53.6% of total provincial health expenditure was on compensation of employees 
(National Treasury, 2007).  
 
Lack of personnel is therefore a major constraint to achieving an equitable distribution 
of PHC resources in South Africa. In general the more urban provinces (Gauteng and 
Western Cape) and districts have no problems in attracting the right mix of personnel, 
and these areas have relatively lower health needs and lower levels of deprivation 
than the more rural areas (districts and provinces). Their expenditure on PHC is 
generally higher partly because they are relatively well staffed and have the requisite 
managerial skills to make good use of any extra funds allocated to PHC. On the other 
hand, the more rural provinces and districts fail to attract staff, are generally under-
staffed and so have lower expenditure. Now, an additional problem for most of these 
under-staffed areas is that their lack of managerial skills reduces their capacity to 
utilise any extra funds allocated to them to improve on the quality or quantity of 
health services delivered. As an official mentioned: 
 
“…so the key thing, really, in all of these initiatives is human resource management. 
If we can‟t fix that up, you can‟t throw money at the initiative” 
 
All officials at the province and district level said that funds for PHC and health in 
general were not sufficient to adequately deliver PHC services to their populations. 
Only one district manager in Gauteng believed that if funds allocated to districts were 
utilised efficiently, the funds would be enough. In addition, an official from the 
NDoH said that provinces and districts always claim that they do not have enough 
funds. From the data on PHC per capita expenditure use in chapter 6, average per 











ZAR 302 in 2007/08
50
. Clearly, there has been a substantial increase in allocations to 
PHC across the country. An NDoH official stated that: 
 
“..if you go to provinces and districts, they will always say that they are under funded 
for the whole range of services that they are providing, but at the same time, they are 
not able to spend the money that has been given to them” 
 
Follow-up interviews conducted in 2008 revealed that the National Treasury has 
recently approved the disbursement of funds specifically to support an audit of PHC 
facilities in a bid to identify where there are gaps in the availability of required PHC 
facilities and resources. Also, interviewees stated that the relationship between the 
National Treasury and the NDoH has become better, with the National Treasury being 
more supportive and understanding in dealing with issues such as the lack of capacity 
to effectively utilise resources in certain areas.  
 
7.7. Perceptions on Equity and Criteria for PHC Allocations 
On the issue of equity, most officials cited either “equal expenditure per capita” or 
expenditure based on disease burden as a basis for allocating PHC funds to achieve 
equity. The use of population size as basis for equitable allocation of resources is a 
basic approach to achieving equity, important nonetheless. Population size is an 
indicator of relative need, but if used alone, the process neglects the differential health 
needs (based on other factors such as burden of ill-health, socio-economic status, 
environment, etc) of individuals that make up the population. Disease burden is also a 
good indicator of need that can be used to inform equity-targeted financing. However, 
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a drawback of this approach is that statistics on disease burden are usually collected 
from facilities, and so the measure of disease burden may well depend on the levels of 
availability and utilisation of health care facilities in different health districts. 
Nevertheless, it is encouraging that most officials understand equitable financing of 
PHC as the financing of PHC according to the relative needs of each district. 
 
In general, interviewees agreed that PHC was a priority. This was a unanimous 
perception. The strengthening of the district health system in providing PHC is a 
priority policy goal in the Eastern Cape, Limpopo and the Western Cape as specified 
in their 2007/08 Annual Performance Plans (Provincial Government of the Western 
Cape, 2007, Limpopo Department of Health and Social Development, 2007, Eastern 
Cape Department of Health, 2007). 
 
Some of the respondents also cited specific disease programmes as major health 
priorities. These were HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and lifestyle diseases such as diabetes, 
hypertension and cardiovascular diseases. Concerning the distribution of PHC funds 
between districts, interviewees admitted that allocations were not entirely distributed 
according to health needs. Budgeting based on historical expenditure still prevails, 
although indicators such as disease burden increasingly influence allocations. In 
general, interviewees thought that allocations between districts were not equitable, but 
were becoming more equitable. This is confirmed by the changes in PHC per capita 
expenditure presented in chapter 6. 
 
Government officials‟ views on equity and the level of priority placed on PHC 











changes in the financing pattern of PHC in support of equity. On the other hand, the 
use of a budgeting process that is based on historical expenditure limits the progress 
in the shift of PHC finances for achieving equity. Importantly, an official raised a 
concern that equity is not the only concern for the provision of PHC services. It is 
important that districts and provinces are able to use resources allocated to PHC 
efficiently, effectively and the services should be provided in an appropriate manner. 
 
“ quality cannot be measured by equity alone … efficacy, efficiency, equity, 
affordability, accountability and appropriateness. If you bring all these into equity 
then we can talk” 
 
This raises the important issue of an overall well-functioning health system. Although 
equity is a key policy priority, without these other qualities, any shifts towards a more 
equitable distribution of resources may not result in intended social benefits. Although 
this study does not focus on these other issues, they are addressed in the last chapter 
of this thesis.  
 
On the question of what „equity‟ means, and how it should be defined for operational 
purposes, most district health managers were not sure what it meant and refrained 
from answering the question. Only one district manager suggested that per capita 
expenditure should be the basis for assessing equity. It is of concern that managers at 
district levels are not confidently knowledgeable about what equity means and how it 
can be used. Responses from provincial and national level officials were more 
encouraging. Some provincial officials thought that equity in health care referred to 
equal access to high quality services for everyone. Other responses from provincial 












“My definition will be the same service for everybody … it must be in terms of 
quality” 
 
Some felt that equity in allocations means equal per capita expenditure. 
“Well we would look at allocations per capita, so that a person who lives in Maluti, 
we‟d spend the same on that person as we spend on a person from another area” 
 
Others thought that equity in allocations should require the consideration of 
differential burden of disease. 
“The disease profile would be one of the things I would also look into” 
 
An official at the NDoH explained that health needs should be the basis for allocating 
health resources to achieve equity. He explained further that health needs should be 
measured in terms of trends and prevalence of diseases in different areas. 
 
What is clear is that while most officials at the level of the province and the national 
government have an idea of what equity means, most district managers do not 
understand what it means. Considering that district managers are responsible for 
preparing budget proposals, it is discouraging that they then cannot motivate for 
increases in their funds on the basis of equity, since they do not understand equity and 
how it can be achieved. At the risk of being cynical, one can say that in the current 
dispensation their understanding (or lack of it) does not matter as district managers 












7.8. Comparisons Between Relatively Higher and Lower Funded Provinces  
Comparison of interview data from the historically higher funded provinces (Gauteng 
and Western Cape) and lower funded provinces (Eastern Cape and Limpopo) revealed 
that information from the two groups were similar with the exception of two areas. 
Areas of similarity include: health priorities, relative priority of PHC, key players 
involved in budgeting for health and PHC, guidelines for determining PHC 
allocations, and who has been responsible for the convergence in PHC per capita 
expenditure.  
 
The two areas of dissimilarity are around: personnel; and the relationship between the 
provincial Departments of Health and their Treasury counterparts. 
 
Gauteng and Western Cape officials stated that although they still needed skilled 
personnel in management positions, they were coping very well with the number of 
management staff they had. For Limpopo and Eastern Cape, they acknowledged a 
shortage of staff in the areas of administration, financial management and health 
personnel. They essentially have a more acute shortage of human resources than 
Gauteng and Western Cape. This is not surprising as Gauteng and Western Cape are 
more urban provinces, while Limpopo and Eastern Cape are more rural. It may well 
be that higher PHC expenditure per capita experienced in the Western Cape and 
Gauteng could be partly attributed to personnel costs. 
 
Interview data revealed that the provincial health departments of the Western Cape 
and Gauteng engage with their provincial Treasuries very often. Their Treasuries were 











budgeting and resource allocation. It appears that there is a good deal of cooperation 
and understanding between them. As commented by a provincial Treasury official in 
the Western Cape: 
 
“…provincial Treasury has a tight relationship with provincial health and they all go 
up to the 10x10s and 4x4s together… “ 
 
On the issue of interaction and cooperation between the provincial Treasury and the 
provincial Department of Health in Western Cape another provincial Treasury official 
said: 
 
“It‟s on a whole number of different levels, so I couldn‟t say. It‟s everything from 
informal to HOD [Head of Department] level. Some of the interactions, for example in 
the budget office, we have an economist who is assigned to the health department and 
she will be in regular contact with them. Both with their budgeting side and their 
CFO [Chief Financial Officer], HOD, and their programme managers… So for 
instance, a good example (of cooperation) is before we have the ten-by-ten, we got 
together with them here back in the province and said what are we going to put on the 
table? What are the key issues that we want to take to the national level about this. I 
think most of the provinces did not do that; you could tell because once they come to 
the meeting, their Treasury is saying something different from their provincial 
departments. We had a conference beforehand and talked about what they wanted to 
put on the table and how we could support them putting it on the table, and what did 
not make sense as well. Even if we don‟t agree, at least we would have had that 
conversation before the national meeting” 
 
With this kind of relationship, the Provincial Departments of Health get support from 
their Treasury counterparts in bidding for additional resources. Unlike the Western 











Limpopo and Eastern Cape do not have this kind of relationship. This is confirmed by 
a statement from a provincial Treasury official in the Eastern Cape: 
 
“…look, I must be frank with you; we do interact [with provincial Department of 
Health] but not as often as one would want it to be …in summary there is a weak link 
between Treasury [provincial] and departments … you know the problem with the 
intergovernmental relation is that when departments outline their policy areas, when 
they embark on their strategic plans, provincial Treasuries are left behind” 
 
The official attributed this weak link to the fact that the provincial Treasury is under-
staffed and so cannot afford to engage with the various departments as regularly as 
they should.  
 
7.9. Summary and Discussion 
Analysis of quantitative data in the previous chapter showed that the geographic 
distribution of PHC expenditure has become more equitable in recent years, 
notwithstanding the prediction of the conceptual framework developed in this study. 
This chapter has reviewed and analysed the data from qualitative data that focused 
more on processes around intergovernmental arrangements, resource allocation and 
budgeting.  
 
Based on interview data, it appears that the process of the vertical split of revenue to 
the different levels of government allows for a consultative process that promotes 
financing of sectors based on overall government priorities. On the assumption that 
this is correct, it is a good foundation for promoting an equitable distribution of 











shares grant, from which health and PHC are funded, is distributed to each province 
based on a supposedly equity-promoting formula. Because the equitable shares are 
unconditional grants, provinces can, and have been allocating equitable share funds to 
sectors as they see fit.  
 
Budgeting for the health sector involves assessment of health priorities, in relation to 
priorities in other sectors. Provincial Departments of Health, the NDoH and the 
National Treasury are all involved in this process. The strength of this process is that 
identified priorities from the province level are taken into account in deciding the 
vertical split of revenue. A concern with this process is that inputs from districts, 
which are the closest to the communities, are not taken into consideration. 
Community preferences are important in identifying priorities in each sector. 
Although there are mechanisms in place to enable districts to collect this information, 
they are not effective. This is not surprising as the districts do not have the authority 
to make changes in service delivery in response to community needs; this is done by 
provincial governments. As provincial Departments of Health (the head office) are the 
ones that make changes in the pattern of service delivery, community members have 
greater incentives to actively participate in engagements with provincial health 
officials rather than the district level forums. Unfortunately, these engagements are 
not regular enough. Also, budgeting for health and PHC is primarily done through a 
historical approach. With limited input from the community and predominance of 
historical led budgeting, information that filters upwards to inform the vertical 
division of revenue is not based on actual health needs as expressed by the 











allocating (albeit incrementally) more PHC funds to districts they believe have higher 
needs for health care. 
 
Provinces in South Africa are not homogenous in terms of the socio-economic and 
other characteristics of their population, or the level of infrastructure available to their 
populations. This is verified by the differences in the deprivation indices generated for 
each province. So, if geographic allocations to PHC are based on the preferences of 
communities, it is most likely that PHC per capita will differ for each district and 
province based on the each community‟s preference for PHC services relative to other 
types of services. Indeed, this is the central argument for greater scope for inequity in 
PHC allocations within a fiscal federal system. Whether this (differential preferences) 
has been the reason for the disjoint between provincial expenditure patterns and 
national priorities is not answered by this study, but what is known (and more 
importantly) is that independent provincial budgeting processes contributed 
significantly in the inequitable financing of PHC in previous years.  
 
National intervention in fiscal arrangements at the level of the province by “pushing” 
provinces to adhere to national priorities has resulted in a better level of coordination 
between provincial expenditure behaviour and national priorities. Based on interview 
data and publications from the NDoH, PHC is a national health sector priority, 
although there is no evidence to suggest that the National Treasury has “pushed” 
provinces to spend on PHC according to any nationally (NDoH and provincial 
Departments of Health) agreed levels. However, the fact that National Treasury is not 
willing to increase allocations to PHC because of poor performance indicators in 











expenditure, and so one cannot rule out completely the possibility that National 
Treasury may have influenced provincial spending behaviour on PHC. So, in the 
absence of any evidence of direct influence from the national government on 
provincial PHC expenditure behaviour, the question of how the convergence of PHC 
happened remains. 
 
Analysis of qualitative data provides some possible explanations for this. First, the 
ZAR 300 per capita benchmark for PHC expenditure, although based on interview 
data has not been effectively communicated to provinces, may have strengthened 
provincial Department of Health bids for additional revenue within the provincial 
budgeting negotiations (budgetary negotiations for different sectors) especially for 
provinces that were spending less than ZAR 300 per capita. From the nature of 
changes in PHC expenditure it appears that most provinces attempted to meet some 
target expenditure. This however is only a supposition as there is no hard evidence to 
back this up. 
 
A second explanation is that with increases in available equitable share grants, many 
provinces, with the knowledge of the inequities in PHC expenditure and the level of 
spending in other provinces allocated proportionally more to districts that had 
extremely low per capita expenditures (or historically disadvantaged). Information on 
how provinces allocate additional resources to districts confirms that this is very 
likely. 
 
While these explanations are plausible, they do not provide sufficient explanation for 











Relative increases in PHC per capita expenditure has not generally been a direct 
reflection of health needs (as defined by deprivation) or exclusively by previous levels 
of expenditure. On the other hand, since provinces allocate increases in funds to 
districts independently, there is no reason to expect that each province will allocate 
additional resources to districts based on the same criteria.  
 
In many previously relatively under-funded districts or provinces, lack of managerial 
capacity and overall lack of health personnel has dampened their ability to effectively 
utilise additional budgets to PHC. This human resource problem may well be, in the 
current time, the most critical problem to the achievement of equity in the financing 
of PHC in South Africa. One can argue this point logically. The inability of rural 
areas to attract health personnel lowers their overall expenditure per capita on PHC. 
The lack of personnel, especially managerial capacity reduces their ability to 
effectively utilise additional funds allocated to them. The combination of high levels 
of health needs and low per capita PHC expenditure experienced in these areas 
maintains high levels of inequity in financing of PHC. Additional funds allocated to 
these areas to reduce inequity are not effectively utilised. Indeed, the lack of human 
resource capacity can adversely affect performance indicators for these areas. These 
in turn reduce the effectiveness of the NDoH‟s case for additional funds that are 
needed to provide better PHC services in these areas.  
 
Both qualitative and quantitative data has shown that within the fiscal federal 
structure of South Africa, it is possible to shift health finances to districts or provinces 
with greater need. The unanimous agreement that equity and PHC are priority areas 











also means that there is less resistance to shifts in resources to areas of greater need, 
within the health sector. Getting the buy-in of government officials on this can be 
viewed as the fundamental step in promoting equity in resource allocation to PHC, 
although the use of historical-led budgeting is a limiting factor. However, one can 
argue that using a historical led budgeting process that allows for incremental changes 
in resource allocation patterns can work in the favour of provinces with districts that 
lack capacity to absorb large increases in PHC allocations. Smaller increases in 
resource allocation are easier to manage and absorb. 
 
An interesting issue that arises from the analysis of the interview data is around the 
performance of the NDoH. Officials from the National Treasury and the Provincial 
Departments of Health do not think that the NDoH is doing its job properly. For 
example, while the NDoH believes that norms and standards on financing PHC which 
they developed has been a major factor in achieving a more equitable distribution of 
PHC expenditure, officials from Provinces (Health Departments and Treasuries), 
including district managers are not aware of any such guidelines. Based on interview 
data, the National Treasury and the Provincial Authorities do not think that the NDoH 
has been providing provinces with sufficient support and guidance, and neither has 
the NDoH been effective in bidding for additional funds for health care.  
 
In the next chapter, information from analysis of data (qualitative and quantitative), 
literature review and the conceptual framework is discussed with a view to provide 
recommendations for the South African government, and countries that are operating 











the next chapter highlights the contribution of this study to the theoretical body of 












Conclusion and Recommendation 
8.1. Discussion 
This study investigated the impact of fiscal federalism on the equitable distribution of 
PHC resources across geographical areas in South Africa. In achieving this objective, 
a key question that arose is how South Africa has managed, in recent years (despite 
the predictions that fiscal federal thinking would suggest) to achieve a shift towards 
more equitable PHC resource allocation between health districts and provinces. Other 
specific objectives of the study included the identification of barriers and facilitating 
factors to achieving an equitable distribution of PHC resources. The literature on 
fiscal federalism, decentralisation, PHC and equity as summarised in the conceptual 
framework support the expectation that there is a greater scope for inequities in the 
distribution of PHC resources within the prevailing intergovernmental fiscal federal 
arrangements in South Africa.  
 
In 1994, the South African government was faced with the immense challenge of 
managing a country with severe inequities that were created by the policies of the 
apartheid government. Inevitably, equity was a key policy objective for most social 
sectors, including health (Gilson et al., 1999, Okorafor et al., 2003, Thomas et al., 
2003). That remains the case.  
 
After 1994, the government embarked on an ambitious policy of achieving an 
equitable allocation of health care finances between geographical areas and sought to 
achieve this in the very short timeframe of just 5 years (Chetty, 2007). Subsequently, 











health care allocations. Similarly, provinces that had previously been better funded, 
received significantly less. By 1996, it became evident that provinces simply could 
not cope with these huge short-run changes. Those provinces which received 
significantly more funds could not spend all the additional money effectively – they 
could not absorb effectively the extra funds allocated to them for health care (ibid).  
 
To add further to the problems of management and governance at this level, it was 
just at this time that the country adopted a fiscal federal system that gave provinces 
significant fiscal autonomy. The provinces suddenly had power; they had money; but 
those that were previously „under-funded‟ did not have the management capacity to 
cope. They were overwhelmed.  
 
Considering the predictions of fiscal federalism literature on decentralisation and 
equity (as identified in Chapters 2 and 3), it is not surprising that previous research 
identified the move to a fiscal federal system as the main culprit for the slow-down in 
progress towards a more equitable distribution of health and PHC resources (Thomas 
and Muirhead, 2000; Thomas et al 2003). This school of thought would claim that the 
shift of authority in determining health and PHC budgets to provinces in 1996 
resulted in the derailment of the national plan to achieve equity in public health care 
resource allocation within 5 years. Other research at the same time identified the 
inability of provinces to cope with the challenge of using huge extra resources in 
public health care allocations as the reason for the slowdown in progress towards 












The conceptual framework in this study also suggests that the move to a fiscal federal 
system and in particular the form of the fiscal federal system adopted in South Africa, 
could contribute to slowing-down progress towards equity. A bigger problem 
identified (see chapter 4) was the inability of provinces to utilise additional funds 
effectively which were allocated to them. That was a more critical problem. Provinces 
that received significantly more funds did not have the management capacity to use 
them effectively. This problem was compounded by simultaneously giving them 
authority to manage their own fiscal affairs. The fact that at this time, the provinces 
were still very young, with much weaker administrative structures and systems, was 
also a factor contributing to the slowing down of the move to equity. These two 
reasons for lack of progress on equity are not wrong. The most probable explanation 
is that one constraint reinforced the other. 
 
The question then remains: why against a background which was not conducive to the 
promotion of equity in terms of the fiscal federal arrangements and the management 
skills and organisation, did progress nonetheless occur? On the question of how South 
Africa managed to achieve a convergence of PHC allocations by geographical areas, 
responses from interviewees were often and understandably „contradictory‟. Most 
district managers were not sure who was responsible for initiating the moves to 
greater equity, while a few felt that the responsibility for the equity initiative rested 
with the provincial authority.  The responses from provincial officials were similar. 
Most national level officials believed that national government was responsible for 
the shift towards equity. The NDoH believes that the benchmarking of PHC per capita 
expenditure has been the guiding force to the provinces, and has influenced how they 











arrangements to ensure that provincial spending is more in line with national priorities 
has facilitated this outcome.  
 
Although these responses may appear to be confused and contradictory, they may all 
have some truth in them. No single government unit, it is worth noting, is solely 
responsible for seeking to achieve this move towards a more equitable distribution of 
PHC services. What emerges as will now be explained is that all government units 
have contributed to achieving a more equitable outcome. A closer and more critical 
examination of available evidence from research outputs, government policies since 
1994 and data from this study all point to this conclusion. 
 
Since 1994, the government has put equity in the forefront of all development and 
social policies. Equity was emphasised in the RDP, and the White paper for the 
transformation of the health system; which led to large reallocations of health care 
resources between 1994 and 1996. The reason for the failure of this initial programme 
to achieve equity is simply because provinces did not have sufficient capacity to cope 
with these massive shifts. Equity still remains a key policy objective in the South 
African policy-making arena, even when the term „equity‟ is not explicitly used. 
Initiatives such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), Integrated 
Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDP) and Urban Renewal Programme 
(URP) launched in 2001
51
 (Thomas et al., 2005), the Black Economic Empowerment 
(Republic of South Africa, 2003) that provides previously disadvantaged groups with 
preferential treatment; all provide evidence that equity is still a high priority for the 
South African government.  
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This study has shown that there have been numerous studies that have provided 
evidence of the inequities in the financing and provision of health care and PHC 
between different geographic areas (McIntyre, 1994, McIntyre et al., 1995, Doherty 
and van den Heever, 1997, Thomas et al., 2003, Brijlal et al., 1997, Daviaud et al., 
2000). As is established in the analysis of qualitative data, research institutions over 
the years have consistently provided the government with evidence of inequities in 
health sector resource allocations and have been working with the government on how 
to address these issues.  
 
Stakeholders (National and Provincial Treasuries, National and Provincial 
Departments of Health and Health Districts) involved in the process of determining 
health and PHC budgets are therefore well aware of the inequities in the allocation of 
PHC resources. They understand the need to provide additional resources to areas that 
have greater need. This is confirmed by interview data. These data also reveal that 
there is unanimous agreement by officials involved in budgeting and resource 
allocation to health care within provinces that equity is a priority goal for PHC. It is 
important to note at this point that some officials from historically relatively well-
funded provinces have concerns around the effective use of additional resources 
allocated to previously relatively under-funded provinces. The implication of this is 
discussed later. The National Treasury acknowledges that PHC may require more 
funds to achieve equity and is more willing to agree to increase the amount of 
resources available for PHC. The National Department of Health has confirmed that 
equity in PHC allocations is a priority. Also, those who have clarified the meaning of 











way that those that were in greater need of health care should receive more resources. 
The conclusion therefore of this study is that within the constraints – indeed despite 
the constraints - presented by the prevailing fiscal federal system in South Africa, 
each governmental level and unit has „bought in‟ to the view that equity is a priority 
and is operating accordingly, albeit in something of a piecemeal and incoherent 
fashion. This is explained in more detail below. 
 
As identified in this study (see Chapter 7) the National Treasury has been concerned 
that provincial expenditure behaviour is not in line with nationally agreed priorities. 
Their intervention in fiscal arrangements has been to promote greater alignment 
between the two. All Provincial Departments of Health and the National Department 
of Health (they determine national priorities) have consistently made bids for 
increased funding for PHC. These have been supported by equity-based arguments. 
National Treasury is aware of the differences in need for PHC and, on the basis of that 
awareness, has been positive to the idea of providing more funds for PHC to achieve a 
more equitable outlay (see chapter 7). So, National Treasury‟s intervention has been 
conducive to the idea of promoting the equitable distribution of PHC resources. 
 
National Treasury has in the past been more concerned with the effective and efficient 
use of funds allocated to the health sector. There are signs that in recent times, 
National Treasury is more ready to help in boosting absorptive capacity in districts 
and provinces than to continue to blame them for failing to utilise the funds 
adequately. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the National Treasury is supporting 
an audit of gaps in the PHC infrastructure and is also more understanding of capacity 











played by National Treasury is essential for any capacity building initiative driven by 
any of the health authorities (national, province or district).  
  
The National Department of Health supports initiatives to promote equity and this is 
reflected in their setting of a benchmark for PHC expenditure per capita (Chitha et al., 
2004). From interview data, it becomes apparent that this standard may not have been 
effectively communicated to provinces; however, it does show that the NDoH is in 
support of changes in the spending pattern of PHC that increases the amount of PHC 
resources committed to areas (districts or provinces) that spend less than the 
pronounced benchmark.  
 
Provincial Departments of Health in less well-funded provinces are aware that they 
are spending much less on PHC compared to other provinces that have relatively 
lower health care needs and have used this to increase their bargaining power for 
additional funds for PHC. The basis for such bids has in principle been favourably 
considered by NDoH and the National Treasury, although poor performance 
indicators have adversely affected the success of the bids. 
 
It is critical to mention that the convergence in PHC per capita expenditure occurred 
largely as a result of increases in expenditure in districts and provinces that previously 
recorded relatively low levels of expenditure. Consequently, convergence in PHC 
expenditure has been possible in the first place because of the consistent increase in 
the size of the equitable shares grant allocated to provinces since the early 2000s. 
Without the increase in funds to provinces, achieving a more equitable distribution of 











that were relatively better funded – a process that would have met with fiercer 
resistance.  
8.2. Constraints to Equity 
At the same time the study identified some important constraints to the progress 
towards equity in PHC allocations. 
 
8.2.1 Lack of Absorptive Capacity 
Health districts and provinces that were previously less well-funded have in recent 
years recorded higher budget allocations to PHC. Despite this, many of these areas, 
especially those that are in rural areas, have found it difficult to spend these additional 
funds on PHC. Unfortunately, these are the same areas that have a greater need for 
health care services. Some of the reasons cited for this are:  
1. These areas have found it very difficult to attract staff (health professionals, 
administrative and managerial) to work in those areas. The health sector is 
human resource driven and a large proportion of health expenditure is on 
human resources. If health personnel cannot be attracted to work in these 
areas, then PHC expenditure will continue to be relatively lower that in areas 
that can attract these kinds of staff.  
 
2. These same areas lack managerial skills and do not have innovative managers 
who can utilise additional resources effectively even when human resources 












8.2.2 Historical Approach to Budgeting 
Most provinces and health districts still use a predominantly historical approach to 
budgeting. The budget for PHC in one year is generally based on the previous year‟s 
expenditure on PHC plus some average add-on. The problem with this approach is 
that it fails to encourage the radical reallocation of resources to areas of greater need. 
What is of note is that, nevertheless, even with this constraint, there have been 
significant changes towards a more equitable distribution of PHC resources.  As 
interview data revealed, most managers responsible for PHC budgeting have allocated 
extra resources available for PHC in such a way that they have favoured districts that 
are considered to have greater needs – essentially a differentiated historical 
incrementalist approach. This was done by maintaining the level of real expenditure 
to areas that have been relatively well funded resources, while allocating new funds to 
areas of greater need. Given the problems of absorptive capacity, this gradual 
approach to reallocation of resources is better. 
 
8.2.3 Inter-Agency Relations 
A potential constraint to achieving equity is the poor interaction between Provincial 
Departments of Health and their provincial Treasuries in less well-funded provinces. 
Provinces such as Gauteng and Western Cape have a good relationship with their 
provincial Treasuries. They have frequent engagements that afford the Treasury 
Departments a better insight into their problems and plans for dealing with these 
problems. The level of cooperation fostered by this relationship encourages the 
Treasury Departments to support initiatives, including PHC, from the health 
departments. This level of cooperation is not found in Limpopo and even less so in the 











Health and the Provincial Treasury is more adversarial than cooperative. This has 
impacted negatively on the Department of Health‟s motivations to provide additional 
funds in the pursuit of equity in PHC allocations. The poor level of cooperation 
between these government agencies reduces the capacity of these provinces in 
meeting their equity objectives (refer to diagram of conceptual framework in Chapter 
3). 
 
8.2.4 Equity Vs Efficiency 
The study also identified an issue that could pose a constraint to achieving equity in 
the future. Although all officials interviewed agreed that equity is a priority and 
should be a priority for PHC allocations, some of them have raised concerns around 
the way “reallocated” funds are used. Officials from better resourced areas such as 
Western Cape and Gauteng admitted that shifts in resources to areas with greater 
health need is necessary; however, some of them remain concerned about how 
effectively and efficiently these resources are used. A point of genuine worry for the 
future, as identified already in chapter 7, is that such concerns might grow to become 
more prominent in debates around equity in PHC allocations if additional funds 
allocated to areas of greater need are not effectively absorbed. These concerns have 
been echoed by the National Treasury. In their view, indicators of performance from 
areas that have received additional funds are not encouraging and National Treasury 
has been opposed to making even more resources available to these areas. In recent 
times (as already mentioned in the previous chapter), the National Treasury is more 
amenable to capacity strengthening initiatives that should promote more efficient and 
effective use of resources. For now, it appears that within the policy arena, the “call” 











and effectively. If efficiency concerns become more dominant amongst officials from 
districts and provinces that were previously well funded, this could negatively impact 
on the universal buy-in of equity as a priority in PHC that has been built up since 
1994. As highlighted in Chapter 4, previous research has raised this issue of 
absorptive capacity. Unfortunately, there has been no action across the board to 
address these capacity problems. As will be reemphasised later, this needs to be 
addressed urgently as calls for greater efficiency may ultimately prevail over calls for 
equity. 
 
8.3. Community Participation  
An additional observation from this study is around the functioning of mechanisms 
for promoting community participation and eliciting community preferences. One of 
the tenets of the PHC approach is the participation of the community in decision-
making around the nature of PHC services provided to the community. Decentralising 
health services is a way of encouraging community participation. What is apparent 
from this study is that the mechanisms put in place to facilitate community 
participation, especially at the district level is not functioning optimally. Districts 
have little or no influence in responding to the needs of the people, since they have no 
authority in determining PHC budgets. The provincial health authorities have this 
power, and so it is not surprising that the communities prefer to engage with 
provincial level forums rather than district level mechanisms. The failure of the 
district health system to promote community participation is not far-fetched. 
Originally, district managers in South Africa were supposed to have some decision-
making authority around financing of PHC services (see discussion in Chapter 7) 











they served. If the district health system is to serve as a mechanism for encouraging 
community involvement in decision-making for PHC, then districts should be given 
some financial autonomy, perhaps around the use of monies allocated to them. The 
ability of districts to respond to the needs of the communities if granted some 
financial autonomy is only one amongst other conditions that are needed to galvanise 
community engagement with the district authority. Nevertheless, it will be a step in 
the right direction. 
 
While eliciting community preferences is one way of determining community „needs‟, 
quantitative indicators of need should also be employed to feed into resource 
allocation decisions. Disease burden and indicators of socio-economic status for 
different districts and provinces can assist provincial and district managers in 
promoting equity.  
 
8.4. Recommendations 
The study has shown that even within a fiscal federal system that allows provinces 
significant autonomy in determining PHC allocations, it is possible to improve equity. 
In the South African case, this has been achieved through continuous representation 
of equity-oriented goals in the policy arena. Also, evidence of the existence of 
inequities in PHC resource allocation has been consistently fed into the policy arena 
since before 1994. This has had the effect of garnering the buy-in of stakeholders in 
the process for determining PHC allocations. In essence, the shift towards a more 
equitable pattern of PHC allocations is attributed to considerable political will at all 
levels of government to promote equity in the health sector. Also, it is important to 











climate for changes in PHC expenditure patterns. This is also supported by the review 
of country experiences. 
 
Over time, there has been a steady generation of evidence from researchers on 
geographic inequities in PHC allocations. This has helped to maintain buy-in of 
stakeholders to equity oriented changes in PHC expenditure, even years after the first 
democratic elections in South Africa. 
 
Initial attempts to achieve equity in the mid 1990s failed because the initiative did not 
consider the capacity of provinces to handle such huge shifts in healthcare funds 
(Chetty, 2007). In more recent times, the shifts in PHC allocations have remained but 
importantly have been taken at a slower pace. Indeed, reasonably and sensibly the 
extent of these shifts have been tempered by the lack of absorptive capacity in areas 
that have greater need for health. Lessons have been learned from the past.   
 
Overall, this study makes recommendations concerning the promotion of equity in 
PHC allocations in three broad, non-mutually exclusive areas. The first set of 
recommendations speaks to the South African policy environment. The second set of 
recommendations highlights the contribution of the study to literature on fiscal 
federalism, decentralisation and equity, by way of pointing out deficiencies in the 
literature. The third set of recommendations is aimed at other countries wishing to 
pursue equity under a fiscal federal structure. For this third set of recommendations, it 
should be noted that the entire work is of relevance to other fiscal federal systems, but 












Policy recommendations made by the study are in three areas. The first focuses on the 
buy-in of stakeholders, the second focuses on intergovernmental arrangements in 
South Africa, while the third deals with capacity development. Although these are 
discussed separately, they can be viewed as separate components of one initiative. 
 
8.4.1 Buy-in of Stakeholders 
The main recommendation to the South Africa government (referring to NDOH as the 
policy developers) with regard to promoting equity in PHC allocations and indeed for 
the health sector is to keep stressing the importance of equity within the policy 
environment. This should be targeted at sustaining the buy-in of government officials 
involved in budgeting for and allocating resources to PHC. This process could be 
complemented by continuing to commission research organisations and universities to 
conduct research that provides evidence on the area of equity and health and what to 
do about it. These should provide evidence on the state of affairs with regards to areas 
of greatest need and what policy options are needed to further reduce inequities. This 
strategy of maintaining the buy-in of stakeholders is necessary to combat any attempt 
to derail equity-oriented policies due to efficiency and effectiveness concerns around 
how additional funds are being used by previously less well-funded provinces and 
districts.  It is particularly important to continue emphasising the importance of 
pursuing equity, given that inequities are reducing; this could lead to complacency. 
Nevertheless, the efficient use of resources for PHC has to be simultaneously 
promoted especially in less well funded districts and provinces. Without the efficient 
and effective use of PHC resources, any progress made in terms of equity in resource 













8.4.2 Intergovernmental Arrangements  
Based on reviewed literature and theory, intergovernmental arrangements in South 
Africa are such that they are likely to promote inequities in the allocation of PHC 
resources between provinces and districts. Provinces have substantial autonomy in 
deciding how much to spend on health and PHC. It is fortunate that equity has taken 
such a prominent place in overall national policy, thus creating a favourable climate 
for equity-oriented changes in resource allocation to PHC. However, this may not 
remain indefinitely. In the meantime, it is necessary to strengthen intergovernmental 
relations and mechanisms that promote a more equitable distribution of PHC 
resources. Of great importance are 
 Strengthening of the mechanism for provincial government accountability on 
expenditure to National and Provincial Treasuries. Although South Africa 
operates under a fiscal federal system, achieving equity in the distribution of 
health care resources requires coordination between the national government 
and the provincial government.  
 Promoting a more collaborative relationship between provincial Departments 
of Health and their Treasury counterparts., and 
 Communicating norms and standards on the PHC package better to provinces 
and districts. The use of norms and standards is a good way to provide 
provinces with expenditure targets to aim for. Better communication of such 
norms and standards is therefore important. An approach for more effective 
communication is for the NDoH to work closer with their provincial 
counterparts. Physical visits to provinces, and direct support in the budgeting 











communication. The apparent lack of effectiveness in communicating norms 
and standards is evidence of lack of engagement between the NDoH and its 
provincial counterparts. 
 
8.4.3 Capacity Development 
This study has not researched strategies for developing capacity in districts or 
provinces in South Africa and so does not make any specific recommendation on how 
capacity of districts and provinces can by developed in order for them to effectively 
absorb additional funds made available to them. However, the study does identify 
capacity development as critical for achieving and sustaining an equitable distribution 
of PHC resources. Indeed, the importance of building financial resource utilisation 
capacity within the South African context cannot be over-emphasised. The unanimous 
buy-in to equity by all stakeholders has been an important factor in facilitating the 
progress towards achieving equity; and the inefficient use of additional resources to 
areas of greater health needs is probably the single most important threat to 
stakeholder-wide buy-in to equity.  
 
Building capacity to manage additional funds for PHC in previously less well-funded 
areas is not a feat that can be accomplished within a very short time. Indeed, it would 
require a full study on its own to come up with context-relevant strategies for 
developing capacity of rural districts and provinces to adequately manage and utilise 
additional PHC allocations. As part of the capacity development strategy, it is 
imperative that the government work on strategies to attract health personnel to rural 
areas. Reviewed literature suggests that factors such as poor career advancement 











deterrents from working in rural areas. This is a cue for the government to build 
incentives such as fast-tracked career progression and scholarships (including time-off 
work) into the remuneration packages of health personnel working in rural areas. 
 
Whatever strategy is adopted, the government needs to once again cultivate the buy-in 
of stakeholders to support this. Capacity development in the areas of management, 
administration and clinical operation in rural areas should take a prominent place in 
the health policy arena. Support from National and Provincial Treasuries, and 
provincial Departments of Health from previously well-funded provinces will be 
necessary for any strategy for capacity development in previously less-funded 
provinces to be successful. 
 
8.4.4 Recommendations to Other Countries 
The study provides good lessons for countries operating a fiscal federal system for 
which equity in PHC is a national policy objective and the financing of PHC is the 
responsibility of SNGs. The levels of autonomy enjoyed by SNGs, differences in 
SNG capacity and the nature of intergovernmental transfers used are all important 
factors that can influence the equitable distribution of PHC allocations. Indeed, and as 
this research shows, garnering political support for equity from all stakeholders 
involved in the process of budgeting and resource allocation to PHC could be 
instrumental in achieving equity, even under unfavourable intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements. Where substantial autonomy is given to SNGs for financing and 
providing PHC, generating political will to achieve equity at all levels of the 
government can be as effective as changing intergovernmental arrangements for 











shifting the responsibility of financing and providing PHC upwards to the central 
government). Of course, and based on literature, the context of the country (economic, 
political, cultural, social etc) need to be considered. For South Africa, the buy-in of 
stakeholders has been the key factor in changing expenditure patterns for PHC to one 
that is more equitable. However, this needs to be complemented by increasing the 
amount of resources committed to the health sector, and also removing constraints 
identified in the study to ensure that the shift towards a more equitable distribution of 
PHC resources is sustainable and that funds committed to areas that have greater need 
are used effectively. Indeed, achieving increases in resources allocated to areas of 
greater need is an accomplishment on its own, but if these funds are not used 
effectively, then equity gains from reallocation of resources may well be grossly 
overestimated. 
 
8.4.5 Contributions to the Literature 
Literature on fiscal federalism and decentralisation within the health sector shed some 
light on the likely implications of different intergovernmental arrangements on equity 
in resource allocation to health. What can be deduced from literature is that the level 
of fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the SNG level that is responsible for PHC is a major 
factor in determining how equitable PHC allocations will be (Thomas et al., 2003, 
Green, 1999). If SNGs have greater fiscal autonomy, then there is greater scope for 
inequity, and vice versa. The level of fiscal autonomy in turn is determined by the 
extent to which the SNG is dependent on transfers from the centre, the form that these 
transfers take, SNG revenue generating capacity and prevailing constitutional 
provisions for intergovernmental relations. The study has shown that these are not the 











federal context. Getting universal support for equity from stakeholders in the 
budgeting and resource allocation process across SNGs can facilitate the shift of 
resources towards equity even where SNGs enjoy substantial fiscal autonomy – as is 
observed for the South African case. Literature on decentralisation and equity does 
not acknowledge this, and this is a key contribution of the study to the literature on 
the subject. Subsequently, the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3 needs to 
be revised to acknowledge this. A new conceptual framework is summarised in figure 
8.1. This now includes political support for equity as a factor that can influence the 
relationship between levels of autonomy at SNG and the likelihood of inequity in the 
distribution of PHC resources. Indeed, the extent to which overall government and 
health sector budget is increasing can influence the rate of shifts in resource allocation 
outlays. 
 
The key recommendation from this section to countries with either fiscal federal 
systems or just decentralised health systems that are facing inequitable patterns of 
allocation to PHC is that they should aim to get political buy-in from all stakeholders 
whether changes in intergovernmental arrangements can be made or not. Getting 
political buy-in for equity can be very instrumental in promoting equity within a 
decentralised system. 
 
A second issue that is relevant to the subject of fiscal federalism and PHC refers to the 
supposition that equity-oriented policies are best managed from the centre (a top-
down approach), as mentioned in chapter 2 (Shah, 1998, Buchanan and Wagner, 1971, 
Inman and Rubenfeld, 1997, Smith, 1985). This perspective supports a centrally 











proponents is the uniformity in the process and criteria for assessment of need and 
allocation of resources to PHC across regions within a country. However, the 
proposition of centrally imposed equity and even uniformity in assessing and 
allocating resources may not be ideal.  
 
The study shows that shifts towards a more equitable pattern of PHC allocations have 
not been achieved through central intervention, solely. The South African scenario 
provides a new dimension to arguments around whether a top-down or bottom-up 
approach is most appropriate for targeting equity. Neither of these two approaches 
was used to achieve shifts in PHC allocations, rather it was achieved through the 
generation of support from all levels of government – in what this study terms an “all-
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Fig. 8.1 Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements and Equity in PHC Allocations 
                  Direct Cause    (+) Positive influence on target box (greater scope for inequity)   
             Reinforcement   (-) Negative influence on target box (creates less scope for inequity)   











Efficiency gains from fiscal federalism are based on the recognition that different 
regions within a country have different characteristics and so different needs. Theory 
is of the opinion that such efficiency gains can be best achieved by assigning 
responsibility for each type of public expenditure to the level of government that most 
closely represents the beneficiaries of these outlays (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989, 
de Mello, 2000, Bird and Vailliancourt, 1997, Ter-Minassian 1997) It is clear from 
both empirical and theoretical literature that PHC should be provided by lower levels 
of government or administrative structures such that they are able to respond to the 
unique needs of the communities they serve. Different communities that make up a 
country are generally different, with different cultures, attitudes and behaviours. It is 
therefore safe to say that different communities will invariably appreciate the need for 
health and PHC services differently. These differences in the appreciation of need will 
most likely be greater the more heterogeneous communities in a country are. Equity in 
resource allocation is about allocating resources based on need. If the communities‟ 
perception of need is to be the basis for assessing need (and this should be the way 
forward, if a PHC approach is to be followed), then a centrally imposed, uniform 
approach to assessing needs for resource allocation will not do in a heterogeneous 
society – and most societies are. Clearly, even in the pursuit of equity in health, a 
centrally imposed equity criterion is flawed. What is needed is broad policy guidelines 
on equity from the centre, leaving lower levels of government (responsible for PHC) 
room to manoeuvre within the boundaries of the policy to meet the specific needs of 
the communities they serve. 
 
In conclusion, the introduction of fiscal federalism in South Africa created an 











created provinces lacked sufficient capacity to cope with large shifts in resource 
allocation. However, with a growing public sector budget, consistent increases in 
health sector allocations, and overwhelming political support for equity, South Africa 
is experiencing a shift towards a more equitable distribution of PHC resources.  
 
8.5 Weaknesses of the Study 
In conducting this study, the author identified several weaknesses in the methodology, 
approach and data used in analysis. As mentioned in earlier sections of the thesis, 
some PHC services are provided in hospitals. These were not taken into account 
because the exact proportion of services provided by hospitals in districts and 
provinces is not known. Consequently, it is likely that the total expenditure on PHC in 
some districts is underestimated. 
 
Ownership of private health insurance does not preclude an individual from using 
public health facilities. Per capita expenditure on PHC that was used in this study is 
based on the population in each district or province that does not have private health 
insurance cover. Therefore PHC expenditure per capita is likely to be overestimated 
for most districts and provinces. 
 
The study focuses only on allocations to PHC and does not consider the social 
benefits for spending in other sectors within each province. As a result, the analysis 
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Schedules 4 & 5 from the South African Constitution 2006 
 
Schedule 4 - Functional areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative 
competence 
Part A  
 Administration of indigenous forests  
 Agriculture  
 Airports other than international and national airports  
 Animal control and diseases  
 Casinos, racing, gambling and wagering, excluding lotteries and sports pools  
 Consumer protection  
 Cultural matters  
 Disaster management  
 Education at all levels, excluding tertiary education  
 Environment  
 Health services  
 Housing  
 Indigenous law and customary law, subject to Chapter 12 of the Constitution  
 Industrial promotion  
 Language policy and the regulation of official languages to the extent that the 
provisions of section 6 of the Constitution expressly confer upon the provincial 
legislatures legislative competence  
 Media services directly controlled or provided by the provincial government, 
subject to section 192  
 Nature conservation, excluding national parks, national botanical gardens and 
marine resources  
 Police to the extent that the provisions of Chapter 11 of the Constitution confer 
upon the provincial legislatures legislative competence  
 Pollution control  
 Population development  
 Property transfer fees  
 Provincial public enterprises in respect of the functional areas in this Schedule and 
Schedule 5  
 Public transport  
 Public works only in respect of the needs of provincial government departments in 
the discharge of their responsibilities to administer functions specifically assigned 
to them in terms of the Constitution or any other law  
 Regional planning and development  
 Road traffic regulation  
 Soil conservation  
 Tourism  
 Trade  
 Traditional leadership, subject to Chapter 12 of the Constitution  
 Urban and rural development  
 Vehicle licensing  















Part B  
The following local government matters to the extent set out in section 155(6)(a) and 
(7):  
 Air pollution  
 Building regulations  
 Child care facilities  
 Electricity and gas reticulation  
 Firefighting services  
 Local tourism  
 Municipal airports  
 Municipal planning  
 Municipal health services  
 Municipal public transport  
 Municipal public works only in respect of the needs of municipalities in the 
discharge of their responsibilities to administer functions specifically assigned to 
them under this Constitution or any other law  
 Pontoons, ferries, jetties, piers and harbours, excluding the regulation of 
international and national shipping and matters related thereto  
 Stormwater management systems in built-up areas  
 Trading regulations  
 Water and sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and 




Schedule 5 - Functional areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence 
Part A  
 Abattoirs  
 Ambulance services  
 Archives other than national archives  
 Libraries other than national libraries  
 Liquor licences  
 Museums other than national museums  
 Provincial planning  
 Provincial cultural matters  
 Provincial recreation and amenities  
 Provincial sport  
 Provincial roads and traffic  
 Veterinary services, excluding regulation of the profession  
 
Part B  
The following local government matters to the extent set out for provinces in section 
155(6)(a) and (7):  
 Beaches and amusement facilities  
 Billboards and the display of advertisements in public places  
 Cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria  











 Control of public nuisances  
 Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public  
 Facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of animals  
 Fencing and fences  
 Licensing of dogs  
 Licensing and control of undertakings that sell food to the public  
 Local amenities  
 Local sport facilities  
 Markets  
 Municipal abattoirs  
 Municipal parks and recreation  
 Municipal roads  
 Noise pollution  
 Pounds  
 Public places  
 Refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal  
 Street trading  
 Street lighting  
















Interview Guide for the National Department of Health (NDoH) 
 
1. Is equity in the allocation of PHC finances across provinces and districts a priority 
for the NdoH? 
2. Do you think equity in the allocation of PHC finances is a priority for the 
provinces? 
3. Are there any existing mechanisms / initiatives / guidelines driven by the NDoH to 
promote equity in PHC allocations across geographic areas? 
 
[If yes, probe for description of the initiative and how well the initiative performed. 
Also, find out what the constraints and facilitators to success have been.] 
 
4. Have there been other initiatives to promote equity in PHC allocations in the past? 
 
[If yes, probe for description of the initiative(s) and how well the initiative(s) 
performed. Also, find out what the constraints and facilitators to success have been.] 
 
5. Are there any other strategies that could be used to promote equitable distribution 
of PHC resources? 
 
6. Previous research has identified the lack of capacity (managerial, technical and 
human resources) to benefit as a key constraint to increasing allocations to poorly 
funded districts. What measures are being taken to solve this problem? 
 
7. In general, many provinces and districts believe that they are underfunded. 
However, it appears that they usually underspend on their budget. Are there any 
strategies you (national / province / district) are considering to ensure that you 
fully utilise all the money you are given, so as to justify increases? 
 
8. Does NDOH have strategies in place to assist provinces that constantly under-
spend? Any mechanism in place to ensure that provincial health departments who 
under-spend still receive fair share from provincial equitable share. 
 
9. What are the major causes of underspending? 
 
10. Is the NDoH involved in negotiations for the provincial health budgets? And how? 
Who and why? 
 
11. The NDoH submits bids for changes (increases) in the health budget to National 
Treasury, however, decisions taken at this level are generally undermined by 
provincial level budgetary negotiations. What is the PDoH or NDoH doing about 
this?  
a. Are there bids for increased funding for specific health programmes? Are 














12. Is the NDoH involved in negotiations for the PHC budget? And how? Who and 
why? 
 
13. Is the NDoH involved in defining the criteria for allocation of PHC finances 
across districts? 
 
14. Are you aware of any guidelines used by provinces for the allocation of PHC 
finances across districts? If there are – what are they? 
 
15. Do you think that the current budgeting and resource allocation system results in 
an equitable distribution of PHC finances? If yes (why?); If no (why not?) 
 
16. Do you think that the NDoH should have more involvement in deciding the 
budgeting and resource allocation system within the provinces? 
 
[If yes, what type of involvement?] 
 
 
Questions around feasibility 
17. Do you think that these strategies for involvement will meet any resistance? 
18. Where would the resistance come from? 
19. Are there any factors that could facilitate the success of this strategy? 
 
20. What definition of equity do you think should guide the allocation of resources to 
PHC across geographic areas? 
 
21. Are there any monitoring and evaluation system in place to ensure that equity in 
PHC allocations is achieved? If there are – what are they, and who is doing the 
monitoring and evaluation? 
 
22. There has been considerable progress in the past 5 years towards a more equitable 
distribution of PHC funds across districts.  
a. Who initiated this? 
b. How was this achieved? 
c. Are districts that are receiving more funds able to fully utilise the funds? 














Interview guide for officials of the National Treasury 
 
1. What is the process for determining provincial budgets? 
 
2. Is the National Treasury involved in any way in budgetary allocations to different 
sectors within the province? – What is the nature of this involvement? 
 
3. Is the National Treasury involved in any way in decision-making for provincial 
health budgets? Who is involved? In what way? 
 
4. Is there any structure in place for interactions with the Department of Health 
around issues of priority setting and financing? 
If Yes: 
5. Who does the National treasury interact with? 
6. What kinds of decisions are taken in these meetings? 
7. What impact do such decisions have on budgeting and resource allocation to 
health and PHC? 
 
8. NDoH submits bids for changes (increases) in the health budget to National 
Treasury, however, decisions taken at this level are generally undermined by 
provincial level budgetary negotiations. What are is being done to resolve this 
issue?  
 
9. Given that PHC is considered a priority, have there been any discussions with the 
Department of Health regarding the protection of PHC budget? 
 
If Yes: 
10. What forms of protection have been suggested? 
11. Were these implemented? Were they successful? [Probe questions on what 
factors influenced the success or failure of the form of protection foe PHC 
budgets] 
12. In not implemented, why not? 
 
[Interviewer can list forms of protection such as conditional grants, norms and 
standards etc to prompt discussion] 
 
13. What form of protection for PHC budgets (to promote equity) will the National 
Treasury be in support of? 
 
14. What type of services should be protected (the funds)? 
 
15. Are conditional grants a “separate” source of revenue to various departments from 
budgeted equitable shares to departments? Is it considered as part of departmental 
revenue in the process of budgeting from equitable shares? 
 
16. To what extent is the health sector seen as a priority? Why? Why not? 
 
17. What is the relative importance of different health programmes? PHC? 
 












19. There are a lot of provinces and districts that under-spend on their health budgets 




20. There has been considerable progress in the past 5 years towards a more equitable 
distribution of PHC funds across districts.  
a. Who initiated this? 
b. How was this achieved? 
c. Are districts that are receiving more funds able to fully utilise the funds? 













Interview guide for officials of the Provincial Department of Health 
 
1. What are the priority areas for health in the province? 
 
2. Are there any financial constraints in achieving the goals set for the priorities? 
 
3. Are you involved in deciding the health budget for the province? 
 
4.  Who else is involved in this process? 
 
5. Who has makes the final decisions on the budget for health? Why? 
 
6. Can you describe the process for deciding the health budget? 
 
7. [Probes] Do you usually get the amount you ask for? Are there any strategies you 
can employ to influence the size of your budget? What are there? Do you get 
reasons for budget cuts? What are they? [all these depend on the response of the 
interviewee] 
 
8. Are there any guidelines that influence the health budget? What are they? 
 
9. Are conditional grants a “separate” source of revenue to various departments from 
budgeted equitable shares to departments? Is it considered as part of departmental 
revenue in the process of budgeting from equitable shares? 
 
10. Once you have received the health budget, how do you decide the budgets for 
different health programmes? 
 
11. Are there any guidelines that influence the budgets for health programmes? And 
PHC? 
 
12. NDoH submits bids for changes (increases) in the health budget to National 
Treasury, however, decisions taken at this level are generally undermined by 
provincial level budgetary negotiations. What are is being done to resolve this 
issue?  
 
13. Are there any mechanisms in place to ensure that these guidelines are adhered to? 
 
14. Are you involved in the distribution of PHC budgets to the districts? Who is 
involved? 
 
15. On what basis/criteria are PHC allocations to districts made? What measure of 
relative need is used for allocating PHC funds? 
 
16. Do you think that the current allocation process achieves an equitable distribution 
of PHC finances across districts? 
 
17. Are there any mechanisms in place to elicit community preferences/priorities with 












18. What definition of equity do you think should guide PHC allocations to districts? 
 
19. Do you think you have the capacity to manage the allocation of the PHC budget 
across all districts? 
 
 
20. There has been considerable progress in the past 5 years towards a more equitable 
distribution of PHC funds across districts.  
a. Who initiated this? 
b. How was this achieved? 
c. Are districts that are receiving more funds able to fully utilise the funds? 
Why? Why not? 
 












Interview guide for officials at the Districts 
 
1. As a district manager what are your roles and responsibilities? 
 
2. Do you have any involvement in deciding the provincial budget for health? 
 
3. Do you have any involvement in deciding the provincial budget for PHC? 
 
4. Are there any guidelines that influence the size of the overall provincial PHC 
budget? What are they? 
 
5. Are there any guidelines / criteria for allocating PHC budgets across districts? 
What are they? 
 
6. Are you expected to prepare a budget for your district? If so, do you get what you 
asked for? 
 
7. Do you think that the PHC allocation to your district is sufficient to provide the 
required services? Why do you think this is so? 
 
8. Do you think that the distribution of PHC budgets based on the current allocation 
is equitable?  
 
9. If no; what criteria should be used in allocating PHC budgets across districts? 
 
10. Are there any mechanisms in place to engage with communities to elicit their 
views on service delivery of PHC? 
 
11. What are these mechanisms? 
 
12. Do they work properly? 
 
13. Does the voice of the community influence service delivery? Amount of PHC 
allocations committed to the district? 
 
14. Do you have the authority to decide on how much of the PHC budget is spent on 
the various cost centres? Or are they decided at the province? 
 
15. If decided at the province; would you prefer if the district had the authority to 
decide the amount of funds allocated to different PHC cost centres? 
 
16. If yes: does the district have the capacity to manage the allocation of PHC budgets 
across cost centres? 
 
17. What definition of equity do you think should guide the allocation of PHC 
budgets across districts? 
18. There has been considerable progress in the past 5 years towards a more equitable 
distribution of PHC funds across districts.  
a. Who initiated this? 











c. Are districts that are receiving more funds able to fully utilise the funds? 
Why? Why not? 
 
















Interview guide for officials at Provincial Treasury 
 
1. Are you involved in budgetary allocations to different sectors within the province? 
 
2. What are your roles and responsibilities regarding allocating budgets for different 
sectors within the province? 
 
3. Please describe the process for allocating budgets to different sectors within the 
province. 
 
4. What is the extent of interaction with sectoral departments? 
 
5. Are there any guidelines from National Treasury on how these allocations should 
be made? 
 
6. Are there any guidelines developed by the Provincial Treasury on how these 
allocations should be made? 




7. Is „Equity‟ a consideration in deciding budgets for sectors? How?   
 
8. Who is involved in these budgetary negotiations?  
 
9. Who would you say has the final say on allocations to different sectors? Why is 
this so? 
 
Involvement in deciding the health budget  
10. Do you have any specific involvement in deciding the health budget? 
 
11. What is the nature of your involvement? 
 
12. What kind of input does the Provincial Department of Health (PDoH) make in 
deciding the health budget? 
 
13. Assuming that the PDoH wants to secure a significantly larger budget, what are 
the procedures for this? What are the strategies available to them? 
 
14. What strategies have the PDoH used in past to secure larger budgets? Success? 
Failure? 
 
15. NDoH submits bids for changes (increases) in the health budget to National 
Treasury, however, decisions taken at this level are generally undermined by 

















17. If „no‟ what reasons have been given for under-spending? 
 
18. What strategies have been initiated to address the problem of under-spending? 
 
19. To what extent is the health sector seen as a priority in this province? Why? Why 
not? 
 
20. What is the relative importance of different health programmes? PHC? 
 
21. Are you aware of any DoH policy on PHC? 
 
Involvement in PHC Allocations 
22. Are you involved in budgetary allocations to PHC/District Health Services? 
 
23. What is the nature of your involvement?  
 
If the Provincial Treasury is involved in PHC allocations, probe to find out whether 
they monitor PHC allocations across districts, if they are aware of inequities in 
allocations across districts, if they know whether some districts under-spend, and what 
they do about these.  
 
24. There has been considerable progress in the past 5 years towards a more equitable 
distribution of PHC funds across districts.  
a. Who initiated this? 
b. How was this achieved? 
c. Are districts that are receiving more funds able to fully utilise the funds? 













Results of Principal Components Analysis 
 
2001 Census Data 
 
. pca pchild pblack punemp pshacktrad pnocloseaccess p_pitbucknone 
p_femhhhead pnoenergy phead_noeduc, mineigen(1.0) 
(obs=21094) 
 
            (principal components; 1 component retained) 
Component    Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     1        5.51153         4.66067      0.6124         0.6124 
     2        0.85086         0.25020      0.0945         0.7069 
     3        0.60066         0.09983      0.0667         0.7737 
     4        0.50083         0.06315      0.0556         0.8293 
     5        0.43769         0.07867      0.0486         0.8780 
     6        0.35902         0.04171      0.0399         0.9178 
     7        0.31731         0.03138      0.0353         0.9531 
     8        0.28593         0.14974      0.0318         0.9849 
     9        0.13619               .      0.0151         1.0000 
 
               Eigenvectors 
    Variable |      1 
-------------+---------- 
      pchild |   0.29733 
      pblack |   0.35229 
      punemp |   0.27378 
  pshacktrad |   0.33399 
pnocloseac~s |   0.38066 
p_pitbuckn~e |   0.38082 
 p_femhhhead |   0.32512 
   pnoenergy |   0.32850 




. score dep_index 
            (based on unrotated principal components) 
               Scoring Coefficients 
    Variable |      1 
-------------+---------- 
      pchild |   0.29733 
      pblack |   0.35229 
      punemp |   0.27378 
  pshacktrad |   0.33399 
pnocloseac~s |   0.38066 
p_pitbuckn~e |   0.38082 
 p_femhhhead |   0.32512 
   pnoenergy |   0.32850 






















2005 General Household Survey Data 
 
pca P_child P_African P_head_noeduc P_femhead P_shacktrad P_npwaternear 
P_pitbucketnone P_noclenergy P_unemp, minei 
> gen(1) 
 
Principal components/correlation                  Number of obs    =        53 
                                                  Number of comp.  =         1 
                                                  Trace            =         9 
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)             Rho              =    0.6629 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Component |   Eigenvalue   Difference         Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
           Comp1 |      5.96573      5.05906             0.6629       0.6629 
           Comp2 |      .906665      .225973             0.1007       0.7636 
           Comp3 |      .680692      .215621             0.0756       0.8392 
           Comp4 |      .465071     .0785885             0.0517       0.8909 
           Comp5 |      .386483      .149444             0.0429       0.9338 
           Comp6 |      .237039     .0549005             0.0263       0.9602 
           Comp7 |      .182138     .0701368             0.0202       0.9804 
           Comp8 |      .112002      .047819             0.0124       0.9929 
           Comp9 |     .0641826            .             0.0071       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Principal components (eigenvectors)  
 
    -------------------------------------- 
        Variable |    Comp1 | Unexplained  
    -------------+----------+------------- 
         P_child |   0.3011 |       .4591  
       P_African |   0.3148 |       .4087  
    P_head_noe~c |   0.3315 |       .3445  
       P_femhead |   0.3780 |       .1478  
     P_shacktrad |   0.2490 |       .6301  
    P_npwatern~r |   0.3753 |       .1599  
    P_pitbucke~e |   0.2758 |       .5461  
    P_noclenergy |   0.3791 |       .1427  
         P_unemp |   0.3673 |       .1954  
    -------------------------------------- 
 
 
Scoring coefficients  
    sum of squares(column-loading) = 1 
 
    ------------------------ 
        Variable |    Comp1  
    -------------+---------- 
         P_child |   0.3011  
       P_African |   0.3148  
    P_head_noe~c |   0.3315  
       P_femhead |   0.3780  
     P_shacktrad |   0.2490  
    P_npwatern~r |   0.3753  
    P_pitbucke~e |   0.2758  
    P_noclenergy |   0.3791  
         P_unemp |   0.3673  














2006 General Household Survey Data 
 
pca P_child P_African P_head_noeduc P_femhead P_shacktrad P_npwaternear 
P_pitbucketnone P_noclenergy P_unemp, minei 
> gen(1) 
 
Principal components/correlation                  Number of obs    =        53 
                                                  Number of comp.  =         3 
                                                  Trace            =         9 
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)             Rho              =    0.8320 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Component |   Eigenvalue   Difference         Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
           Comp1 |      5.14886      3.91154             0.5721       0.5721 
           Comp2 |      1.23732      .135259             0.1375       0.7096 
           Comp3 |      1.10206      .541588             0.1225       0.8320 
           Comp4 |      .560473      .121296             0.0623       0.8943 
           Comp5 |      .439177      .198872             0.0488       0.9431 
           Comp6 |      .240305     .0936924             0.0267       0.9698 
           Comp7 |      .146612      .076485             0.0163       0.9861 
           Comp8 |     .0701272      .015061             0.0078       0.9939 
           Comp9 |     .0550663            .             0.0061       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Principal components (eigenvectors)  
 
    ---------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |    Comp1     Comp2     Comp3 | Unexplained  
    -------------+------------------------------+------------- 
         P_child |   0.2618    0.4194   -0.2638 |       .3528  
       P_African |   0.3436   -0.0053    0.2827 |        .304  
    P_head_noe~c |   0.3543    0.3246    0.0254 |       .2225  
       P_femhead |   0.3969    0.1433   -0.0877 |       .1551  
     P_shacktrad |   0.2691   -0.6578    0.0612 |      .08763  
    P_npwatern~r |   0.4123   -0.0182   -0.1174 |       .1091  
    P_pitbucke~e |   0.4164    0.1225   -0.0493 |      .08618  
    P_noclenergy |   0.3370   -0.4539    0.0644 |       .1557  
         P_unemp |   0.0315    0.2100    0.9045 |       .0388  





Scoring coefficients  
    sum of squares(column-loading) = 1 
 
    -------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |    Comp1     Comp2     Comp3  
    -------------+------------------------------ 
         P_child |   0.2618    0.4194   -0.2638  
       P_African |   0.3436   -0.0053    0.2827  
    P_head_noe~c |   0.3543    0.3246    0.0254  
       P_femhead |   0.3969    0.1433   -0.0877  
     P_shacktrad |   0.2691   -0.6578    0.0612  
    P_npwatern~r |   0.4123   -0.0182   -0.1174  
    P_pitbucke~e |   0.4164    0.1225   -0.0493  
    P_noclenergy |   0.3370   -0.4539    0.0644  
         P_unemp |   0.0315    0.2100    0.9045  














2007 Community Survey Data 
 
. pca P_child P_African P_head_noeduc P_femhead P_shacktrad P_npwaternear 
P_pitbucketnone P_noclenergy P_unemp, minei 
> gen(1) 
 
Principal components/correlation                  Number of obs    =        52 
                                                  Number of comp.  =         2 
                                                  Trace            =         9 
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)             Rho              =    0.7806 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Component |   Eigenvalue   Difference         Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
           Comp1 |      5.82716       4.6288             0.6475       0.6475 
           Comp2 |      1.19836      .332967             0.1332       0.7806 
           Comp3 |      .865392      .518611             0.0962       0.8768 
           Comp4 |      .346781     .0489914             0.0385       0.9153 
           Comp5 |       .29779     .0322472             0.0331       0.9484 
           Comp6 |      .265542       .17276             0.0295       0.9779 
           Comp7 |     .0927821     .0336601             0.0103       0.9882 
           Comp8 |      .059122     .0120548             0.0066       0.9948 
           Comp9 |     .0470671            .             0.0052       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Principal components (eigenvectors)  
 
    ------------------------------------------------ 
        Variable |    Comp1     Comp2 | Unexplained  
    -------------+--------------------+------------- 
         P_child |   0.3538   -0.0496 |       .2677  
       P_African |   0.3253    0.4155 |       .1765  
    P_head_noe~c |   0.3256   -0.0446 |       .3798  
       P_femhead |   0.3767   -0.0331 |       .1719  
     P_shacktrad |   0.3105   -0.1017 |       .4258  
    P_npwatern~r |   0.3931   -0.1199 |      .08215  
    P_pitbucke~e |   0.3837    0.0028 |       .1421  
    P_noclenergy |   0.3445   -0.2027 |       .2593  
         P_unemp |   0.0653    0.8695 |      .06917  
    ------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Scoring coefficients  
    sum of squares(column-loading) = 1 
 
    ---------------------------------- 
        Variable |    Comp1     Comp2  
    -------------+-------------------- 
         P_child |   0.3538   -0.0496  
       P_African |   0.3253    0.4155  
    P_head_noe~c |   0.3256   -0.0446  
       P_femhead |   0.3767   -0.0331  
     P_shacktrad |   0.3105   -0.1017  
    P_npwatern~r |   0.3931   -0.1199  
    P_pitbucke~e |   0.3837    0.0028  
    P_noclenergy |   0.3445   -0.2027  
         P_unemp |   0.0653    0.8695  















Deprivation Indices 2001 – 2007 
 
No Province District Index 2001 Index 2005 Index 2006 Index 2007 
1 Eastern Cape Alfred Nzo DM 1.631172 4.434091 4.585833 4.146428 
2 Eastern Cape Amathole DM 0.238216 1.732225 1.349305 1.408376 
3 Eastern Cape Cacadu DM -1.70192 -1.02251 -1.30724 -1.97121 
4 Eastern Cape Chris Hani DM 0.600198 3.097776 2.116326 2.459282 
5 
Eastern Cape Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality -2.00425 -1.76347 -1.88953 -2.41658 
6 Eastern Cape O R Tambo DM 1.824015 4.603675 3.493356 4.348433 
7 Eastern Cape Ukhahlamba DM 0.634059 2.26335 2.178093 2.34347 
8 Free State Lejweleputswa DM -0.98669 -1.10068 -1.52013 -1.456 
9 Free State Motheo DM -1.26778 -1.60968 -1.41487 -1.34223 
10 Free State Fezile Dabi -1.44245 -1.86652 -2.47634 -2.31864 
11 Free State Thabo Mofutsanyana -0.18726 1.655178 0.885798 0.465155 
12 Free State Xhariep DM -1.54088 -0.05748 -0.89036 -0.69371 
13 Gauteng City of Johannesburg -2.01524 -2.86533 -2.32033 -2.08018 
14 Gauteng 
City of Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality -1.85134 -2.55138 -1.97644 -1.6125 
15 Gauteng 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality -1.83629 -2.73034 -1.81427 -1.67624 
16 Gauteng Metsweding DM -1.63837 -1.15797 -1.12809 -0.96644 
17 Gauteng Sedibeng DM -1.9518 -1.84511 -1.68258 -2.11577 
18 Gauteng West Rand DM -1.79614 -2.87515 -1.47101 -1.90926 
19 KwaZulu Natal Amajuba DM -0.41922 0.317492 0.545533 0.507345 
20 KwaZulu Natal Ilembe DM 0.626324 0.88666 1.281763 2.148309 
21 KwaZulu Natal Sisonke DM 0.853005 1.922967 3.060228 3.558438 
22 KwaZulu Natal Ugu DM 0.693579 1.724339 1.841952 2.664567 
23 KwaZulu Natal Zululand DM 1.211906 3.379342 2.954347 3.519829 
24 
KwaZulu Natal eThekwini Municipality 
(Durban) -1.53655 -2.3486 -2.09331 -1.83502 
25 KwaZulu Natal uMgungundlovu DM -0.63265 -1.25303 -0.8803 -0.53135 
26 KwaZulu Natal uMkhanyakude DM 1.589184 4.253882 4.055359 4.279194 
27 KwaZulu Natal uMzinyathi DM 1.587639 3.730372 4.130188 4.576696 
28 KwaZulu Natal uThukela DM 0.682727 2.048629 2.682975 2.773934 
29 KwaZulu Natal uThungulu DM 0.666524 1.264339 1.810806 1.914776 
30 Limpopo Bohlabela DM 0.606219 3.509576 2.552818   
31 Limpopo Capricorn DM 0.306604 1.999115 1.50634 1.604587 
32 Limpopo Greater Sekhukhune DM 1.027324 3.161837 2.999338 3.289079 
33 Limpopo Mopani DM 0.466654 2.334091 1.733315 1.419189 
34 Limpopo Vhembe DM 0.690505 2.077491 1.932262 1.846795 
35 Limpopo Waterberg DM -0.37427 -0.65519 -0.87736 0.179908 
36 Mpumalanga Ehlanzeni DM -0.14583 0.056734 0.683869 0.921932 
37 Mpumalanga Gert Sibande DM -0.2384 0.156581 0.293898 -0.09258 
38 Mpumalanga Nkangala DM -0.68332 0.312834 0.303334 -0.10222 
39 North Cape Frances Baard DM -1.86938 -0.90654 -0.85839 -2.04021 
40 North Cape Pixley ka Seme -1.90131 -1.3423 -1.80802 -1.83961 
41 North Cape Kgalagadi DM 0.354167 1.408351 1.070969 0.608938 
42 North Cape Namakwa DM -2.74831 -3.30689 -2.76663 -3.76729 
43 North Cape Siyanda DM -2.27395 -2.2246 -2.51993 -2.46913 
44 North West Bojanala Platinum DM -0.60245 -0.5165 -0.17637 -0.20511 
45 North West Bophirima DM 0.183052 2.127184 1.585682 1.757761 











47 North West Southern DM -1.50513 -1.12396 -1.92738 -1.56868 
48 Western Cape Cape Winelands DM -3.01237 -3.78062 -3.42222 -3.26863 
49 Western Cape Central Karoo DM -2.77544 -2.97601 -2.63885 -2.74977 
50 Western Cape City of Cape Town -2.71355 -2.96147 -3.17741 -2.98912 
51 Western Cape Eden DM -2.79 -2.57377 -2.1731 -2.83252 
52 Western Cape Overberg DM -3.06368 -4.01569 -3.73006 -3.53437 













PHC expenditure per capita 2001/02 – 2007/08 
 
No Province District 2001/02 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
1 Eastern Cape Alfred Nzo DM 106.06 199.63 216.76 197.66 
2 Eastern Cape Amathole DM 193.74 282.39 284.23 304.93 
3 Eastern Cape Cacadu DM 97.58 217.9 239.91 338.6 
4 Eastern Cape Chris Hani DM 154.15 264.21 274.32 302.9 
5 
Eastern Cape Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality 182.43 247.87 259.26 263.64 
6 Eastern Cape O R Tambo DM 128.69 212.23 213.95 222.52 
7 Eastern Cape Ukhahlamba DM 67.88 209.98 224.39 238.58 
8 Free State Lejweleputswa DM 135.76 210.08 204.27 190.97 
9 Free State Motheo DM 181.02 286.08 318.23 273.99 
10 Free State Fezile Dabi 125.86 256.26 238.27 229.61 
11 Free State Thabo Mofutsanyana 100.41 231.51 228.67 210.59 
12 Free State Xhariep DM 205.06 372.99 387.15 387.17 
13 Gauteng City of Johannesburg 483.65 323.84 336.07 371.42 
14 Gauteng 
City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality 239 275.53 333.53 335.26 
15 Gauteng 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality 550.12 274.17 306.65 273.22 
16 Gauteng Metsweding DM 213.54 222.71 161.17 286.63 
17 Gauteng Sedibeng DM 268.7 212.14 210.36 233.46 
18 Gauteng West Rand DM 230.51 272.29 237.49 236.17 
19 KwaZulu Natal Amajuba DM 209.3 170.54 190.19 219.94 
20 KwaZulu Natal Ilembe DM 175.36 219.23 233.02 310.2 
21 KwaZulu Natal Sisonke DM 239 269.22 293.39 415.79 
22 KwaZulu Natal Ugu DM 233.34 229.6 232.59 272.06 
23 KwaZulu Natal Zululand DM 213.54 226.56 231.87 280.23 
24 
KwaZulu Natal eThekwini Municipality 
(Durban) 253.14 317.83 327.07 365.37 
25 KwaZulu Natal uMgungundlovu DM 282.84 243.75 253.41 275.83 
26 KwaZulu Natal uMkhanyakude DM 234.76 307.65 330.28 339.7 
27 KwaZulu Natal uMzinyathi DM 189.5 222.8 243.98 263.32 
28 KwaZulu Natal uThukela DM 212.13 192.97 208.98 276.54 
29 KwaZulu Natal uThungulu DM 212.13 255.81 245.77 277.56 
30 Limpopo Bohlabela DM         
31 Limpopo Capricorn DM 108.89 185.3 206.97 256.26 
32 Limpopo Greater Sekhukhune DM 123.03 136.83 174.58 221.34 
33 Limpopo Mopani DM 197.99 245.25 252.58 289.93 
34 Limpopo Vhembe DM 175.36 244.69 217.44 301.11 
35 Limpopo Waterberg DM 176.77 210.13 220.17 302.75 
36 Mpumalanga Ehlanzeni DM 189.5 184.42 200.77 255.83 
37 Mpumalanga Gert Sibande DM 59.4 154.51 198.4 211.29 
38 Mpumalanga Nkangala DM 62.22 180.11 209.27 226.26 
39 North Cape Frances Baard DM 190.92 227.1 280.59 314.26 
40 North Cape Pixley ka Seme 230.51 266.03 315.28 375.79 
41 North Cape Kgalagadi DM 197.99 285.24 297.33 353.25 











43 North Cape Siyanda DM 141.42 134.43 160.68 206.05 
44 North West Bojanala Platinum DM 202.23 249.48 300.24 290.26 
45 North West Bophirima DM 534.57 426.77 343.68 367.33 
46 North West Central DM 224.86 315.72 352.61 397.63 
47 North West Southern DM 305.47 328.44 334.25 342.45 
48 Western Cape Cape Winelands DM 284.25 306.13 312.82 353.14 
49 Western Cape Central Karoo DM 459.61 330.71 344.5 526.18 
50 Western Cape City of Cape Town 504.87 398.76 412.46 444.69 
51 Western Cape Eden DM 374.76 366.31 372.7 435.33 
52 Western Cape Overberg DM 339.41 239.21 264.53 319.55 












Results of Regression Analysis 
 
2001/02 Per capita PHC and 2001 Deprivation Index  
regress  phc_0102 dep_index2001 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      52 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    50) =   15.51 
       Model |  166703.958     1  166703.958           Prob > F      =  0.0003 
    Residual |  537271.542    50  10745.4308           R-squared     =  0.2368 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2215 
       Total |    703975.5    51  13803.4412           Root MSE      =  103.66 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    phc_0102 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dep_ind~2001 |   -40.0644    10.1718    -3.94   0.000    -60.49505   -19.63375 






2005/06 Per capita PHC and 2001 Deprivation Index  
 
. regress phc_0506 dep_index2001 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      52 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    50) =   11.48 
       Model |  49790.1436     1  49790.1436           Prob > F      =  0.0014 
    Residual |  216811.684    50  4336.23368           R-squared     =  0.1868 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1705 
       Total |  266601.827    51  5227.48681           Root MSE      =   65.85 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    phc_0506 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dep_ind~2001 |  -21.89563   6.461629    -3.39   0.001    -34.87419   -8.917063 






2006/07 Per capita PHC and 2001 Deprivation Index  
 
. regress phc_0607 dep_index2001 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      52 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    50) =   14.56 
       Model |  68996.4541     1  68996.4541           Prob > F      =  0.0004 
    Residual |  236947.635    50   4738.9527           R-squared     =  0.2255 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2100 
       Total |  305944.089    51  5998.90371           Root MSE      =   68.84 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    phc_0607 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dep_ind~2001 |  -25.77502   6.755024    -3.82   0.000    -39.34289   -12.20716 






















2007/08 Per capita PHC and 2001 Deprivation Index  
 
. regress phc_0708 dep_index2001 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      52 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,    50) =   12.85 
       Model |  78988.3481     1  78988.3481           Prob > F      =  0.0008 
    Residual |  307348.065    50   6146.9613           R-squared     =  0.2045 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1885 
       Total |  386336.413    51  7575.22378           Root MSE      =  78.403 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    phc_0708 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dep_ind~2001 |  -27.57828   7.693358    -3.58   0.001    -43.03085   -12.12572 
       _cons |    289.675   12.17262    23.80   0.000     265.2256    314.1245 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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